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This thesis contributes to an understanding of the changes in prominence in 
EU energy policy since the 1990s. It does so by analysing struggles over energy poli-
cy developments, as well as focusing on a new way of looking at EU politics, in par-
ticular, at the role of the EU Commission in the development of energy policy.  
Realist and liberal oriented perspectives, and constructivist and discourse ap-
proaches, offer competing theoretical frameworks through which to view EU politics, 
and furnish us with many useful insights. However, they also suffer from some prob-
lematic features, such as state-centrism, automatism, determinism, and cultural rela-
tivism.  
Drawing on the neo-Gramscian approach, informed by a historical institution-
alist perspective, and certain elements of the post-structuralist account, I provide a 
more convincing and thorough explanation of several considerable shifts in EU ener-
gy policy, beginning with competitiveness in the 1990s, then turning towards energy 
security as well as climate change in the 2000s, and again competitiveness at the end 
of the 2000s. In addition, I illuminate the proactive role of the Commission in contin-
uous hegemonic struggles over EU energy policy development. First, using historical 
institutionalism, I argue that the EU Commission acts as a political entrepreneur, 
promoting a long-term pro-growth orientation that stems from its organizational 
DNA, i.e. its historical make-up. Moreover, other state and non-state players often 
contest the Commission’s forward-looking position. The neo-Gramscian account of 
hegemony provides a comprehensive and detailed framework that reveals how the 
Commission, and other players, were actively involved in hegemonic struggles sur-
rounding the EU energy policy domain. Furthermore, due to the lack of analytical 
mechanisms in the neo-Gramscian tradition to explore dynamic struggles and changes 
at the discursive level, I use the post-structuralist political logics of equivalence and 
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Historically, national governments have been the main actors in the energy 
policy sphere, not least because energy has always been considered a domestic policy 
sector closely linked to the strategic domains of the sovereign state: security, and 
economic and social stability. Moreover, one could argue that individual EU member 
states have been dominant in energy policy as national governments have been reluc-
tant to pool sovereignty to create a common European energy policy. This could be 
explained by the fact that energy is a wide policy area which could have different ef-
fects on individual states in terms of their national energy resources, im-
port/investment needs, and consumption patterns (Eberlein, 2012). Due to different 
resource situations, political and policy preferences, as well as cultural traditions, 
governments are not willing to make the necessary compromises to conflicting energy 
policy objectives. 
The creation of a European wide energy policy is a difficult, slow and ambig-
uous process which is often interrupted by the particular interests of state and non-
state players. In other words, the process is often undermined by collective action 
problems. As Eberlein (2012:152) pointed out “…a constellation of heterogeneous 
situations and preferences suggests a decentralized approach to energy policy in Eu-
rope…The problem for collective action on EU policy is that both costs and benefits 
are unevenly distributed among member states”. In other words, if the development 
of European energy policy was left only to the preferences and mechanisms of indi-
vidual member states, one would not expect to see any progress or coherence among 
various objectives, including energy security, competitiveness, and climate change, as 
countries would do everything they could to protect their national energy interests. 
Despite these expectations, in the case of policy formulation and discourse, we ob-
serve a somewhat different process that, although sometimes interrupted by particular 
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interests, involves some degree of coherence in terms of attempting to promote long-
term European-wide energy policy discourse (Eberlein, 2012). However, in terms of 
establishing a consensus over the EU dimension of energy policy, the results have 
been rather limited. According to Eberlein (2012:24) “…Europeanisation in terms of 
policy outcomes and performance has been much less of a success story”. Moreover, 
during the process of creating a European energy strategy, energy policy has under-
gone several considerable shifts in the prominence of certain objectives, beginning 
with competitiveness in the 1990s, then shifting towards energy security as well as 
climate change in the 2000s, and again competitiveness at the end of the 2000s. The 
uncertain and ambiguous process of EU energy policy development deserves closer 
examination in order to see which forces are driving and resisting this development. 
The puzzle that my research aims to solve is thus the following: how, despite various 
constraints and heterogeneity, have certain steps, albeit rather modest, towards the 
development of EU energy policy taken place? My project’s research questions speak 
to the debate surrounding the major developments in EU energy policy:   
Why has EU energy policy been subject to changes in prominence through 
time? What explains the continuous struggles over energy policy development during 
different periods of time? What role did the EU Commission play in the development 
of European energy policy?  
In answering these research questions I focus on a new way of looking at EU 
politics and, in particular, at the role of the EU Commission as a political entrepre-
neur which promotes a long-term pro-growth orientation. By using an historical insti-
tutionalist account, I explain that the Commission’s forward-looking policy orienta-
tion comes from its organizational DNA; i.e. its historical generic make-up estab-
lished under its predecessor, the High Authority (HA) of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). The Commission’s path-dependent long-term policy orientation 
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is often confronted by the particular, often short term, interests of state and non-state 
players. This drives continuous struggles and ambiguity at the EU level and, to some 
extent, shapes the development of EU energy policy. For this reason, I provide addi-
tional analytical resources to account for these changes and to reveal the dynamics of 
contestation surrounding the energy domain. 
I look at the operation of EU politics using the neo-Gramscian theory of 
hegemonisation which helps us to assess hegemonic actions across three dimensions: 
material, institutional (organisational), and discursive. The historical institutionalist 
and the neo-Gramscian traditions assume that certain exogenous crises (critical junc-
tures) create an opportunity for players with different interests and ideologies to chal-
lenge the existing order by providing a realignment of the material, institutional and 
discursive domains. One of the main features of the EU energy domain is the fact 
that, as a response to energy, economic and environmental shocks, the Commission 
often attempts to promote long-term EU energy policy discourse and to portray its 
own interests as common European interests. In addition, the Commission and other 
players often use discursive actions to deal with collective action problems. However, 
other players with alternative ideologies often challenge the Commission’s discourse. 
In order to reveal the Commission’s attempt to use strategic discursive moves, as well 
as to operationalize neo-Gramscian analytical concepts such as transformismo, this 
theoretical approach must to be supplemented by certain framing devices, including 
elements of post-structuralist political logics which allow me to track the architecture 
of policy arguments; i.e. how certain energy policy issues are framed, coupled and 
decoupled. These post-structuralist logics will be used as descriptive framing ele-
ments to help to reveal dynamic struggles and changes at the discursive level. Histor-
ical institutionalism, informed by a neo-Gramscian perspective and some elements of 
post-structuralist understanding, therefore contribute to an innovative approach to 
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how the Commission operates in the EU political environment. It also allows to me 
interpret contestations and shifts in European energy policy in a more comprehensive 
way than other theoretical perspectives allow.  
In the subsequent theory chapter (Chapter 1) I present my theoretical approach 
in more detail, comparing it to more mainstream liberal intergovernmentalist, supra-
nationalist and constructivist perspectives, and I explain why this can more convinc-
ingly account for contestations during different phases in EU energy policy. In the 
remaining sections of this introduction I discuss the complexities of defining energy 
policy. I then elaborate on some elements of my theoretical approach and introduce 
the key changes in EU energy policy since the 1990s. Finally, I describe my data col-
lection process and present an overview of the thesis. 
1. Defining energy policy  
Before assessing changes in the EU energy domain, one needs to understand 
the concept of energy policy. Defining policy in any area is difficult because any pol-
icy context is generally complex and it is often difficult to define the boundaries of a 
policy area. At the level of policy, everything often seems to influence everything 
else (Falkner, 2008). Energy is no exception as, being a cross-cutting issue, it inter-
connects various policy domains, including economy, security, environment and/or 
transport. For example, Eberlein (2012:150) stated “The convenient label ‘energy 
policy’ masks a heterogeneous mix of fuel sources, production, distribution and con-
sumption processes, and value chains…Energy policy covers very complex value 
chains, from upstream energy R/D and resource exploitation to downstream energy 
use. Finally energy policy is very ‘horizontal’ in the sense of reaching into different 
issue areas…”. Moreover, states are extremely heterogeneous when it comes to the 
energy domain. Due to natural monopoly features of physical energy networks in 
some countries, national energy policies are strongly affected by the particular inter-
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ests of “national champions”; i.e. electricity and gas industries. Furthermore, some 
European countries, such as Bulgaria and Hungary, are completely dependent on 
Russian gas. Some, such as Spain, rely on Algeria and Northern Africa while others, 
such as the UK, rely on Norway and their own resources. According to Keppler 
(2009:205) “…European efforts to forge a proper energy policy are hampered by the 
lack of an internal consensus about the nature of the trade-offs between competing 
policy objectives”. As a result, these complexities and heterogeneities often cause 
collective action problems in the European energy domain.  
Different states, energy organisations and institutions put different emphases 
on what the main elements of energy policy are. For example, the International Ener-
gy Agency (IEA) highlights the security element of energy policy: “the uninterrupted 
availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA, 2010). US energy strategy 
focuses on energy independence, job creation, and climate change (Yacobucci, 2014). 
Energy policy is therefore a contested concept which interconnects different areas. 
Although the EU does not provide an explicit common definition, it could be argued 
that factors such as energy security, economic competitiveness, and environmental 
objectives define EU energy policy. As is argued in the 1995 White Paper on Energy 
Policy “…energy policy…that reconcile competitiveness, security of supplies and 
protection of the environment while bearing in mind that the Unions central concerns 
are…job creation and the quest for greater efficiency in the general business envi-
ronment…” (EC, 1995a:3). Economic competitiveness is linked with energy prices, 
innovation and efficiency. Security means granting consumers, the citizens, con-
sistent access to energy. Environmental objectives are based on a respect for the envi-
ronment. Moreover, one could depict EU energy policy as a triangle (Figure 1). Eber-
lein (2012:151) explained “From a policy-making perspective, energy policy involves 
three major policy goals often depicted as the ‘energy policy triangle’…It entails se-
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curity of supply (availability of and access to energy sources and fuels) at reasonable 
price as well as infrastructure security…the second goal is economic efficiency and 
competition…The third and most recent goal is environment sustainability…”.  








However, in my research I argue that a better representation of changes in the 
energy policy domain could be achieved if we analyse energy objectives not as sepa-
rate, but interacting with one another (Figure 2). It should be pointed out that the 
prominence of these objectives has changed over time. Moreover, energy objectives 
are interconnected and can contradict each other, thus opening a space for contention 
between the different stakeholders involved.  








In my research I argue that, at various times, the prominence of EU energy 
policy has shifted from one dimension to another, thus affecting the intersection of 











     objectives 
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braces diverse objectives and instruments and the mix changes over time. In the se-
cond half of the twentieth century, industrialised countries shifted from the public 
provision of adequate supply to a greater emphasis on competition, market forces and 
private initiatives…The change in emphasis not only reflected developments in ener-
gy markets, but also wider political and economic changes”. At different times one 
element of energy policy may gain, as well as lose, prominence. Historical institu-
tionalism, together with the neo-Gramscian and post-structuralist theoretical ap-
proaches, is better able explain the role of the EU Commission in promoting forward-
looking EU energy policy through different shifts. The development of EU-wide en-
ergy policy touches on the core of a nation’s sovereignty by dictating that it commits 
to European energy policy rules and regulations as parts of national policy-making in 
this area are moving over to the EU. This may trigger contestations between the 
Commission and other state and non-state players. 
There have been distinctive changes in the prominence of EU energy policy 
since the 1990s. First, at the end of the 1980s, as an integral part of the single market 
agenda, the Commission began to focus on the issue of market liberalisation. Moreo-
ver, due to changing economic, energy supply and environmental circumstances at 
the end of the 1990s, energy policy began to shift away from the markets and liberali-
zation agenda towards energy security and climate change constrains. The Commis-
sion’s Green Paper “Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Sup-
ply”, released in 2000, gave a warning regarding Europe’s dependence on imported 
energy. The document, which focuses on the use of domestic energy sources, was 
released following a tripling of the oil price that led to protests in Europe. In the mid 
of 2000s the issue of climate change became the central point around which other 
dimensions of energy policy were formulated. The Commission attempted to link the 
advantages of renewable energy, energy efficiency and the reduction of CO2 emis-
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sions within a new economic order based on low carbon energy use. At the end of the 
2000s, the economic/financial crisis slowed progress towards energy and climate in-
tegration and raised concerns regarding competitiveness and economic growth. I will 
elaborate further on these shifts in sections 3 and 4. Having defined the concept of 
energy policy and identified the major changes in EU energy policy, the next section 
will briefly outline the main features of my theoretical approach. 
2. Theoretical perspective: embedded contestation between heterogeneous inter-
ests and ideologies 
My research proposes a distinctive way of looking at EU politics, and particu-
larly at the role of the EU Commission. Moreover, I am looking at the operation of 
EU politics through the theoretical lens of a neo-Gramscian approach informed by the 
historical institutionalist perspective and some elements of the post-structuralist ac-
count. Before moving to the neo-Gramscian perspective and its contribution to ex-
plaining processes of struggle and hegemonisation in EU energy policy, one needs to 
understand the mechanisms of the EU institutional setting. In this respect, historical 
institutionalism, with its more organisational focus, helps us to investigate the context 
in which EU institutional design was formulated, while revealing the interests of the 
key forces involved in the mechanisms employed by this design. In addition, at the 
organizational level, historical institutionalism has much in common with Stinch-
combe’s (2000) notions of imprinting and historical causation, according to which 
organisations are shaped by both their external environment and by powerful found-
ers who create certain birth marks that continue to affect an organization’s behaviour 
in the long run (Wille, 2013). In other words, I shed the light on how hegemonic 
struggles are mediated by institutional and governance setting in which they take 
place. The central claim of historical institutionalism is that choices taken when an 
institution is being formed have constraining effects on future policy actions. Accord-
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ing to Greener (2005:62) “’History matters’ because formations put in place in early 
stages of an institutional…life effectively come to constrain activity after that point”. 
In order to understand the complexities of EU institutional governance and the role of 
EU Commission, one must trace the origins of this supranational body and examine 
the creation of the main EU institutions.   
One of the central arguments of my research is that the EU Commission is in-
terested in both long-term perspectives and economic growth which, together, could 
be defined as “economic development”. Economic growth is just one aspect of the 
process of economic development. In other words, I argue that the Commission is 
interested in broader, more inclusive growth that advances future economic well-
being and benefits for wider sections of society rather than just increases in economic 
output. In addition, the Commission tries to construct consensus and address collec-
tive action problem. Today’s EU Commission originated from the High Authority 
(HA) of the European Steel and Coal Community, an institution which since its crea-
tion in the 1950s has promoted broader, longer-term thinking. The main principles of 
the HA’s modus operandi was influenced by the culture of French public administra-
tion, based on the principles of dirigisme, or state planning, and intervention in the 
economy that always involves taking a broader view (Gillingham, 2003); (Wille, 
2013). Jean Monnet, a French political economist and diplomat, and his small band of 
friends and advisors could be regarded as the Commission’s founding fathers (Bur-
gess, 2000) (Hooghe, 2001). Moreover, one could argue that the initial objective of 
the European project was to bring peace to Europe (Tovias, 2000). Peace and eco-
nomic development were considered as interdependent elements. The Commission’s 
interest in long-term development/growth comes from the fact that continuous mutu-
ally beneficial economic development in the region contributes to the preservation of 
peace. The EU Commission was thus established to facilitate long-term economic 
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development in Europe. In addition, the Commission is interested in economic 
growth as it is much easier to promote long-term policies, and to persuade other 
stakeholders, when growth is more inclusive and wide-spread and when short-term 
constrains do not undermine a long-term perspective. Furthermore, the EU Commis-
sion’s role in fostering dialogue and cooperation between different stakeholders orig-
inates from the HA’s historical mandate to chair the Consultative Committee, an ad-
visory committee which tried to find a common ground between different stakehold-
ers in the ECSC (Dufresne, 2006).  
In outline, in my research I argue that the EU Commission is a long-term pro-
growth oriented EU institution that shares some similarities with national govern-
ments, but also differs in many respects. For instance, compared to national govern-
ments, the Commission lacks “hard” power to promote policies by military and/or 
significant financial means. In addition, the Commission‘s legitimacy does not neces-
sarily depend on the success of its economic and social policies as it is not directly 
elected by citizens in the EU. Although it could be argued that, to a certain extent, 
progressive1 businesses play an important role for the realisation of the Commission’s 
forward-looking policies, businesses in general do not have direct structural power 
over the Commission’s decision making as they do with national governments who 
depend on them for tax revenue or the provision of employment (Gill and Law, 
1993). In other words, compared to national governments, the Commission’s legiti-
macy and survival does not necessarily depend on the success of businesses. In Chap-
ter 1 I am going to elaborate on the distinction between the Commission and state vis-
à-vis capital. 
                                                      
1 Efficient, dynamic, forward looking, innovative, sustainable businesses 
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Despite the lack of certain material powers, the Commission is able to propose 
and lead policies in certain directions by focusing on other levels, such as the discur-
sive. The Commission’s visionary role and its ability to steer the long-term develop-
ments of the Union is embedded in its historically constructed institutional nature 
which leads to a path-dependent tendency to think more broadly and longer-term. 
According to Nugent (2000:27) “…the Commission is much more than an adminis-
trative institution, implementing, servicing, and coordinating the ideas, the needs, and 
the decisions of others. It is also a proactive policy-oriented institution”. Due to the 
complex and multi-faceted nature of EU governance, other players may contradict the 
Commission’s long-term orientation through strategic actions and competing ideolo-
gies. 
There may be different visions within the Commission, and between different 
Commissioners, on what constitutes long-term development and which forward-
looking pro-growth policies should be adopted. Moreover, the Commission’s long-
term policy may be in conflict with other EU institutions, such as the European Par-
liament, and these positions can be ambiguous, depending on the composition of the 
institution and the issues under discussion. Furthermore, it could be argued that the 
Commission’s path-dependent long-term European interests are in conflict with the 
particular, often short-term, interests of member states as well as certain capital 
groups. EU member states have always been important players in the European ener-
gy policy domain. Historically, national states were the main players in energy field, 
not least because energy has always been treated as strategic policy sector closely 
related to security and economic stability. Within EU institutional governance, states 
act through the EU Council where they express positions and defend their interests. 
Countries are not unanimous as different states often have distinct models of econom-
ic growth that are fuelled by different energy sources (Newell and Paterson, 1998). 
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When it comes to the European context, one could argue that, historically, the support 
of certain governments for the creation of the ECSC was generated by the structural 
power of certain capital groups (industries, business associations). The decisions of 
national governments in the energy domain are, to some extent, constrained by the 
structural power of certain business groups which are directly affected by develop-
ments in EU energy and climate policies.  
Although historical institutionalism helps to reveal the “path-dependent” fea-
tures of EU institutions, and the deeper structural conditions that empower or limit 
certain hegemonic projects, it is not able to account for the processes of struggle and 
change very well. In order to reveal the use of hegemonic strategies, and to account 
for the conflicts and dynamics of change in EU energy policy, some additional re-
sources are needed. In this respect, the neo-Gramscian theoretical approach can help 
to account for such dynamics and thus explain how the Commission has pushed ener-
gy hegemonisation through the alignment of material, institutional and discursive 
powers. Moreover, the historical institutionalist and neo-Gramscian traditions assume 
that certain exogenous crises (critical junctures) make players more cautious and cre-
ate an opportunity for actors with different interests and alternative ideologies to chal-
lenge the existing order by providing for the realignment of the material, institutional 
and discursive domains (Jagers et al., 2004). It could be argued that climate change, 
and economic or energy security crises in the energy domain, can create useful open-
ings for actors wishing to advance their alternative interests and ideas through the 
process of hegemonisation.  
In the neo-Gramscian tradition there are two types of strategies for hegemon-
isation. First, a war of position refers to gradually building hegemonic order through 
the alignment of material (technological development, financial instruments), institu-
tional/organisational (stabilization through the rules and regulations and/or manipula-
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tion with dimensionality of issues) and ideational (discursive strategies) dimensions 
(Levy and Newell, 2004). Second, passive revolution explains what happens when a 
hegemonic bloc is challenged. It represents the reorganisation of power to preserve 
the dominant class hegemony through transformismo, a strategy which allows an un-
derstanding of how an existing bloc attempts to organise a coalition of interests in 
order to incorporate and rearticulate potentially dangerous ideas (Gramsci, 1971).  
Hegemony is always contested by competing energy discourses. In order to 
flesh out how the Commission and other players construct their hegemonic ideas and 
arguments, as well as to operationalize some of neo-Gramscian concepts such as 
transformismo, I use the post-structuralist logics of equivalence and difference. I am 
not applying the poststructuralist ontological position which ascribes causal impact to 
ideas. In my project political logics are used only as a descriptive framing device to 
show how different players try to couple or decouple different policy demands in the 
overall contestation of energy policy hegemonisation. The logic of equivalence helps 
to grasp the way in which political frontiers are constructed via the linking together of 
social demands and identities, while the logic of difference captures the way in which 
demands are negated, disarticulated, mediated and negotiated by various institutions. 
In addition, I will explore how, in the process of discursive contestation, civil society 
groups and organic intellectuals play an important role in using various rhetorical 
strategies, including narratives, generative metaphors and new discursive categories, 
in order to assess the architecture of the policy arguments used by different groups to 
justify, legitimize or denounce certain policy decisions. The objective of discursive 
analysis is to identify the formation of competing discourses, i.e. to explore how they 
mutate, are superseded or collapse. Furthermore, I argue that in the process of 
hegemonisation the Commission often uses discursive elements in order to address 
collective action problems. The Commission, supported by scientists, academics and 
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other intellectuals that could be regarded as Gramscian organic intellectuals, attempt 
to address collective action problems through the use of motivating myths, the power-
ful narratives which orient and motivate different players towards unity (Augelli and 
Murphy, 1997). In Chapter 1 I will thus be looking at the integration of historical in-
stitutionalism with the neo-Gramscian and post-structuralist theoretical approaches in 
more detail. In addition, I will defend my theoretical approach towards EU politics 
vis-à-vis liberal intergovernmentalist, supranationalist and constructivist approaches.  
3. European energy policy developments: a historical perspective 
Before becoming an important part of the European policy agenda, energy 
was considered an exclusively national issue. After the Second World War, energy 
supply was the main concern of those European countries which were trying to re-
cover from the destruction caused by the war. One of the first steps was the estab-
lishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, followed by 
the set-up of a common policy for the nuclear sector via Euratom. In the 1960s there 
was the lack of a common strategy in EU energy policy. As Eberlein (2012:151) 
pointed out “This brings us to two key obstacles to Europeanisation: heterogeneity of 
national resource situation and preferences; and the national entrenchment of the elec-
tricity and gas industries in particular”. The Commission began to deal with the issue 
of balance by submitting the Memorandum on Energy policy in 1962 and the First 
Orientation to a Common Energy policy in 1968. Referring to this period Molle 
(2006:190) explained “It reflected the fundamental problems of the EU energy posi-
tion and established the principles of EU policy, namely to ensure supply at the low-
est possible price, with due regard to the specific structure of the energy sector”. The 
struggle between national energy policies and a common EU policy continued during 
this time. During the period from 1957 until the mid-1960s, energy was not a primary 
issue on the European policy agenda (Andersen, 2001). In 1968 the Commission 
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played an important role in establishing the first guidelines towards a common Euro-
pean energy policy. As Haghighi (2007:47) explained “Dependence on imports…was 
seen by the Commission as an opportunity to exert more influence on the world mar-
ket by adopting a common approach”. It was therefore not until the end of the 1960s 
that the need for a common energy policy strategy arose.  
European-wide attention to energy challenges emerged during the 1970s and 
the beginning of the1980s. This period was associated with problems of oil supply 
and prices, in particular when the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo to western markets. As 
Scrase et al. (2009:8) pointed out “In 1973/4 a combination of Middle East conflict 
and concerted action by OPEC pushed up oil prices dramatically – almost five-fold in 
two years”. The price increase had serious economic effects, while also raising ques-
tions about national and global longer-term dependence on finite fossil fuel reserves. 
At that time the EU encountered two major problems: insecurity of supply and the 
instability of energy prices (Molle, 2006). The Commission tried to address long-term 
issue of over-reliance on external supplies and prepared a Communication to the 
Council. Haghighi (2007:52) stated “In 1972, the alarm of increasing reliance on ex-
ternal supplies resonated more vigorously and the Commission sought to outline the 
problem in a Communication to the Council”. Nevertheless, in the 1970s, despite the 
Commission’s attempts the response to the crisis was rather individual and very di-
verse. According to Haghighi (2007:53) “…the differences among Member States’ 
strategies to guarantee this security created barriers to reaching a common policy as 
desired by the Commission”. Despite recognition of common problems, there was 
thus a lack of interest in dealing with energy issues in a cooperative manner.   
One could argue that, during the second half of the 1980s, there was a major 
shift in the European energy domain as several important initiatives at the EU level 
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brought liberalisation and competitiveness to the forefront. Since the late 1980s Eu-
rope has tried to rebuild its efforts to develop a common energy policy. As Haghighi 
(2007:62) claimed "The Commission stated the need for the establishment of an in-
ternal energy market and analysed the obstacles of the creation of such market in Eu-
rope". An attempt to foster a common policy was partly influenced by growing long-
term accumulation problems. As Helm (2007:35) argued “…the sharp recession in 
the early 1980s reduced growth below the level that had been predicted in the 
1970s…and then changed the composition of developed economies more towards 
service and away from energy-intensive industries…”. In the subsequent parts of this 
chapter I will identify the key changes in the EU energy policy domain in the last 20 
years. Despite common objectives to ensure security of supply, competitiveness and 
care for the environment, one could argue that the prominence of these elements has 
shifted over time with certain elements gaining or losing prominence in EU energy 
policy.     
4. Key shifts in EU energy policy 1990s-2013 
My research will account for contestation through different shifts in EU ener-
gy policy from the 1990s until 2013. The time period covered by my study can be 
justified by the changes in the EU’s institutional framework, as well as the increased 
role of energy in the European policy domain. First, on 1 November 1993, following 
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union was created. Moreover, it 
was not until the Maastricht Treaty that energy was first mentioned at the level of 
primary law (Falkner, 2008). Before the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, 
security of supply issues dominated the European energy agenda. At that time it was 
often argued that these challenges could be addressed at the national level. However, 
in the early 1990s, energy began to be seen as an inseparable part (a cross-cutting 
issue) of tackling other important long-term challenges, such as the decline in EU 
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competitiveness and growing climate challenges pushed by the UN after the estab-
lishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 
(UNFCCC, 2014). Energy policy became a major element of the EU approach to the 
common market and climate change (Commission of the European Communities, 
1988). In 1994 the Commission proposed a Green Paper on energy, "For a European 
Union Energy Policy", in which, for the first time, it laid out European-wide energy 
priorities. The 1994 Green paper argued "Whatever the energy resources of each 
Member State and whatever their respective energy balance, the Community as a 
whole has to respond to the challenges of industrial competitiveness, security of sup-
ply and environmental protection. The energy policy of the Community has to answer 
these challenges and optimise the diversity of national and regional energy portfolios 
for the overall benefit of the Community” (EC, 1995b).  
I start my research in the 1990s with a narrow account of energy policy, cen-
tred on the policies and actions of DG Energy. This distinction is made because 
throughout the 1990s at the EU level among policy-makers energy and climate were 
perceived as separate issues that were dealt with to a large extent in a non-
complementary way. There was a lack of cooperation between energy and climate 
commissioners as well as their respective services. In addition, energy and climate 
domains were fully merged only in the mid-2000s with the promotion of the 2020 
climate and energy package. This also explains why this research is less focused on 
the discussion of more climate-oriented policies in the 1990s, including EU ETS and 
the EU carbon tax debates that were primarily run by DG Environment.  
In the following subsections I will briefly identify and describe different phas-
es of EU energy policy developments, which will also determine the general structure 
of later empirical chapters. The aim is to show that there have been distinctive shifts 
in the prominence of various EU energy policy elements since the 1990s. In the sub-
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sequent empirical chapters I will look at contestation through these energy policy 
shifts in much more detail, focusing on the role of the Commission in promoting its 
long-term goals. 
 4.1. Energy market liberalisation and competitiveness 
In the mid-1980s, the Commission of the European Communities (today the 
EU Commission) began a major programme of economic restructuring. Responding 
to the growing challenges of globalisation, a lack of competitiveness with regards to 
major economic rivals, and the rise of unemployment, the Delors Commission, influ-
enced by neoliberal economic ideology, proposed an economic programme to create a 
single European market which would bring long-term economic benefits. Energy was 
considered as one of the pillars of the success of the single market. According to An-
dersen (2000a) "…a number of important EU initiatives have been taken to strength-
en the supranational influence over particular energy sectors. Such changes are in line 
with, but unique versions of, global trends towards liberalisation". In Chapter 2 I will 
thus analyse and explain the efforts of the Commission-led pro-liberalisation bloc to 
make significant steps in the direction of energy liberalisation.  
At the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, the Commission was actively 
involved in energy market liberalisation. For example, Andersen (2001:110) claims 
“The Commission took a close look at energy sectors in Europe within the framework 
of the internal market programme…It was primarily in the gas and electricity sector 
that there was a need for new directives". One could claim that historically natural 
monopolies, i.e. vertically integrated companies responsible for production, supply, 
and delivery, have dominated the EU electricity and gas markets. Moreover, the pro-
motion of competition in the energy sector has been regarded as a necessary instru-
ment to increase efficiency gains, reduce energy prices, and facilitate higher standards 
of services. As Haghighi (2007:104) argues “The necessity of introducing competi-
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tion in the energy sector, along with the fast development of integration in other sec-
tors (especially since the creation of the Single European Act in 1986), finally led to 
the creation of laws that specifically addressed the integration mechanisms in the en-
ergy sector”. The competitiveness dimension in energy markets has therefore become 
a central aspect of EU actions in the energy domain. 
In 1989 the Commission proposed the introduction of elements of liberalisa-
tion and competition in electricity and gas supply markets. In the early 1990s, the 
essence of energy market liberalisation policy was defined by the idea of third party 
access (TPA) to grids and pipelines (Buchan, 2009). By opening access to all custom-
ers, the EU anticipated helping smaller companies to compete in a market which was 
always dominated by large vertically-integrated energy corporations. Alessandro Or-
tis (2011:132) pointed out “The Internal Energy Market (IEM) was originally con-
ceived as a single EU-wide space where energy producers and consumers could un-
dertake transactions without distinctions as to nationality, activity, size, or any other 
characteristic”. In 1995, the Green Paper “For A European Union Energy Policy” 
focused on the strengthening of Europe's overall competitiveness. As is argued in the 
1995 Green Paper, "...Green paper seeks to contribute to the definition of a new 
framework for the sector which would accommodate continuing changes and, at the 
same, time contribute towards the overall competitiveness of our economies" (EC, 
1995b:5). By the mid-1990s, the EU adopted its first legislation for the liberalisation 
of electricity and gas markets. With this legislation, the Commission aimed to set a 
common framework for energy market regulation.  
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4.2. Energy security challenges and growing climate constraints 
As was argued earlier in this chapter, throughout the 1990s EU energy policy 
was focused on liberalisation (i.e. competition). However, during the second half of 
the 1990s, due to changing economic, energy supply and environmental circumstanc-
es, energy policy began to shift away from the markets and liberalisation towards en-
ergy security and growing climate change constraints (interview 26). As a response, 
in November 2000, the Commission published the Green Paper “Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply”. This document was released following a 
tripling of the oil price which led to massive protests over rising fuel prices, a situa-
tion which the Commission regarded as a structural weakness of the European growth 
model. As it is argued in the 2000 Green Paper “The European Union’s long-term 
strategy for energy supply security must be geared to ensuring, for the well-being of 
its citizens and the proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical 
availability of energy products on the market. The European Union now has to face 
new challenges characteristic of a period of profound transition for the European 
economy" (EC, 2000a:2). In response, at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 
the 2000s, discussions in Brussels largely focused on the nuclear option in order to 
address growing security and climate challenges. In Chapter 3 I will thus analyse how 
the EU Commission used the nuclear link to facilitate energy security and climate 
integration. In addition, I will evaluate the material, institutional and discursive strat-
egies of different capital groups, state and non-state actors in this energy policy trans-
formation. 
During the second half of the 1990s, the environmental dimension was seen as 
a growing challenge to long-term growth. The 2000 Green Paper on energy released 
by the Commission underlined that challenge: “…climate change…is a fact and it 
poses a threat to harmonious world development. Today, security of supply on Eu-
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rope’s energy market must take account of the imperative to combat climate 
change…” (EC, 2000a:46). This movement towards addressing climate change was 
partly driven by the Kyoto Protocol in which the EU in general, and the Commission 
in particular, played one of the leading roles. As was explained by the Commission in 
the 2000 Green Paper “As for the struggle against climate change, this is a major bat-
tle. Climate change is a long-term battle for the international community. The com-
mitments made in the Kyoto Protocol are only a first step” (EC, 2000a:3). Moreover, 
in 2001 the Commission formulated and released “A Sustainable Europe For a Better 
World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development”, a long-term strat-
egy to reconcile policies for economically, socially and environmentally sustainable 
development. One of the main objectives of this strategy was the fight against climate 
change. According to the 2001 Sustainable Development Strategy “Emissions of 
greenhouse gases from human activity are causing global warming. Climate change is 
likely to cause more extreme weather events (hurricanes, floods) with severe implica-
tions for infrastructure, property, health and nature” (EC, 2001a:4). Climate change 
thus began to be viewed as urgent challenge to Europe’s long-term development. 
In its initial response, at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, the 
Commission wanted to reconcile the security and environmental dimensions by fo-
cusing on the development of nuclear policy. Although there were certain renewable 
energy developments in 1997, when the Commission proposed an indicative objective 
for renewable energy to reach 12 per cent of total electricity consumption, discussions 
were mainly focused on nuclear power and its role in EU energy policy. The EU 
Commission and Energy Directorate in particular began to treat nuclear as one of the 
most reasonable solutions to deal with growing issues of security of supply and the 
Kyoto commitments. As a result, in 2002 the Commission proposed “The Nuclear 
Package”, a policy strategy which strived to introduce a common EU approach on 
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nuclear safety standards and nuclear waste disposal. At the beginning of the 2000s, 
the Commission therefore tried to address security and environmental challenges 
through this nuclear option. In the following section of this chapter I will show how, 
in the mid-2000s, European energy policy discussion shifted even more towards the 
climate-oriented dimension with the main emphasis on renewable energy and, later, 
energy efficiency. 
4.3. Energy policy integration: the growing prominence of the climate 
dimension 
In the mid-2000s the issue of climate change became even more prominent in 
the EU energy domain. According to Buchan (2009:1) “Climate change is transform-
ing energy policy in the European Union. The scale of the problem – the risk of irre-
versible warming from the world overdosing on fossil fuels – dwarfs Europe’s more 
traditional preoccupations with energy market structures and stable supply. EU mem-
ber states automatically look to their Union for solutions to the ultimate cross-border 
problem, in a way that they have never done with other aspects of energy policy”. 
Moreover, the issue of climate change became central, around which the other dimen-
sions of energy policy were formulated. Eberlein (2012:164) explained “The climate 
change challenge was the best policy window for Union action on energy that the 
Commission could have wished for”. Moreover, the energy security dimension main-
tained its prominence in EU energy policy. In 2006 the Commission proposed a new 
energy Green Paper “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy” in which it attempted to integrate actions against climate change with securi-
ty and economic benefits. The 2006 Green Paper underlines the emergence of new 
energy landscape “This is the new energy landscape of the 21st century. It is one 
which the world’s economic regions are dependent on each other for ensuring energy 
security and stable economic conditions, and for ensuring effective action against 
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climate change. The effects of this landscape are felt directly by everyone. Access to 
energy is fundamental to the daily lives of every European. Our citizens are affected 
by higher prices, threats to the security of supply and changes to Europe’s climate” 
(EC, 2006a:4). In Chapter 4 I will therefore analyse how the Commission and other 
players used the opportunity of emerging exogenous crises to attempt to repackage 
EU energy policy in a hegemonic way. The aim was to convince the public that sus-
tainable low carbon energy policy was important not only for climate (environment) 
issues, but also for economic competitiveness and security, i.e. in order to link differ-
ent demands together. 
In January 2007 the EU Energy Commissioner presented policy guidelines for 
energy and climate integration in the form of “An Energy Policy for Europe”. As was 
pointed out in the document “The point of departure for a European energy policy is 
threefold: combating climate change, limiting the EU's external vulnerability to im-
ported hydrocarbons, and promoting growth and jobs...’’ (EC, 2007a:5). The Com-
mission’s 2007 Strategic Energy Review proposed a unilateral commitment to reduce 
CO2 by 20 per cent by 2020. In 2006, the Commission published a Renewable Energy 
Roadmap outlining a long-term strategy. It called for a 20 per cent share of renewable 
energy in the EU's total energy mix by 2020 (EC, 2006b). EU leaders endorsed this 
target in March 2007. Moreover, other important steps were taken in the biofuels area 
at this time: EU leaders decided that, by 2020, biofuels should account 10 per cent of 
all transport fuels (EC, 2007b).  
In January 2008, the European Commission unveiled “20 20 by 2020: Eu-
rope's climate change opportunity”, an ambitious package of proposals to fight cli-
mate change and promote renewable energy in line with EU commitments. The main 
objective of this package was to adopt the so called “20 20 20” targets: A 20% reduc-
tion CO2 emissions from 1990 levels; raising the share of renewable resources to 
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20%; and a 20% improvement in the EU's energy efficiency (EC, 2008a). According 
to the package “2007 marked a turning point for the European Union's climate and 
energy policy. Europe showed itself ready to give global leadership: to tackle climate 
change, to face up to the challenge of secure, sustainable and competitive energy, and 
to make the European economy a model for sustainable development in the 21st cen-
tury” (EC, 2008a:2). Furthermore, less than a year later in December 2008, “The In-
tegrated Energy and Climate Change Package” with its 20 20 20 targets was agreed. 
The EU gradually therefore became one of the leading proponents of green energy 
investments. In the following section I will explain how, in the context of economic 
and social crises, integrated EU energy and climate policy began to lose coherence 
and prominence.  
4.4. The shift towards competitiveness 
During the second half of the 2000s, concerns were raised regarding the com-
petitiveness and economic growth aspects of EU energy policy, as the econom-
ic/financial crisis slowed progress towards energy and climate integration. The first 
evidence of the loss of energy-climate momentum came in late 2010 with the presen-
tation of “Energy 2020 – A Strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy”. 
As was stated here, “Energy is the life blood of our society. The well-being of our 
people, industry and economy depends on safe, secure, sustainable and affordable 
energy. It will take decades to steer our energy systems onto a more secure and sus-
tainable path. Yet the decisions to set us on the right path are needed urgently as the 
costs for consumers…put Europe’s competitiveness at risk’’ (EC, 2010a). Moreover, 
in December 2011, the Communication “Energy Roadmap 2050” was adopted. The 
roadmap called on the EU to move to a low carbon economy via a substantial rise in 
renewable energy, significant energy savings, and other measures. The principal mes-
sage of this document was the goal to move to secure, competitive and decarbonised 
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energy by 2050 (EC, 2011a). Despite its attempts to keep energy-climate integration 
intact, the roadmap highlighted certain trade-offs with regards to long-term decarbon-
isation policy. According to the 2011 Energy Roadmap 2050 “A potential trade-off 
between climate change policies and competitiveness continues to be a risk for some 
sectors…Europe cannot alone achieve global decarbonisation…the energy system 
transition should avoid industry distortions and losses especially since energy remains 
an important cost factor for industry” (EC, 2011b:9). Following intensive discussions, 
the Energy Roadmap 2050 was opposed by a number of states and industrial players, 
and was eventually vetoed by Poland (Keating, 2012a). Moreover, some of the largest 
industrial corporations warned about growing European energy costs and an emerg-
ing gap in competitiveness (Wiesmann, 2012). Given these growing contradictions 
between different dimensions of EU energy policy, in 2011 the Commission tried to 
reconcile them by focusing on a new energy efficiency strategy. As is explained in 
the 2011 Energy Efficiency Plan “…the Union has set itself a target for 2020 of sav-
ing 20% of its primary energy consumption compared to projections, and…this ob-
jective was identified in the Commission’s Communication on Energy 2020 as a key 
step towards achieving our long-term energy and climate goals” (EC, 2011c:2). In 
Chapter 5 I will explain the growing prominence of the competitiveness and growth 
dimensions in European energy policy. I will analyse how the economic crisis and 
growing production of unconventional oil and gas, mainly in the US, undermined the 
low carbon order, created discrepancies within the hegemonic bloc, and raised accu-
mulation-legitimation tensions.  
5. Data collection 
The process of data collection is based on a structured and focused compari-
son method (George and Bennett, 2004). I began the process by setting research ques-
tions which were linked to my research objectives. In addition, these questions were 
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repeated in the analysis of each of the empirical chapters (Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5), thereby 
standardising data collection. According to George and Bennett (2004:67) “…the re-
searcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these 
questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardise data collec-
tion…”. Moreover, data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Di-
rect observations came from 30 semi-structured elite interviews which covered the 
entire chain of key stakeholders and decision-makers relevant to my research, includ-
ing officials from the Commission, Council of the European Union, European Par-
liament, civil society groups (mostly environmental NGOs), business associa-
tions/lobby groups, national representations at the EU, and energy experts. The inter-
viewees were selected on the basis of positional and reputational samplings. In trying 
to locate potential interviewees I consulted conference programmes, articles, and the 
electronic directories of the EU. The interviews were conducted in two phases. The 
majority were conducted in Brussels and Vilnius between October-December 2012. 
The second phase took place in Brussels in September 2013. Due to confidentiality 
constraints, the list of interviewees could not be included in this project. Every inter-
viewee was given a number by which they are referred to in this research. Further-
more, one of the main features of this data collection is that I have tried to get as close 
to the real decision making process in the EU as possible. In writing this research, I 
have done two six-month traineeships in the Council of the European Union and in 
Lithuania’s Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels. During these internships 
I was able to learn how EU decision-making is conducted on the ground, and also had 
the opportunity to attend important working parties and ambassadorial-level meetings 
which gave me a greater understanding of how EU decision-making processes work, 
and how different players formulate and promote their arguments. In addition, daily 
conversations with my traineeship supervisors and other experienced officials in the 
27 
EU were extremely beneficial sources of information which I used in writing this re-
search project. 
The documents analysed include EU treaties, EU Green/White Papers, press 
releases, primary policy papers/reports, corporate reports, and position papers. Most 
of these documents were obtained either via the Internet or through archival research 
in the libraries of EU institutions (the Commission and the Council Secretariat of the 
EU). In addition to this primary research, I consulted newspapers/magazines (Euro-
pean Voice, EUobserver, EurActiv, Financial Times, The Economist, The New York 
Times, The Wall Street Journal, Forbes, The Guardian, The Telegraph, Platts, and 
Libération) and major news websites (Reuters, BBC, CNN, Bloomberg). 
Overview of the Thesis 
The current chapter has so far presented energy policy definitions, introduced 
the reader to the neo-Gramscian and historical institutionalist theoretical frameworks, 
identified major developments and shifts in the EU energy policy, and explained the 
role of other actors involved in energy policy contestations.  
Chapter 1 presents the neo-Gramscian theoretical perspective, supplemented 
by certain elements of the historical institutionalist and post-structuralist approaches, 
as well as alternative theoretical frameworks for interpreting shifts in EU energy poli-
cy since the 1990s. The central assertion is that the EU Commission is a long-term 
oriented EU institution which promotes forward-looking policies through material, 
institutional and discursive dimensions. However, Commission’s long-term view of-
ten clashes with particular, often short-term, interests promoted by state and non-state 
players. This contestation between different players is manifested in the neo-
Gramscian hegemonisation process. 
28 
Chapter 2 analyses contestation over EU energy market liberalisation. I will 
assess how a pro-liberalisation bloc tried to make significant steps in the direction of 
an internal energy market. In addition, I will explain the first attempts by the Com-
mission and other players in the pro-liberalisation group to lead a neo-Gramscian war 
of position in order to challenge monopolistic energy structures. Moreover, the anti-
liberalisation bloc’s actions to undermine the creation of a competitive energy market 
will be analysed. 
Chapter 3 interprets how the prominence of EU energy policy shifted towards 
energy security and climate change. It explores how, at the end of 1990s, the Com-
mission interacted as a strategic entrepreneurship and promoted the nuclear option in 
response to growing security and climate challenges.  The Commission tried to lead 
the transition towards a new energy reality in which European energy policy would 
be transformed by taking into account a longer-term perspective. This chapter anal-
yses the material, institutional and discursive strategies of capital groups, state and 
non-state actors in energy policy transformation. 
Chapter 4 analyses and explains how, in the context of an emerging organic 
crisis, the Commission and other players have pursued a war of position in order to 
create a new historical bloc for a low-carbon EU energy policy. The bloc led by the 
Commission attempted to diversify and to link together a range of demands in order 
to confront the carbon-based accumulation model which was considered as unsus-
tainable in the long-term.  
Chapter 5 assesses how, given growing economic and financial challenges, an 
integrated EU energy and climate policy began to crumble and lose prominence. This 
chapter explains the changing prominence of the competitiveness and growth dimen-
sions in EU energy policy. It analyses the role of specific state and non-state actors in 
their attempts to challenge progress towards a low carbon future. 
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Finally, the Conclusion summarises the empirical and analytical findings. It 
also considers potential alternative explanations in light of the empirical findings. The 
chapter concludes by discussing the distinctive role of the Commission in developing 
an EU energy policy oriented towards the long-term, and by outlining the implica-
tions and relevance of this research for studies which focus on the operation of EU 
politics in general, the Commission’s role in particular, as well as for practitioners 
directly involved in EU institutional governance. Moreover, I will discuss likely fu-




Contestation and changes in the EU energy domain: theoretical re-
flections 
Introduction 
The European energy sector was, for a long time, governed primarily at the 
national level. However, over the last twenty years there have been several major 
shifts in the development of EU energy policy. At the end of the 1980s, EU energy 
policy began to focus on liberalization as the Commission began to agitate against 
energy monopolies and started to search for new solutions in this policy domain. 
Moreover, following the oil price shock and the accumulation of evidence regarding 
the seriousness of global warming at the end of the 1990s, the focus of EU energy 
policy began to move away from markets and liberalization agenda towards energy 
security under growing climate change constrains. The Commission reacted to these 
new challenges by trying to coherently address the issue of overdependence on ener-
gy imports, as well as action against climate change, through the nuclear energy op-
tion. As a result of growing evidence of the seriousness of climate issues in the mid-
2000s, the issues of climate change and decarbonisation became the central elements 
around which the energy security and competitiveness dimensions were integrated. 
Moreover, the Commission attempted to link the advantages of renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and the reduction of CO2 emissions, with a new economic order 
based on low carbon energy use. At the end of the 2000s the economic/financial crisis 
slowed progress towards this low carbon future, diminishing the energy and climate 
link, and raising concerns over costs, competitiveness and economic growth. Due to 
the complex and heterogeneous nature of EU energy policy, different actors with 
competing ideologies entered into contestation at the EU level in order to portray 
their own interests as common European interests.  
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In explaining shifts in the prominence of energy policy, this research aims to 
account for struggles during different energy policy phases, and to explain the role of 
the EU Commission in providing a forward-looking pro-growth orientation. Towards 
this goal, I use theoretical resources from the neo-Gramscian and historical institu-
tionalist perspectives, as well as certain elements of post-structuralist discourse analy-
sis. In short, I will integrate these theoretical resources in the following way. First, 
neo-Gramscian analytical concepts can help to account for change, the dynamics of 
contestation and to explain how the Commission and other players have pushed ener-
gy hegemonisation policies through the alignment of the material, institutional and 
discursive levels of power. Nevertheless, before analysing hegemonic struggles one 
must reveal the mechanisms of the EU institutional and governance setting. This al-
lows us to better understand the motives and interests of the players involved in the 
decision-making process. I use the historical institutionalist approach to reveal the 
creation of EU institutional and organisational design in which the Commission was 
established as a long-term and pro-growth oriented institution. Moreover, lacking the 
material resources for their strategies of hegemonisation, the Commission and other 
players often rely on discursive formations. Due to the fact that there is no single 
agreed way in which to develop competitive energy policy, to react to energy security 
challenges, or to foster a green energy future, the Commission’s discourse is often 
challenged by alternative discourses. In order to reveal the Commission’s attempt to 
use strategic discursive moves and to explore the contestation of different ideas, the 
theoretical approach must be supplemented by certain descriptive framing devices, 
including elements of post-structuralist political logics. In the remaining parts of this 
chapter I will argue that some of the existing mainstream approaches are not able to 
fully account for certain aspects of energy policy developments. 
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This chapter is divided into several sections. In what follows I will present my 
theoretical model based on neo-Gramscian and historical institutionalist accounts, 
supplemented by some elements of the post-structuralist perspective. Moreover, I will 
explain why this framework is relevant when accounting for conflicts within the for-
mulation of EU energy policy, and for analysing the role and influence of the Com-
mission and other state and non-state groups in leading the construction of the EU 
energy order. At the end of this chapter, I will assess the possible contributions and 
pitfalls of alternative theoretical approaches. It should be pointed out that I do not 
intend to provide a thorough analysis of the general differences and similarities be-
tween these theoretical frameworks, but rather I will look at those aspects that are 
relevant to my research questions.          
1. Historical institutionalism and the creation of EU institutional governance 
Before elaborating on the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony in the follow-
ing section, it must be explained how the struggles between different players are me-
diated through the historically established mechanisms of EU institutional decision-
making. Contestations surrounding the EU energy domain cannot be explained by 
simply referring to the relevant players in these struggles, and denying the importance 
of EU institutional decision-making mechanisms. In other words, one must reveal the 
historically created EU institutional context that, to some extent, affects the identities 
and motives of players in these struggles. I thus use the historical institutionalist per-
spective in order to reveal how these path-dependent conditions are historically root-
ed in the EU’s institutional and organisational set-up. The rest of this section will fo-
cus on the historical institutionalist explanation of the origins of the EU in general, 
and the role of the EU Commission in particular. 
Historical institutionalism is a broad theoretical approach that covers a diverse 
range of scholarship. As Pierson (1994:10) points out “Historic Institutionalism is a 
33 
loose term governing a range of scholarship that has tried to combine social science 
concerns and methods with a recognition that social processes must be understood as 
historical phenomena”. Historical institutionalists have been strong proponents of an 
image of social causation that is “path dependent”. There has been lack of attention 
to revealing the historically created organizational character and architecture of Euro-
pean institutions (Balding and Wehrenfennig, 2011). One could argue that an organi-
zation’s architecture establishes patterns of incentives and expectations for its mem-
bers, through which they and the institution coalesce around broader rules, norms, 
and practices. The dynamics of path dependence ensure that the creation of institu-
tions can explain the underlying orientation of their subsequent actions. The notion of 
path dependence usefully focuses attention on the founding conditions of institutions 
and organisations (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2009). According to Thelen (1999:385) 
“once a path is taken, then it can become ‘locked in’, as all the relevant actors adjust 
their strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern”. In order to understand the 
complexities of EU institutional governance in general, and in the energy domain in 
particular, one has to trace the origins of this supranational body and its creation of 
main EU institutions.  
Today’s EU originated from the European Steel and Coal Community 
(ECSC), the organisation which launched the process of EU integration. In 1950 the 
French foreign minister Robert Schuman announced an extraordinary idea to place 
the whole of Franco-German coal and steel production under a common High Au-
thority (HA), within the framework of an organization open to the participation of 
other European countries (Gilbert, 2012). The experience of the ECSC’s creation is a 
period when formal EU governance began to operate, and two main institutions (the 
Council and Commission) developed their interests, working processes and routines. 
According to Annet (2010a) “The process and outcomes of regional integration can 
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be understood and analysed through an historical institutionalist approach. This inter-
prets institutions as forming a ‘web’ of structure, relationships and meaning within 
which political actors move”. Moreover, historical institutionalism regards the period 
of organisational origin as crucial to understanding later developments. In this res-
pect, at the organisational level, historical institutionalism has much in common with 
Stinchcombe’s (2010) concept of “imprinting”, which captures how initial environ-
mental conditions and powerful founders leave a persistent mark (imprint) on an or-
ganization’s strategies, strategic choices and operating practices. The crux of this ar-
gument is that, due to subsequent inertia and institutionalization, organisations con-
tinue to exhibit traces of their founding context (Marquis and Tilcik, 2013). As An-
nett (2010a) points out “the only fixed phase of institutional development is the ori-
gins phase. Any other phase may follow, depending on the experiences and outcomes 
of the origins phase”. One must therefore go back to the 1950s and analyse how the 
creation of the ECSC institutional framework, based on a supranationalist ideology, 
contributed to the governing structures of today’s EU’s.  
Historical institutionalism can assist in illuminating how the origins of EU in-
stitutions affect the behaviour of political actors during subsequent developments in 
the European energy domain. According to Meunnier and Kathleen (2007:4) 
“…institutions…can have an independent and/or intervening effect on the policy 
paths chosen”. Particular attention is paid to the historical development of the inter-
ests and roles of two executive EU institutions, the Commission and the Council. 
Although national states possess significant powers in the military and social policy 
spheres, certain EU institutions and other players have increased their role and influ-
ence here, leading to the development of coherent long-term energy policies.  
Max Weber defined the state as “a human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory” (Weber, 
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1946:78). Yet despite the fact that the Commission is not a state in Weberian terms, it 
is still able to steer national governments and non-state players in ways contrary to 
how they would behave if allowed to act unilaterally. According to Jessop (2004:56) 
“… the absence of European army-police, constitution, and massive budgets may be 
less important than the presence of the EU’s ability to mobilise organized intelligence 
and other forms of soft intervention that shape how national and regional states de-
ploy their respective capacities”. In addition, the Commission could be regarded as 
the motor or engine of the European Union (Nugent, 2000). It has an entrepreneurial 
role and is able to seize opportunities to encourage, promote and lead new visions and 
long-term policies. Referring to the role of the Commission, Pierson (1994:21) argued 
that it “…is literally a new actor on the political scene. It has its own interests, which 
may diverge from those of its creators, and it typically has resources – expertise, del-
egated authority - to strike out on its own should the opportunities arise…There are 
more players and more interests to be accommodated. The political organs of the EC 
are not simply the tools of the member states”. Furthermore, due to its visionary role 
the Commission may be considered as an important vehicle for progress. According 
to Nugent (2000:18) “…the existence of clear visions and firm resolve, and the use of 
appropriate strategies and tactics, can do much to ensure that the Commission does 
not just follow events, but can do much to encourage, promote, and even lead them“. 
The Commission may therefore be regarded as a proactive institution which has its 
own interests and policy-orientation.  
The EU Commission can be viewed as a forward looking and pro-growth ori-
ented institution. Despite debates within the EU between different commissioners, as 
well as some actions that pull away from long-term considerations at certain points in 
time, the Commission’s tendency to gravitate back to broader and longer-term think-
ing is a sort of “path dependence”, a recurring feature which stems from its organiza-
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tional DNA, i.e. its historical “generic make-up”. The Commission was established in 
the early 1950s by its predecessor, the High Authority (HA) of the ECSC under the 
presidency of Jean Monnet, who together with his advisors could be regarded as the 
Commission’s founding fathers. As Wille (2013:35) referred to the origins of the 
Commisssion: “Its central features were established in its early years by its predeces-
sor, the High Authority, which created long-term ‘path dependencies’…The nature 
and architecture of the EU Commission, its foundational, normative, and organiza-
tional principles, were strongly modelled on this High Authority”. In addition, Mon-
net modelled the HA on his own Planning Commission (fr. Le Commissariat Général 
au Plan) whose aim was to provide an independent, impartial, overall, and long-term 
view of planning and economic development in France (Featherstone, 1994). In other 
words, Monnet’s idea was to create, at the European level, a version of the French 
Economic Planning Commission (Hooghe, 2001). As Monnet (1978:329) pointed out 
“The methods of the French Planning Commissariat were readily adaptable …to Eu-
ropean problems …We had to work out a new method, transposing into the organisa-
tion of Europe the principle underlying the Modernisation Commission…”. One 
could argue that Monnet tried to escape from short-term considerations to focus on 
what happens beyond this. Contrasting with national governments or businesses, the 
HA’s modus operandi was to focus on long-term objectives that increased productivi-
ty and economic development rather than profit, as well as protecting the European 
public interest rather than private interests (Gillingham, 1995). According to Vinen 
(2000:329) “Jean Monnet…was the most notable practitioner of state intervention. 
His plans were based on the assumption that the state should not merely react to eco-
nomic crisis but act to promote modernisation, making choices about the economy 
and deciding which sectors should be supported and which should be allowed to de-
cline”. Due to the influence of the culture of French public administration, based on 
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the principles of dirigisme or state planning and intervention in the economy, the 
Commission was thus set up as a classic technocracy populated with bureaucrats who 
were not generalists but technical experts whose main concern was to ensure planning 
and to protect a common European interest. As Wille (2013:38) argued “The Europe-
an Commission was designed as a technocratic body to propose solutions to policy 
problems, to broker deals…and to be the guardian of the common European interest”. 
In order to achieve these objectives the Commission has pursued a long-term orienta-
tion. As one European fonctionnaire pointed out “I think it is the logic that the Com-
mission has to think about longer term perspective even if in a short term it may have 
a negative effect. A forward-looking vision…is precisely our unique contribution” 
(Interview 11). One could argue that the main features and principles of the Commis-
sion’s work were further embedded through a gradual process of socialisation 
(Hooghe, 2001). According to Wille (2013:39) “The Commission was set up from the 
start to act as an autonomous supranational institution with an Europeanization voca-
tion; Monnet expected the officials working in the European administration to devel-
op a strong ‘European spirit’”.  
The EU Commission’s interest in promoting long-term economic growth, 
what could be defined as “economic development”, stems from its historical founda-
tion and path dependent organisational DNA. Yet economic growth is just one aspect 
of the process of economic development. That is to say, the Commission is interested 
in facilitating broader and more inclusive growth rather than mere increases in eco-
nomic output. Indeed, one could argue that the European integration project started as 
a political project to bring peace to Europe. First, peace and economic development 
were considered as mutually reinforcing elements, and peace was regarded as one of 
the preconditions for post-war economic development. In the same vein, it was real-
ized that in order to ensure sustainable peace, Europe needed to ensure continuous 
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mutually-beneficial economic development. According to Dumas (2006) “Encourag-
ing economic development facilitates efforts to create…economic relationships that cre-
ate positive incentives to avoid war”. Moreover, stable economic development was 
linked to the establishment of mutually beneficial relationships among European 
states (Dumas, 2006), and the creation of effective institutions was regarded as an 
important in ensuring this. As Dumas (2006) pointed out “Building the right kinds of 
economically and politically sustainable institutions is also important to supporting 
and strengthening the virtuous circle between development and peace”. In this re-
spect, the HA of the ECSC was set up as an institution whose objectives were both to 
cement peace in Europe, as well as to supervise and ensure wider elements of eco-
nomic development such as economic expansion, the growth of employment, rising 
standards of living, growth in international trade, and modernisation of production 
(Treaty of Paris, 1951). In other words, the Commission was set up with a historical 
mission to supervise and ensure post-war economic development, via growth in trade 
and modernisation. These objectives were encapsulated in the Treaty of Paris which 
laid the core principles of EU institutional governance “The mission of the European 
Coal and Steel Community is to contribute to economic expansion, the development 
of employment and the improvement of the standard of living in the participating 
countries through the institution, in harmony with the general economy of the mem-
ber States…” (Treaty of Paris, 1951). The establishment of the EU Commission can 
therefore be viewed as an effort to ensure peace and to facilitate long-term economic 
development in Europe.  
The Treaty of Paris focused on trade liberalisation through the abolishment of 
trade barriers. Trade liberalisation was seen as one of the main elements to facilitating 
long-term economic growth/development, which would eventually strengthen peace 
and security in Europe. First, it was realized that stronger trade ties increase the level 
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of interdependence that would ensure peace. Following the Kantian Perpetual Peace 
argument, countries are less likely to fight if they have strong trade links (Kant, 
2003). According to the former European Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy 
(2013) “The recognition that trade promotes peace, by binding nations together in ties 
of mutual interest and dependence, dates back at least to the Enlightenment. It is an 
insight no less relevant today than it was during the 18th century”. Second, the focus 
on trade and the modernisation of production in the treaty establishing the ECSC in-
dicated that the HA had long-term economic objectives. As Lee points out 
(1993:300). “International trade…may increase long-term growth by permitting the 
economy to specialise in the sectors with scale economies that may arise from re-
search and development…”. Moreover, increases in trading relations were viewed as 
an important element of enhanced productivity growth, and a key driver of long-term 
prosperity (Dabla-Noris et. al., 2013).  
The Commission is also interested in growth because, during favourable eco-
nomic periods when growth is more inclusive and wide-spread, it is easier for the 
Commission to garner public support and promote its long-term vision and forward-
looking policies. It could be argued that in an environment of growth, other actors are 
more receptive to such policies. As one official in the Commission argued “In good 
economic times it is easier for us to justify medium and long-term policies not least 
because state and non-state actors could escape from short-term constraints” (Inter-
view 14). The Commission’s interest in growth thus comes from its attempt to ensure 
peace and promote long-term policies.  
The Commission’s role and interest in promoting growth was strengthened as 
debates regarding globalization and the neoliberal deregulation of the US economy in 
the 1980s increased the US’s structural power, and revealed Europe’s backwardness 
in ensuring stable economic growth, competitiveness, and efficiency (Cafruny, 2003). 
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The Commission was more able to promote long-term growth policies because it was 
realised that individual states were too small to master these challenges by themselves 
and to withstand increased economic pressures. Leon Brittan, a former UK member 
of the European Commission, claimed “…given my view of the success of the EU so 
far in pooling sovereignty for the wider benefit of its Member States and in adapting 
to the challenges of globalization, it is obvious to me that Britain’s own interests can 
only be served through a continued commitment to the process of European integra-
tion” (Brittan, 1998:24). The Commission has developed an interest in European in-
tegration, not least because increased globalization has empowered it to execute its 
agenda of making and proposing powers for long-term growth-oriented policies. 
The Commission’s attempt to pursue and protect the common interests of Eu-
rope, rather than the particular interests of individual states or non-state players, can 
be illustrated by looking at energy developments in the 2000s. As has been argued, 
the Commission was set up to serve the general interest of the Union by linking peace 
and long-term economic development, and capitalism requires an effective energy 
sector to ensure economic growth. In the early stage of the development of its energy 
policy, the Commission realised that, in the long-term, fossil fuels are going to be-
come scarcer and more expensive (Ahmed, 2013). In addition, some have warned 
about the dangers of approaching peak oil, a period when the production of oil will be 
in continuous decline despite booming demand. As Allmendinger (2007) made clear 
“After peak oil, in the latter half of the century, there will still be considerable oil 
(and natural gas) in the ground, but it will be so expensive to extract that other energy 
sources will be utilized”. This situation could trigger conflict and endanger peace in 
Europe, as individual countries could start to protect their own national interests and 
aggressively compete for raw materials, as was evident during the oil shocks in the 
1970s. Moreover, the price of fossil fuels will become less competitive due to the 
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growing use of renewable energy, and economies of scale in renewables will thus 
limit the future competitiveness of fossil fuel energy (Clark, 2013). Furthermore, it 
has been argued that climate change challenges could undermine productivity in key 
sectors such as agriculture. Nelson et al. (2009) stated that “Agriculture is extremely 
vulnerable to climate change. Higher temperatures eventually reduce yields of desira-
ble crops while encouraging weed and pest proliferation. Changes in precipitation 
patterns increase the likelihood of short-run crop failures and long-run production 
declines”. The Commission considered that climate change might cause food insecu-
rity and pose a serious threat to long-term economic development and peace (Barroso, 
2009). Furthermore, climate change has been considered as having negative conse-
quences for free trade in the long-term, thus undermining Europe’s economic as well 
as political stability. As is argued in the WTO report on Trade and Climate Change 
“There appear to be two likely effects of climate change on international trade. First, 
climate change may alter countries’ comparative advantages and lead to shifts in the 
pattern of international trade… Disruptions to the supply, transport and distribution 
chains would raise the costs of undertaking…trade. While an increase in trade costs 
would be bad for trade in general…” (WTO, 2009:64).  It could be argued that the 
sudden rise in oil prices in 1999, that some referred to as a “third oil shock”, created a 
temporary vulnerability and opened a room for the contestation of energy policy, to 
which the EU Commission responded with its long-term orientation. At the end of the 
1990s, the Commission saw the issue of dependence on fossil fuels and climate 
change not only as long-term environmental problems, but also as long-term growth 
and security challenges that could be tackled through the development of nuclear 
power. As a result, the Commission’s wider view of the general interests of Europe 
sometimes goes against the particular interests of powerful state and non-state actors. 
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The Commission has the capacity to solve collective action problems by creat-
ing policy networks through bringing particular groups of interests together within the 
EU context. According to Heldt (2004:38) “The Commission has the ability to exploit 
situations where national government representatives are confronted with a collective 
action problem”. In this research I argue that as an apolitical, functionalist bureaucra-
cy the Commission was designed to address such collective action problems (Harlow, 
2002). In doing this, the Commission often relies on discourse and ideology. In the 
following section, where I discuss the neo-Gramscian approach of hegemonisation, I 
will elaborate on the Commission’s instruments, capacities and limits when seeking 
to solve collective action problems. Further, I argue that the Commission’s role in 
addressing collective action problem stems from its historical origins, which lead it to 
moderate different opinions and to seek common ground between divergent interests 
(Wille, 2013). Indeed, the HA of the ECSC, a predecessor of today’s Commission, 
was set up to address a set of collective action problems arising from European coop-
eration (Annett, 2010b). With the creation of the ECSC, the HA was responsible for 
chairing a Consultative Committee, an advisory committee which comprised equal 
number of producers, workers, consumers, and dealers (Dufresne, 2006). In other 
words, the EU Commission’s very origins lie in a supranational institution, the ECSC 
HA, which was established to foster dialogue and enhance cooperation between dif-
ferent stakeholders.  
The beginnings of European integration are often depicted as a political pro-
cess whose objective was to bring peace to the continent. However, the creation of 
these governing structures in Europe cannot be understood without taking into ac-
count the economic interests and influence of large industrial groups. According to 
Haller (2008:113) “…while it is true that economic integration was a means for polit-
ical aims, it diverts attention from the fact that the interests and networks of industri-
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alists played a decisive role”. One could argue that the proposal to integrate the coal 
and steel industries of France and Germany that eventually materialised as the ECSC 
was, to a large extent, initiated by the economic interests of these industrial groups. 
Haller explained: (2008:123,124) “The formal cooperation between the French and 
German steel and coal industries, initiated by the ECSC, was not new…The produc-
ers of France and Germany quite early after the war began to reach out their antennas 
to achieve a restoration of the old connections and forms of organisation. From this 
point of view, we can understand somewhat better the surprising fact that industrial-
ists, not politicians, were the first to show the necessity of an intact German and 
French mining industry for European economic recovery”. Economic groups and as-
sociations have therefore played a decisive role in creating the governing mechanisms 
of the EU.  
Due to the interests of large industrial sectors, one could argue that political 
support for the creation of the ECSC in some European countries was generated by 
the structural power of certain capital groups. In order to account for the role of na-
tional governments in the structure of EU institutional governance, one could argue 
that member states, represented in another major ECSC institution, Special Council of 
Ministers (which later evolved into the Council of the European Union), were struc-
turally constrained by the interests of major capital groups. As Alter and Steinberg 
(2007:93) argued “European governments were most concerned with protecting jobs 
and facilitating industrial growth –defined exclusively in national terms”. By support-
ing the integration of the steel and coal sectors, national governments responded to 
the needs of their key industrial sectors at that time. Defining the structural power of 
capital, Newell and Paterson (1998:691) point out that “Capitalist societies are sys-
tematically dependent on economic growth/capital accumulation…What is im-
portant…is the centrality of the state in the process of capital accumulation, on which 
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the continued existence of a capitalist order depends…the role of state is to identify 
and advance the general interest of capital…As a result of the role of the state in capi-
tal accumulation, those who organise that process (i.e. capital) gain great structural 
power with regard to state decision making”. One could argue that, after the post-war 
period, the interests of coal and steel businesses in many countries were considered to 
represent the general interest of capital as these sectors were the largest sources of 
employment and state revenues. Even more importantly, coal and steel were the two 
most vital materials for developed nations; the backbone required to rebuild post-war 
economies. Coal was the primary energy source in Europe at this time, accounting for 
almost 70% of fuel consumption (CES, 2015), while steel was a fundamental material 
for industry which required large amounts of coal to manufacture. According to 
Meckling (2011:8) “These are the strategic sectors that the entire capitalist system 
builds on…”. Thus, the political decision to create the ECSC was affected by the 
structural power of particular capital groups.  
Business is not a homogeneous bloc with wholly common interests. On the 
contrary, different groups of capital often confront each other. As Newell and Pater-
son (1998:691) point out “…the particular interests of particular capitals 
and…capital-in-general are not the same thing. The structural power of capital does 
not necessarily mean that capital acts as homogenous bloc… the interests of capital-
in-general…may be in opposition to the immediate interests of particular capitals, 
because capitalists confront each other through competition in the market…”. The 
structural power of capital over national states is thus not identical across all coun-
tries. Moreover, member states are different not least because of their distinct modes 
of capital accumulation and may thus depend on different capital groups. For in-
stance, a coal industry may have more structural influence in coal-dependent country 
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than in one that depends on nuclear power. As a result, due to this diversity, capital 
sectors, as well as states, compete for dominance. 
Although it could be argued that certain progressive businesses play an im-
portant role in supporting the Commission’s forward-looking policies, the EU Com-
mission is not directly constrained by the structural power of businesses in the same 
way as national governments, as it does not directly depend on tax revenues or the 
provision of employment. In addition, the Commission is not directly elected, so its 
survival and legitimacy does not depend on voters who rely on businesses growth for 
their well-being. According to Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988:12) “Politicians 
seeking re-election must anticipate the impact of their policies on the decisions of 
firms because these decisions affect employment, inflation and personal income of 
voters: vote-seeking politicians are dependent on owners of capital because voters 
are”. Nevertheless, the Commission requires legitimacy to operate effectively, even if 
it is not directly elected. The Commission’s internal and external legitimacy stems 
from its historically created role to ensure lasting peace and economic development. 
As Feldman (1999:71) explained “The focus on peace…is a source of the EU’s legit-
imacy in the eyes of other international actors, and in the eyes of its own citizens”. 
However, in giving this prominence to peace, we must not underestimate the econom-
ic dimension of the Commission’s historical set up as economic factors are key in 
establishing a stable peace (Feldman, 1999). As has been argued, the Commission 
was historically set up to ensure the stabilisation and perpetuation of peace through 
long-term economic development. In order to sustain its legitimacy, the Commission 
thus needs to supervise and ensure continuous economic development. Moreover, the 
Commission’s ability to address collective action problems derives not from the 
structural power of coal and steel industries, even if they played a role in determining 
the positions of national governments, but from the Commission’s original mission to 
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plan for the future, take independent decisions, make recommendations and deliver 
opinions; all activities that involve an important discursive (ideological) element. As 
a result, the Commission can be understood as relatively autonomous institution, de-
signed to manage competing national and business interests in favour of broader Eu-
ropean interests. 
2. Struggles between conflicting interests in the process of EU governance 
Given the importance of an institution’s origins in understanding later policy 
developments, as posited in historical institutionalist accounts, one could argue that 
there is a dialectic tension between the Commission and member states embedded in 
the historical institutional setting of EU governance. According to Annett (2010a) 
“The experience of the ECSC…is clearly an establishment phase where formal insti-
tutions began operation and political actors (the representatives of the member states, 
the staff of the High Authority) developed their working processes and routines. We 
see in this period tension between…High Authority and the representatives of mem-
ber states as they each try to mould the emerging Community to their ideas, prefer-
ences and strategies”. It could be argued that the Commission’s path dependent long-
term orientation clashes with the particular, often short-term, interests of member 
states, as well as those of certain capital groups. The tension between short-term and 
long-term interests is often ignored in arguments about the EU’s institutional design. 
Historical institutionalism helps to identify this tension and to explain why certain 
players at the European institutional level clash with each other, and seek to protect 
their positions as well as to define the essence of EU energy policy in accordance 
with their historically constructed interests (Pierson, 1996). For example, I argue that 
member states contend with an EU Commission that wants to take an advantage of 
any opportunity to promote its forward-looking agenda. Although historical institu-
tionalism helps to explain path-dependent institutional conditions and functions, it is 
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thus not able to reveal how historical conditions are manifested through the struggles 
of competing hegemonic projects. The role of intentional agency is hence a necessary 
condition for a thorough understanding of hegemonisation in the EU energy domain. 
One important feature of the EU is that historical tensions between different 
players in EU institutional governance can result in a process of contestation between 
opposing groups. The key role of the Commission is to lead the process of struggle 
(in a Gramscian sense) and to advance its wider policy orientation through consensus 
building mechanisms. One could argue that the consensus-building function of the 
Commission has often been underestimated in the EU literature (Cini, 1996). Moreo-
ver, the Commission is often portrayed as an “honest broker” (impartial mediator) in 
consensus building processes. According to Moravcsik (1999:278) “supranational 
entrepreneurs wield power by mediating effectively among governments”. Neverthe-
less, I argue that the Commission is a proactive player which has its own incentives 
and interests to act as a “leader” rather than as “impartial mediator” (Rhodes and 
Thart, 2014). In addition, faced with diverse players and distinct interests, the Com-
mission aims to secure the consent of other players. As one official in the Commis-
sion pointed out “Officials in the Commission not only formulate and propose poli-
cies but they also attempt to get member-states and other stakeholders behind their 
policy lines. We are not only deciding but we are also fighting for our policies” (In-
terview 20). In my project, I argue that the Commission plays a more prominent role 
in manufacturing consensus regarding its long-term policy orientation rather than 
merely organising or mediating consensus. According to Hartlapp, et. al., (2014:218) 
“Given the EU’s complex institutional structure of shared power among the decision-
making institutions, the Commission has to constantly engage in consensus-
building…”. In addition, the Commission executes those strategies and tactics at its 
disposal in order to generate a consensus that goes beyond settling for the lowest 
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common denominator (Cini, 1996). This process of contestation, alongside the gov-
ernance system of EU, which tends towards seeking compromise, therefore allows us 
to explain why changes in EU energy policy have often been ambiguous and uneven. 
In the rest of this chapter I will elaborate on the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony, 
which allow me to explain the leadership role of the Commission in generating con-
sent regarding its historically established policy orientation. 
Lacking an account of agency, historical institutionalism is not able to provide 
adequate analytical resources to account for change and dynamics in processes of 
contestation, and thus the role of the Commission in manufacturing consensus in the 
EU. However, in my project I intend to account for such shifts in the development of 
EU energy policy. As Hay and Wincott (1998:954) explained “…historic institution-
alists have…placed considerable and growing emphasis on…institutions as the sub-
ject and focus of political struggle; and on the contingent nature of such struggles 
whose outcomes can no…be derived from the extant institutional context itself”. Ac-
cording to Schmidt (2008:1) “Historical institutionalist approaches have difficulty 
explaining change, tend to be static and equilibrium-focused...”. In this respect, I fo-
cus on the neo-Gramscian account on hegemony that provides a more comprehensive 
and detailed framework to reveal agency factors in the struggles over EU energy poli-
cy hegemony (Burawoy, 2012). For example, this approach gives us analytical re-
sources to account for the proactive role of the Commission in creating a consensus 
(neo-Gramscian hegemony) regarding EU energy policy. It provides us with re-
sources in order to account for the agential aspects of hegemonic practices, projects 
and strategies. In addition, it also allows us to explain how certain players resist 
changes and transformations. As Newell and Levy (2004:340) argued “…the neo-
Gramscian framework…provides a more systematic understanding of dynamic pro-
cesses of political contestation…”. Moreover, the neo-Gramscian perspective sheds 
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light on both endogenous and exogenous elements in the process of hegemony. This 
perspective brings endogenous factors into play and assumes that this struggle does 
not occur in a social and economic vacuum. However, compared with structural ac-
counts, the neo-Gramscians do not take the structure to be overly deterministic. His-
torically established institutional conditions do not determine concrete hegemonic 
struggles, but rather provide grounds for such actions and render them meaningful. 
The Gramscian focus on the process of evolving power struggles and shifting institu-
tional life cycles therefore brings the neo-Gramscian perspective into conversation 
with the more structuralist historical institutionalism, which explains how historically 
constructed institutional conditions affect the motives and interests of different play-
ers in the process of contestation. 
The historical institutionalist and neo-Gramscian traditions assume that cer-
tain exogenous crises (critical junctures) render tensions more visible and create the 
opportunity for other players, with different interests and ideologies, to challenge the 
existing order by providing realignment in the material, institutional and discursive 
domains. As Donelly and Hogan (2012:5) pointed out “The critical junctures theory 
argues that a critical juncture is made up of crisis, ideological change…and that, with-
in this context, policy and political entrepreneurs act as either carriers or barriers of 
change”. Gramsci talks about emerging shocks or crises which help to open up a 
space for alternative strategies to challenge the status quo. As Jagers et al. (2004:250) 
explained “Crises, such as that posed by a phenomenon like climate change, create 
particularly useful openings for actors wishing to advance such alternatives. Such 
crises can arise from changes in markets, regulations, technology, as well as relative 
pose positions and ideology, and while it lasts, the historical bloc is both fragile and 
open to challenge”. Moreover, Gramsci referred to “organic crises”, or structural and 
long-term discrepancies within the existing order. Cox (1987:273) defined organic 
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crisis as the situation when the “old forces are dying (but not yet dead) and the new 
are being born”. An important aspect of organic crisis is the emergence of a trans-
formative political agency, or historical bloc, with an alternative ideology to chal-
lenge the economic, moral and ethical underpinnings of the existing order. This tem-
porary vulnerability opens a way for players with competing interests and ideologies 
to rearticulate different elements and to initiate alternative policies that often lead to 
emerging processes of contestation. For example, due to historically established prin-
ciples, the Commission responds to exogenous shocks or crises in the energy domain 
by adopting a forward looking orientation which often clashes with the particular 
short-term interests of other players. There are therefore moments when crises or 
shocks lead to a temporary vulnerability that is used by opposing players to lead 
counter-hegemonic struggles. 
Although historical institutionalism helps to explain deeper institutional con-
ditions and functions, it is not able to reveal how these deeper underlying conditions 
are expressed through the role of various hegemonic projects. The role of intentional 
agency is thus a necessary condition for a thorough understanding of hegemonisation. 
There has been lack of attention to unravelling the mechanisms and strategies behind 
contestations within the European energy order. In order to explain contestation and 
consensus building during different periods in the EU energy domain, it is not enough 
to refer to historically embedded conditions that affect different actors or to exoge-
nous crises. What is needed is to understand the strategic realignment of forces in a 
conscious agency-led struggle. As Widmaier et al. explained (2007:749) 
“…exogenous shocks must be endogenously interpreted”. The neo-Gramscian ap-
proach explores how specific actors orient their strategies in light of calculations in-
fluenced by their historical DNA. The neo-Gramscian framework helps to understand 
how the Commission and other players used strategic actions in struggles surrounding 
51 
the EU energy policy domination. The neo-Gramscian account used in this project 
sheds light on the diversity of material, discursive and organizational strategies used 
by certain players seeking to have their particular interests accepted as general Euro-
pean interests (Andrée, 2004). The ideas of Antonio Gramsci (1971) are relevant for 
assessing the dynamics of the struggle for dominance in the energy policy domain. 
The conceptual cornerstone of the neo-Gramscian framework is the application of the 
concept of hegemony, as constituted within a historical bloc, that rests on a specific 
configuration of societal groups, economic structures, and concomitant ideological 
superstructures (Gramsci, 1971:181). In the neo-Gramscian tradition, hegemony is 
premised upon manufactured consent or consensus rather than coercion (Selby, 
2007). A historical bloc should be understood as a process that is initiated by con-
scious forces that use material, institutional and ideological resources in order to es-
tablish new hegemonic order. In my specific context, these resources could be re-
garded as EU leadership resources (Krotz and Schild, 2013, Bunse et al., 2005). In 
this project I argue that an aligning of these power resources creates hegemonic order. 
According to Levy and Egan (2003:805) “Hegemony rests on a broad base of con-
sent, which relies on coalitions and compromises that provide a measure of political 
and material accommodation with other social groups, and on ideologies that convey 
a mutuality of interests. Hegemonic stability is rooted in the institutions of civil socie-
ty…which play central role in ideological reproduction, providing legitimacy through 
the assertion of moral and intellectual leadership and the projection of particular set 
of interests as the general interests”. In other words, hegemony means the success of 
certain players in presenting their definition of reality, or their view of the world, in 
such a way that other groups accept it as “common sense”.  
From the neo-Gramscian perspective, the role of organic intellectuals is im-
portant in building hegemony. In traditional Gramscian perspective the role of organ-
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ic intellectuals is viewed from a rather narrow perspective of class struggle. Accord-
ing to Burawoy (2008) “Gramsci grounds truth in the experience of workers in the 
process of production and factory council, making way for what he calls “the organic 
intellectual,” embedded in the working class”. By reducing intellectuals to the role of 
proletariat or bourgeoisie intellectuals prevent us from exploring the role of certain 
individuals or groups in building energy/climate hegemony. As we live in different 
times with a variety of different issues that are often inter-linked, one must be flexible 
in interpreting Gramsci and applying his analytical concepts, including organic intel-
lectuals to the area of EU politics. It could be argued that the EU is a more complex 
and heterogeneous environment than national state. In addition, energy, being multi-
faceted and global domain, transcends the issue of class relations. For example, there 
might be different groups interested in creating a low-carbon hegemony, including 
certain energy industries, business associations, trade unions, international and regio-
nal environmental/energy organisations. As a result, this research broadens the tradi-
tional Gramscian meaning of organic intellectuals as radical activist rooted in certain 
social group. I argue that organic intellectuals irrespective of their relation to certain 
business groups and/or trade unions provide new thinking and organising elements 
for a new hegemonic bloc as well as stimulate public’s knowledge about certain is-
sues. In addition, energy sector being a cross-cutting issue that interconnects various 
policy domains, including economy, security, environment and/or transport yields its 
own variety of organizers, creators, mediators, and contemplators, such as academics, 
business leaders, energy and climate experts whom Gramsci labels organic intellectu-
als.  
There are two types of strategies in the fight for hegemony: the war of posi-
tion, which means gradually building a new hegemonic order within the existing en-
vironment, and passive revolution, which represents the reorganisation of power to 
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preserve the dominant class hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). Moreover, in a war of posi-
tion hegemony is reached through the alignment of material, institutional and discur-
sive dimensions (Levy and Newell, 2004). These dimensions are theoretical concepts 
that help to explain what we observe. Although these dimensions do interact, on cer-
tain occasions they exhibit some relative autonomy when some actions or events in 
one of these realms are not reducible to interaction between all three of them. The 
material dimension is constituted of technological development, financial instruments 
which are all directed towards the strengthening of market positions, and the material 
base of hegemony. As Sinclair (1996:10) explained “Material capabilities consists of 
dynamic productive capabilities (such as technology) and accumulated resources”. 
On the ideational level, the historical bloc uses discursive strategies to challenge the 
scientific, economic, social, political basis of certain order and provide a well-argued 
and convincing case for change (Jagers et al., 2004:250). Furthermore, in the institu-
tional (organizational) domain, the emerging historical bloc attempts to create the 
widest possible consensus to stabilize and perpetuate particular order through rules, 
regulations, and certain manipulative actions. Cox (1996:99) stated “Institutionaliza-
tion is a means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order…Institutions…can 
become a battleground of opposing tendencies…”. Discussing the institutional di-
mension in the European political context, I refer largely to the EU level. According 
to Newell (2008:525) “For hegemony to be exercised, though never complete, the 
material, organisational and discursive elements of power need to be closely aligned”. 
These three categories of power interact in a reciprocal rather than deterministic way 






Figure 3. Categories of power 
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Cox (1996:98) argued “No one-way determinism needs to be assumed among 
these three; the relationships can be assumed to be reciprocal. The question of which 
way the lines of force run is always a historical question to be answered by a study of 
the particular case”. Moreover, passive revolution explains what happens when a 
hegemonic bloc is challenged. One of the components of passive revolution is trans-
formismo, a strategy that allows us to understand how an existing bloc attempts to 
bring together a coalition of interests to incorporate and rearticulate potentially dan-
gerous ideas, adjusting them to its interests and thus maintaining status quo. Accord-
ing to Cox (1996:139) “Transformismo…absorbs potentially counterhegemonic ideas 
and makes these ideas consistent with hegemonic doctrine”. Here is where the neo-
Gramsian perspective helps to explain the entrepreneurial role of Commission in try-
ing to solve collective action problems. The focus on the strategies of the neo-
Gramscian approach therefore helps to explain contestation surrounding EU energy 
policy developments. 
The neo-Gramscian focus on hegemonisation helps us to explain how the 
Commission tries to address collective action problems. I argue that as an entrepre-
neur the Commission relies on discursive, and to some extent organisational, strate-






     











awareness of common long-term European interests. According to Cram (1998:71) 
argued “The Commission plays an important role in…promoting particular set of ide-
as which may encourage collective action among various transnational and domestic 
interests”.  One could argue that the Commission lacks structural leadership capabili-
ties because it only possesses a tiny budget and has limited material capabilities to 
use as bargaining leverage. In other words, due to a lack of financial capabilities the 
Commission is not able to offer significant side-payments and promise material re-
wards for supporting its policies (Young, 1991). In addition, the historical bloc led by 
the Commission might use organisational and negotiation skills to advance its policy 
orientation and strategically shape the form in which issues are devised and presented 
(Young, 1991). However, at the end of the day its success at the institutional level 
largely depends on the Council’s consent. As a supranational policy entrepreneur, the 
Commission is thus rather constrained and has relatively low resources aside from 
discourse and persuasion. 
The neo-Gramscian perspective allows us to explain how, despite a lack of 
material resources, the Commission attempts to address collective action problems 
through its discursive resources. According to Augelli and Murphy (1997:28) “…one 
cannot explain effective collective action without taking into account the emotional 
power of the narratives aimed at binding people together”. The neo-Gramscians focus 
on George Sorel’s concept of motivating myths, the stories which create unity among 
particular players bent on transformation by effectively orienting and motivating their 
actions. These myths are the instruments which help to address collective action prob-
lems as they help to organise a collective will. As Augelli and Murphy (1997:28) ex-
plained “…collectivities bound together historically by particular myths - and the in-
dividual within them – are, themselves, transformed…”. Moreover, Gramsci himself 
used the concept of myth as central part to the formation of collective subjectivity. 
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Indeed, intellectual leaders, through the promotion of motivating myths, provide an 
understanding of the world and a political/economic vision that binds other players 
towards collective goals in a concrete historical bloc (Augelli and Murphy, 1997). In 
my project I argue that, in the wake of certain exogenous crisis or events, the Com-
mission and organic intellectuals create and use motivating myths as weapons in the 
process of hegemonisation. I contend that neo-Gramscian organic intellectuals play 
an important role in providing certain myths that help to forge collective consent in 
the creation of an historical bloc. In addition, these myths are powerful narratives that 
create unity among the bloc by describing the process by which the bloc could be 
successful and by promising its ultimate victory. For example, the idea of “ever closer 
union” which was embodied in the Treaty of Rome could serve as an example of a 
motivating myth. It was based on the dual narrative of hope that a newly united Eu-
rope will generate not only a strong impetus that will result in the prosperity for all, 
but also that it will ensure security against the Soviet threat (Topaloff, 2014). As a 
result, the Commission’s collective action orientation is executed through discursive 
actions. In the following paragraphs I will elaborate on the use of strategic actions at 
the institutional and discursive levels. 
In order to reveal the dynamics of hegemonic contestation by using political 
manipulation at the institutional (organizational) level, I will use Riker’s logic of her-
esthetics, the process of constructing political choices so as to be able to manipulate 
outcomes and to get preferable results. As Shepsle (2002) pointed out “…politicians 
must master…the institutional resources at their disposal. The punch line here is that 
institutional arrangements provide both obstacles to and opportunities for strategic 
maneuvering…”. One example of this maneuvering is the manipulation of the dimen-
sionality of the issue space. Riker (1986:ix) explained “Heresthetics…refer to a polit-
ical strategy…It is true that people win politically because they have induced other 
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people to join them in alliances and coalitions. But the winners induce by more than 
political attraction. Typically they win because they have set up a situation in such a 
way that other people will want to join them – or will feel forced by circumstances to 
join them – even without any persuasion at all”. In contrast with transformismo, 
which involves bringing about the widest possible coalition of interests and absorbing 
counter-hegemonic ideas through certain rhetorical mechanisms, heresthetics sheds 
light on an understanding of the Commission’s strategic behavior that can arise from 
different sources and in different ways. As Mclean (2001:10) pointed out “Rhetoric is 
the art of verbal persuasion. Heresthetics is the art and science of political manipula-
tion”. In other words, transformismo shows how, at the discursive level, persuasive 
arguments attempt to neutralise opposing ideas, whereas heresthetics explains how 
one structures the world so that one can win. For instance, in the mid-1990s, as a re-
sponse to the Commission’s model of energy liberalization, the anti-liberalisation 
bloc proposed an alternative single buyer model of liberalization which attempted to 
strategically reframe the issue of energy market liberalisation, to break the unity of 
the pro-liberalisation bloc at the institutional level and to keep the monopolistic ener-
gy order intact. Moreover, this alternative liberalization proposal structured a winning 
situation for the anti-liberalisation bloc as it led to divisions between different com-
missioners and member states on how the process of energy liberalization should be 
conducted. In order to acquire support for processes of contestation certain players 
therefore make use of heresthetics. 
Given the complex and heterogeneous nature of the EU energy policy domain, 
there are different visions within the Commission on what constitutes long-term de-
velopment and which forward-looking pro-growth policy aspects need to be adopted. 
Moreover, it could be argued that the Commission’s path dependent forward looking 
European interests might be in conflict with the particular, often short-term, interests 
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of member states as well as those of certain capital groups. Due to a lack of material 
resources the Commission and other players, especially those from civil society, often 
rely on discursive actions in their attempts to lead energy policy hegemonisation. As 
Apeldoorn (2002:20) pointed out “In connection to hegemony, then, ideology as-
sumes the task of ‘unifying’ and ‘cementing’ the ‘social bloc’ upon which rule by 
consent rests. This involves first of all a process of ideological articulation of diverse 
and initially opposed ideological elements into a single ideological discourse, which 
is then the expression of a hegemonic world view inasmuch as it transcends the nar-
row ‘interests’ of the leading social group”.  
Furthermore, as I have already argued, hegemony is never complete and is 
always contested by competing ideologies such as, in this case, those of economic 
growth, energy and climate. Fiske (1987:41) stated “Hegemony is a constant struggle 
against a multitude of resistances to ideological domination, and any balance of forc-
es that it achieves is always precarious, always in need of re-achievement”. The neo-
Gramscian account lacks mechanisms to account for hegemonic contestation over the 
ideational dimension during certain energy policy phases. We thus need certain addi-
tional resources through which we can assess the dynamics of ideational formations 
and operationalise the neo-Gramscian strategy of transformismo. I will supplement 
my analysis with various rhetorical instruments, including narratives, generative met-
aphors and new discursive categories. In addition, the use of the post-structuralist 
political logics of equivalence and difference as framing devices will allow me to re-
veal the architecture of the policy arguments used by different groups to justify, legit-
imize or denounce certain policy decisions, thus contributing to a recontextualisation 
and transformation of energy policy. Griggs and Howarth (2013:47) pointed out “Po-
litical logics enable analysts to explain and potentially criticise the emergence and 
formation of a social practice or regime. Of particular importance in this regard are 
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the logics of equivalence and difference. The former enable the research to grasp the 
way in which political frontiers are constructed via the linking together of social de-
mands and identities, while the latter capture the way in which demands are negated, 
disarticulated, mediated and negotiated by various institutions”. It must be pointed 
out that I do not apply a poststructuralist theoretical approach with an ontological po-
sition that ascribes a causal impact to ideas. In my project, political logics are used 
only as descriptive framing devices to show how different players try to couple or 
decouple different policy demands in the overall contestation of energy policy 
hegemonisation. I will explain my theoretical position vis-à-vis the post-structuralist 
approach later in this chapter (section 4.3) when I discuss the benefits and deficien-
cies of ideational theoretical perspectives.    
The synthesis of historical institutionalism and neo-Gramscian perspectives 
with some elements of the post-structuralist account allows me to properly address 
my research questions. First, the use of historical institutionalism explains the distinct 
role of the EU Commission in promoting a forward-looking pro-growth orientation. 
Due to the complexity of the energy domain, as well as the existence of heterogene-
ous interests and ideologies, energy policy is a subject of continual contestation be-
tween the Commission’s long-term view and particular, often short-term, interests 
promoted by state and non-state players. Historical institutionalism is not able ac-
count for these endogenous struggles, nor can it reveal the proactive role of the 
Commission in manufacturing consensus during different phases of EU energy poli-
cy. In order to account for conflict, change and dynamics I use a neo-Gramscian ap-
proach that provides a strategy of hegemony through the use of material, institutional 
and discursive strategies. Moreover, the Commission and other players often rely on 
discursive elements to address collective action problems. I will analyse how compet-
ing policy arguments are constructed by using certain techniques of interpretative 
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analysis, such as metaphors and categories. In addition, post-structuralist logics will 
be used to explore how policy arguments are coupled and decoupled in order to justi-
fy, legitimize or denounce certain policy decisions. I will put my theoretical frame-
work to work in analysing the concrete phases of EU energy policy in the empirical 
chapters. Having defined the main elements of my approach, in the following sections 
of this chapter I will compare the explanatory potential of my theoretical account with 
more mainstream theoretical perspectives. While there are some elements of common 
ground between these different positions, I argue that the alternative approaches are 
not able to provide a thorough and convincing explanation of the shifts and continu-
ous contestations over EU energy policy.  
3. Alternative approaches 
Contestations during different phases in the development of EU energy policy, 
and the role of the EU Commission, could also be interpreted from other perspectives. 
Although the neo-Gramscian approach, informed by an historical institutionalist per-
spective, explains embedded contestation between long-term and short-term interests 
and helps to reveal how the mechanisms of this struggle is waged between different 
actors, other perspectives may contribute in explaining different aspects of energy 
policy developments. In the following sections I will assess the contributions and 
shortcomings of other approaches in explaining different aspects of energy policy 
developments. At the outset, it must be pointed out that I will not compare the general 
differences and similarities between these theoretical frameworks. On the contrary, in 
relation to my research questions, I will look at the role and power of agents in their 
attempts to lead energy policy developments. As a result, this will shed the light on 




3.1. State-centric approaches 
The realist school believes that power lies at the root of state behaviour, and 
that international law and international organisations play only a minor role. There 
are several ramifications in these realist theoretical underpinnings. With respect to 
attitudes regarding the international or regional political arena, cooperation and con-
flicts between different actors, and the role of corporations and other non-state actors 
in international affairs, realism acknowledges a state-centric reading. As Meckling 
argues (2005:12) “Realism contends that the power-seeking state remains the most 
important agent…”. There are several strands of realism. For example, state-centric 
realism envisages the state as an autonomous agent in which a plurality of officials 
compete over the definition of the national interest. According to Meckling (2005:12) 
“…the core state is thought to be an effective gatekeeper between domestic non-state 
interests and the international, possessing agency itself”. At the end of the 1970s, 
Waltz (1979) elaborated on neo-realist theoretical understanding with the primacy of 
the anarchical international system dominated by states. As Dannreuther (2010:1) 
argues “…realism…main assumptions were that the international system is anar-
chical, that the structure of the system is determined by the distribution of power be-
tween states (the balance of power), and that the internal nature of the state (i.e. 
whether it is democratic or authoritarian) has no material structural impact on interna-
tional relations”. The validity of state-centric realism after the end of the Cold War 
has been contested, not least because it does not take into account the significance of 
other actors. Realist work on the EU has been quite diverse. Realist scholarship offers 
a cautionary analysis of both European integration and of the EU’s role in the world, 
pointing to the importance of material interests and the significance of structural fac-
tors that may impede intra-EU relations and the transatlantic alliance. For example, 
defensive realists such as Grieco tried to explain the success of the success of EU in-
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tegration in post-Cold War Europe through the neorealist “voice opportunities hy-
pothesis”, where he argues that states seek to ensure that any cooperative arrange-
ments they construct will include effective voice opportunities (Grieco, 1996).  
Realism seems more obviously able to explain the security related concerns of 
EU energy policy, including supply problems and growing energy dependence on 
Russia. Realists would underline the importance of energy supply due to the intimate 
relationship between energy and state security. With its emphasis on geopolitics, rela-
tive gains realism could provide a thorough understanding of developments in Eu-
rope’s energy security realm. For example, some realists may argue that given the 
2006 and 2009 gas crises, tense geopolitical relations with Russia, and the lack of a 
common approach, EU member states are not interested in European cooperation and 
prefer to deal with issues unilaterally. European countries saw a potential cut in the 
energy supply as a threat to their security and survival. Some could thus argue that 
this response to security challenges is largely a realist response, which focuses pri-
marily on relative gains at the state level. In response to realist arguments, one may 
argue that, even in the security realm, the EU is developing a range of collective re-
sponses that would be difficult to explain through the prism of relative gains. For ex-
ample, following the 2009 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, new collective in-
struments such as the EU Gas Coordination Group were created. Even in the security 
domain, energy could be regarded as a public good that involves collective actions by 
all member states. Realism could explain such collective action through the hegemon-
ic stability theory that argues that the leading state (hegemon) could play a significant 
role in fostering cooperation (Keohane, 1984). In this respect, realists would argue 
that a powerful member state such as Germany pushed for a common European ap-
proach on energy security. However, this view is rather unconvincing and implausible 
because throughout the 1990s and 2000s the most powerful EU countries, such as 
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Germany, the UK and France, have been ardent critics of a common EU approach in 
the energy domain, fiercely resisting any attempts to breakdown their individual long-
term supply contracts with Russian gas monopolist Gazprom. Moreover, another cri-
tique of realism is that energy policy is not just about security in a narrow realist un-
derstanding. Realism is less useful in explaining contestations over shifts in ap-
proaches to climate change and, to some extent, the economic competitiveness di-
mensions of EU energy policy. With regards to the explanation of developments in 
the climate change and economic competitiveness dimensions, the realist-centred ac-
count is not convincing as it would only regard the most powerful EU Member States 
as primary actors who govern the construction of energy policy (Kirchner and Berk, 
2010). On the contrary, with regards to climate change, one can see growing coopera-
tion at the EU level, generated by the pro-active role of the EU Commission and other 
non-state players. Realism thus has blind spots in explaining those aspects of energy 
policy developments which are not directly related to hard security concerns. 
Sharing some arguments with traditional realist understanding, Moravscik 
(1998) developed liberal intergovernmentalism, a theory which puts more emphasis 
on the role of domestic society as the source of state power, and by arguing that state 
behaviour in the international or regional arenas depends on the configuration of in-
terests between interdependent states. Moreover, liberal intergovernmentalism em-
phasises that the EU is primarily understood as a successful intergovernmental forum 
designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy-
coordination. In addition, Moravscik’s account is centred on domestic politics and 
national executives rather than supranational institutions and non-state players. As 
Moravscik (1993:481) explained “National interests…emerge through domestic polit-
ical conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transna-
tional coalitions form, and new policy alternatives are recognised by governments. 
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An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for…the analysis of the stra-
tegic interaction among states”. Liberal intergovernmentalists view national govern-
ments as engaged in a permanent two-level game where a government’s preferences 
are derived from processes of domestic politics, and these preferences are bargained 
in intergovernmental forums, primarily the European Council (Rosamond, 2002). 
Furthermore, supranational institutions are considered as playing only a marginal role 
in the conduct of intergovernmental negotiations, rather than a determining one. Insti-
tutions promote international cooperation by disseminating information and policy 
ideas. As Verhoeff and Niemann (2011:1274) pointed out “…for Moravcsik the role 
of supranational institutions is limited…He does not ascribe them a significant influ-
ence on decision outcomes. Instead, they are used by governments as a platform to 
pursue their own interest”. 
There are certain aspects of the liberal intergovernmental tradition which can 
limit our understanding of EU energy policy developments. First, the realist and lib-
eral intergovernmentalist accounts tend to remain too state-centric in explaining shifts 
in EU energy policy. It could be argued that the liberal intergovernmental perspective 
neglects the important role of the Commission in EU energy policy formation. In ad-
dition, the influence of business and civil society groups are not taken into account. 
Especially in such broad and far-reaching domains as energy or climate, an explicit 
focus on the state level, without taking into account the interests of state and non-state 
players, renders the analysis less comprehensive and less able to explain struggles for 
dominance in these areas. According to Dannreuther (2010:4) “In terms of interna-
tional energy politics, this involves a criticism that too much attention is accorded to 
states and inter-state competition and too little attention to the autonomous role of 
transnational actors…”. I argue that, in order to account for shifts and contestations in 
the energy area, we must take into account the forward-looking pro-active role of the 
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Commission in initiating long-term general European interests and promoting new 
visions of the energy future. Although some insights of liberal intergovernmentalism 
could be related to the neo-Gramscian understanding, especially in explaining the 
importance of states and the domestic political context in energy policy domain, the 
liberal intergovernmentalist approach, in general, remains deficient in explaining the 
role of non-state actors, including the Commission, in the struggle for energy 
hegemonisation. For example, the theoretical account used in my project does not 
neglect the important role played by national preferences with regards to the devel-
opment of the EU energy order. However, compared with liberal intergovernmental-
ism, which does not systematically incorporate the structural effects of capital, I ar-
gue that, due to inseparable linkages between energy and economic growth, national 
preferences are affected by the structural constraints of capital’s particular interests. 
The structural power of capital is not a uniform factor for all member states. States 
have distinct modes and strategies of capital accumulation, and they thus might be 
structurally dependent on different groups of capital. According to Pierson 
(1996:159) “While the member states remain extremely powerful…their influence is 
increasingly circumscribed, and embedded in a dense, complex institutional environ-
ment that cannot easily be described in the language of inter-state bargaining”. Alt-
hough the historical institutionalist and the neo-Gramscian perspectives accept the 
liberal intergovernmental proposition regarding the importance of national prefer-
ences in energy policy development, the latter does not take into account the structur-
al constraints of capital in explaining the formation of these preferences.  
3.2. Liberal-oriented traditions 
In the liberal tradition, the world is one of complex interdependence founded 
on the principle of absolute rather than relative gains. In other words, liberalism ex-
plains how actors may prefer cooperation and absolute gains instead of seeking rela-
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tive gains. As it has been argued “…the world is one of complex interdependence 
created by the beneficial effects…of the global market economy, creating the need for 
international institutions and regimes to manage this interdependence” (Apeldoorn et 
al., 2003:20). On the contrary from realism, liberalism takes into account a plurality 
of state and non-state actors. Furthermore, neofunctionalism could be considered as 
sharing some of the ramifications of the liberal tradition. This perspective considers 
the importance of non-state players, including EU institutions. As Niemann and 
Schmitter (2009:48) made clear “Once established, institutions can take on a life of 
their own and progressively escape the control of their creators”. For example, the 
Commission is considered as playing an important and independent role. Nugent 
(2001:219) explained “What must also be recognised…is the important and inde-
pendent role of non-governmental actors. The Commission is generally seen as being 
the most prominent of those non-governmental actors”. In addition, supranationalists 
underline the prominence of the Commission in shaping the policy agenda, and for-
mulating and drafting policy proposals (Nugent, 2000). Niemann and Schmitter 
(2009:50) pointed out “…the Commission…occupies a privileged position of central-
ity and authority, enabling it not only to direct the dynamics of relations among states 
but also the relations of interest groups within each state”. The concept of spillover is 
used in neofunctionalist explanations in order to identify the driving force and logic 
for change, i.e. how the creation of common policy in one sector generates the need 
to transfer policy making in related sectors to the supranational level (Apeldoorn et 
al., 2009). For example, with regards to energy policy, supranationalists would argue 
that changes in energy domain in the 2000s followed the logic of spillover, which was 
triggered by the success of energy market liberalization in the 1990s. 
With regards to explanations of the shifts in EU energy policy, the liberal ap-
proach focuses on the issue of complex interdependence, and thus on external influ-
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ences on EU energy policy. The concept of complex interdependence is especially 
relevant in explaining actions in the climate change dimension. Liberals would argue 
that climate change developments could be regarded as an example of complex inter-
dependence, i.e. EU actions on climate and potential solutions to climate change de-
pend on what other regions or states do. Although the EU has been trying to play a 
leadership role in the climate change domain, its actions ultimately depend primarily 
on the world’s biggest polluters, the US and China. Some argue that complex interde-
pendence can partly explain developments in this domain. Nevertheless, the liberal 
understanding does not capture all aspects of what the EU Commission is doing here. 
At the EU level, climate change has been regarded not only as an environmental is-
sue, driven by complex interdependence, but to a large extent as a long-term growth 
constraining issue. For example, the Commission views that climate change would 
eventually hit productivity in key sectors such as agriculture. Moreover, the Commis-
sion views climate-oriented investments and innovations as important pillars for long-
term growth (European Council, 2000). In other words, the EU is not just reciprocally 
contributing towards climate change as a global public good, but is also attempting to 
use it as a springboard for forward-looking development. The neo-Gramscian ap-
proach informed by a historical institutionalist perspective can thus better accommo-
date this explanation as it is able to take into account the historical creation of the 
EU’s institutional framework, as well as long-term socio-economic conditions.        
In explaining shifts in EU energy policy and the influence of different actors, 
liberal oriented accounts underline the independent role of the Commission and other 
non-state actors in launching new energy policy initiatives (Eikeland, 2008). Moreo-
ver, supranationalists could argue that the Commission has been playing a proactive 
and integrative leadership role in leading changes in EU energy policy (Niemann and 
Schmitter, 2009). For example, the decision to focus on energy market liberalisation 
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could be regarded as a result of the functional spillover effect generated by the gen-
eral single market agenda. Nevertheless, on the contrary from historic institutional-
ism, supranationalists do not explain the origins of the long-term growth-oriented 
nature of the EU Commission. Although my theoretical perspective takes the Com-
mission as the leading force in fostering shifts, in contrast with supranationalist un-
derstandings it also considers its proactive forward-looking stance as stemming not 
from the automatic logic of spillover, which is essentially a deterministic structural 
pressure, but from its historical institutional set-up based on the French public admin-
istration tradition of planning. In other words, one could argue that the Commission’s 
attempts to lead the development of a new long-term energy order have been caused 
not by the mechanism of “spillover”, but by the long-term objective of ensuring a 
viable regime of economic development. Compared with supranationalism, the neo-
Gramscians do not take the structure as overly deterministic but as shaped and re-
shaped by the strategic actions of different players. The neo-Gramscian framework 
transcends an overly structural understanding of change, and thus illuminates the role 
of agency in the struggle for hegemonisation within three sites of power (material, 
institutional, discursive). As Cox (1987:395) explained “…structures are not in any 
deeper sense prior to human drama itself….Structures are not “givens” (data), they 
are mades (facts)…”. Furthermore, another important shortcoming of supranational-
ism is that it does not elaborate on the question of power. For example, supranational-
ist perspectives do not explain why some groups are more successful and powerful in 
influencing developments in the energy policy domain. As Apeldoorn et al. (2003:23) 
argue “The crucial problem with supranationalism is that many important aspects of 
this approach remain rather under authorized. For example, there is no explanation of 
where transnational interests come from and why they would be so powerful”. In or-
der to understand and explain why some groups have more influence, in my neo-
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Gramscian theoretical account I recognise the structural power of capital vis-à-vis the 
state. However, the Commission is not constrained by the structural power of capital 
as, on the contrary from member states, it is not directly dependent on business for 
taxation or employment. Despite certain common understandings with the neo-
Gramscian perspective, supranationalists do not therefore explain the origin of the 
Commission’s forward-looking policies.  
3.3. Ideational perspectives 
Constructivism emerged as a result of the critique of realist and liberal orient-
ed approaches. Some constructivists accentuate the role of ideas in the process of 
structural change. For example, Blyth (2002:11) claims that “ideas allow agents to 
reduce uncertainty, propose a particular solution to a moment of crisis, and empower 
agents to resolve that crisis by constructing new institutions in line with these ideas”. 
There are different branches of constructivism. For example, Wendt (1999) develops 
the structural constructivist thinking and his central argument is that political action is 
driven by the ideational not material factors. According to Sikkink (2011:21) 
“…“structural constructivism” focuses on the deep ideational structures that guide 
state behaviour. In many situations, these constructivists argue, states and individuals 
don’t make rational choices about what to do but instead are guided by almost auto-
matic understandings of what is appropriate behaviour in particular circumstances”. 
In addition, Wendt’s version of constructivism is state-centric in explaining change. 
As Wendt explained “…system change ultimately happens through states” (Wendt, 
1999:9). Moreover, other constructivist perspectives such as social constructivism 
highlight the intersubjective quality of convergent expectations as a necessary condi-
tion for cooperation. According to the social constructivist approach, constant interac-
tions at the EU level affect the national positions. As Risse (2009:148) claimed 
“…actors try to figure out the appropriate rule in a given social situation. It follows 
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that social institutions including the EU can no longer be viewed as ‘external’ to ac-
tors. Rather, actors, including corporate actors such as national governments, firms, 
or interest groups are deeply embedded in and affected by the social institutions in 
which they act”. Social constructivists thus underline that the actions and interests of 
different players are shaped by their interactions at the EU level.  
Other ideational perspectives such as post-structuralism assume that human 
reliance on language is so complete that there is nothing outside language. There are 
obvious similarities between social constructivism and post-structuralism. As social 
constructivists, the post-structuralists focus on discourse as bounded areas of social 
knowledge and argue that meaning is derived from the historical, social, cultural, and 
institutional context in which discourse is conducted. However, on the contrary from 
social constructivism the post-structuralists reject the distinction between the material 
and ideational dimensions. Instead of seeing structure and agency as two different 
entities the post-structuralists assume that these entities are directly implicated in each 
other through discursive practices. As de Goede claims (2001:152) “Discourse pro-
vides criteria of intelligibility that establish the conditions of possibility for social 
being and, as such, cannot be considered as separate from, or secondary to, the mate-
rial realm”. In terms of EU governance and decision-making, the post-structuralists 
envisage a free flow of discourse without explaining the origins of discursive for-
mations. Moreover, post-structuralists focus on state-nation discourses where the cen-
tral place for discursive contestation is the national setting. According to Waever 
(2009:173) “The theory does allow for a European (‘Brussels’) scene as an overlap-
ping layer, but this is secondary to the basic construction in terms national spaces. In 
this sense, it… privileges national context over socio-economic orientation”. Fur-
thermore, post-structuralist analysis emphasises the inherent tensions in any attempt 
to create coherent EU wide policy discourse. 
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Neither constructivism nor post-structuralism can thoroughly explain the stra-
tegic contestation between heterogeneous groups in the EU energy policy domain 
during its different phases. Structural constructivists underplay the significance of the 
role of non-state players, including the Commission in explaining contestation and 
shifts in EU energy policy. Moreover, the underlying power structures are not recog-
nized and/or explored because of the delinking of ideational contestation from mate-
rial constrains. In other words, the missing part is the analysis of why certain players 
use one discourse or the other and how it relates to broader structural conditions. For 
example, I argue that due to the importance of stable and adequate supplies of energy 
for economic growth, certain business groups structurally affect the energy discourses 
of some member states. In addition, I claim that there might be exogenous and rela-
tively autonomous shocks, such as the eruption of economic crisis, energy disruptions 
or technological advances which affect energy policy phases and which cannot be 
explained solely within the discursive realms. However, in line with some construc-
tivist accounts, I argue that ideas are not just automatic reflections of material condi-
tions. On the contrary, the relationship between different domains is reciprocal, 
meaning that powerful ideas might equally affect material and/or institutional dimen-
sion(s). Furthermore, the post-structuralist focus on the distinctiveness of national 
discourses does not allow us to reveal the emergence of EU wide policy discourse in 
the process of ideational contestation. The role of agency is not developed in certain 
post-structuralist traditions. It does not allow us to account for how different players 
in the energy domain attempt to create change and transform ideas in order to estab-
lish hegemony. For instance, one would not be able to explain the Commission’s at-
tempts to provide forward-looking energy policy. Furthermore, these struggles are 
reduced to discursive contestations, neglecting institutional and material power do-
mains at the EU level. In order to provide a thorough explanation of contestations 
72 
during different phases of energy policy one must also reveal the material, ideational 
and institutional strategies.  
My theoretical approach resonates to some extent with critical constructivism 
(Apeldoorn et all., 2003). Referring to critical constructivism Apeldoorn (2002:15) 
explained “Ideas can neither be simply reduced to interests nor (as in idealism) be 
reified as existing prior to practice. It is only in human activity that ideas are generat-
ed…”. In line with some neo-Gramscian approaches (Cox, 1987), I make a distinction 
between two kinds of ideas, “intersubjective meanings” and “collective images”. I 
argue that the formation of certain intersubjective meanings, or shared notions of the 
nature of EU organisational and decision making objectives, cannot be understood 
without examining historically conditioned circumstances. For example, I argue that 
the EU historical institutional set-up affects the way that individuals and groups are 
able to understand their roles and interests. In other words, the claim that the content 
of any ideological practice is shaped by the institutional position of the players who 
engages in it is upheld here (Apeldoorn, 2002). Moreover, the other kinds of ideas 
relevant for the formation of hegemony are collective images of a particular order or 
situation held by different players. The rival collective images held by different actors 
clash and thus provide the opportunity for alternative paths towards discursive he-
gemony (Cox, 1987). According to Bieler (2000:13) “…neo-Gramscian perspectives 
take into account the independent role of ideas. On the one hand, they are considered 
to be a part of the overall structure in the form of “intersubjective meanings”…On the 
other hand, ideas may be used by actors as “weapons” in order to legitimise particular 
policies and are important in that they form part of a hegemonic project…”. In my 
research I focus on struggles at the ideational level and explain how different players 
use ideas as weapons in hegemonic struggles. In addition, I argue that agency 
equipped with powerful ideas might have an influence on the material and institution-
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al dimensions. On the contrary from more deterministic reading of constructivism, I 
treat ideas as competing ideologies that certain groups often use in a war of position 
in order to establish policies, norms, and institutions that affect the formation of the 
EU energy future in one way or another. The approach presented here explores the 
capabilities of, and attempts by, state and non-state players to spread ideas in a pro-
cess of hegemonisation, thus raising questions of power and influence. In other 
words, the dissemination of ideas is not a quasi-automatic process but depends on 
actors’ discursive, material and institutional capabilities and skills. As Apeldoorn 
(2002:9) explained “…ideas do not float about in an endless universe of meaning, but 
are seen as produced by human agency…”. In order to understand the dynamics of 
discursive struggle it is important to link ideological discourse to agency, i.e. to 
acknowledge that it is dependent upon human practice for its reproduction and trans-
formation (Apeldoorn, 2002). As a result, I focus on the dynamic ideational struggles 
in the process of hegemonisation. In order to explain the role of the Commission in 
the process of manufacturing consensus, I consider ideas as intervening variables 
used by actors together with material and ideational strategies. 
Summary: An analytical framework 
 By using historical institutionalist accounts in my project, I argue that contes-
tation between the Commission’s path dependent long-term orientation and the par-
ticular interests of member states and other non-state players generate a process of 
contestation that eventually shapes certain changes the prominence within EU energy 
policy. This change comes partly out of a struggle which can be explained and illu-
minated by using a neo-Gramscian approach. I will focus on the role and power of the 
Commission and other state and non-state actors in the construction of a forward-
looking hegemonic energy order. Despite the lack of state-like attributes and powers, 
we should still take into account the role of the Commission in leading the develop-
74 
ments and changes in the EU energy policy. Due to its historical institutional DNA, 
based on the principle of long-term economic planning, the EU Commission could be 
considered as a forward-looking institution. Moreover, the Commission is interested 
in economic development in order to help preserve sustainable peace in Europe. In 
addition, in periods of more inclusive growth, it is easier for the Commission to pro-
mote long-term policies because they are more receptive among other actors. Fur-
thermore, the Commission’s forward-looking policies can be in conflict with the poli-
cies of member states in the Council and other non-state players. 
Following this line of argument, one could argue that, due to its ability to re-
veal the mechanisms and strategies of struggle over energy policy and to reveal the 
proactive role of the Commission in this contestation, the neo-Gramscian approach 
goes hand in hand with historical institutionalism. Compared with other theoretical 
perspectives that narrow the explanatory picture by providing either overly structural 
or overly agent-based explanations, the neo-Gramscian perspective focuses on the 
three dimensions of hegemonisation to allow us to bridge the agency-structure di-
chotomy in order to show how a struggle over interests is taking place in the EU 
across these three dimensions: the material, organisational and discursive. In addition, 
the neo-Gramscian approach explains the use of hegemonic actions at the ideational 
level in order to resolve collection action problems. Moreover, it allows us to under-
stand more comprehensive developments in the energy sector, and to provide a more 
informative account of European-wide energy hegemonisation. The main advantage 
of the neo-Gramscian approach lies in a multidimensional concept of hegemony. Its 
central assertion is that, compared with national governments, the Commission is able 
to transcend the short-term structural constraints of capital accumulation and lead the 
development of long-term energy policy. Moreover, state and non-state actors com-
pete at the EU level in order to lead energy policy hegemonisation. Together with 
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states, and environmental and social NGOs, the Commission is trying to create he-
gemony over its long-term policy orientation in energy domain. For example, with 
regards to the construction of EU energy policy, the neo-Gramscian framework helps 
to explain how pro-liberalisation or pro-decarbonisation blocs attempt to construct 
hegemonic order by exercising the material, organisational and discursive elements of 
power. In addition, it helps us to understand how the existing bloc attempts to main-
tain the status quo and dismantle the counter-hegemonic war of position by various 
strategic actions. Its lack of certain material powers gives the Commission an incen-
tive to focus more on other levels, such as the discursive. In addition, my theoretical 
perspective acknowledges the relevance of agency-led discursive struggles between 
different players. In order to flesh out the strategic dimension of discursive struggles, 
and to expose the practical nature of strategies of transformismo, I apply some rhetor-
ical instruments and use the post-structuralist logics of equivalence and difference. 
Both realist and liberal-oriented understandings, as well as social constructiv-
ist and discursive approaches, offer competing explanatory perspectives. These alter-
native readings all grasp certain relevant aspects of the struggle to lead the construc-
tion of a new energy future in Europe. For instance, realism and liberal intergovern-
mentalism help to explain the significance of states as important actors in developing 
EU energy security policy. Moreover, the liberal-oriented account deepens our under-
standing of the role of supranational actors, including the EU Commission. Further-
more, constructivism points to the importance of intersubjective ideas in the struggle 
for the creation of a new energy security order. Some less radical and more agency-
oriented discourse approaches analyse how different actors are engaged in ideational 
struggles by framing energy issues in a particular way. The neo-Gramscian approach, 
informed by the historical institutionalist framework, overlaps in one way or another 
with certain aspects of a critical constructivist perspective. For example, although the 
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neo-Gramscians reject a state-centric understanding in their analysis, the importance 
of states in the struggle for hegemony does play an important role in my approach. In 
addition, the neo-Gramscian perspective acknowledges the relevance of agency-
oriented critical constructivism and the importance of ideologies in the hegemonic 
struggle between different blocs. 
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Chapter 2 
The struggle for energy market liberalisation 
Introduction 
Over the course of development of the European Communities, and prior to 
the creation of the European Union in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, 
attempts to create European energy policy were unsuccessful. Despite the fact that 
two of the three original treaties, the ECSC and Euroatom, both concerned energy, 
the establishment of a common European approach to energy challenges was never 
fully realized. Energy has always been a primarily national security issue, i.e. coun-
tries were mainly interested in the security of their energy supply in order to ensure 
stable economic growth.  
The development of energy policy in Europe can be separated into several pe-
riods. First, after the Second World War and until the 1960s, energy supply was a 
major problem facing the six members of the ECSC. At this time energy was largely 
produced from domestic coal supplies (Andersen, 2000a), and energy cooperation led 
to wider European economic and political cooperation. Second, from the 1960s until 
the mid-1970s, due to the transition to cheap oil, energy was not a pressing issue on 
the European agenda (Andersen, 2000a). There were thus no major breakthroughs in 
energy cooperation at this time. In the third period, from the mid-1970s and a large 
part of 1980s, a preoccupation with the security of energy supplies was developed 
due to problems with oil prices and the stability of supply. Since then one can see 
complex evolving processes to create European energy policy, often responding to 
certain external events and shocks. It could be argued that, in the mid-1980s, there 
was a paradigm shift in the European energy domain as a number of important initia-
tives brought liberalisation and competitiveness to the forefront of European energy 
policy. Following the Single Market Agenda, the Commission saw energy as an inex-
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tricable part of its long-term accumulation programme to foster European competi-
tiveness and growth. The Commission proposed energy liberalisation initiatives in 
order to open up national energy markets, create a proper regulatory environment for 
the functioning of an internal energy market (IEM), and to deal with energy monopo-
lies or vertically integrated energy companies which controlled all sections of the 
value chain: production, distribution and supply. Despite some progress, the process 
of energy liberalisation was in general slow. Matlary (1997:12) claims “The Commis-
sion’s push towards the creation of an IEM has met with mixed success. Many of its 
controversial proposals have not been adopted, and those who have been adopted 
have been substantially diluted”. The period of energy liberalisation can be divided in 
two parts. First, in the period between the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, there 
was no progress towards the creation of an IEM as all initiatives proposed by the 
Commission were rejected by the anti-liberalisation bloc. Nevertheless, after 1994 
some progress was achieved in the electricity domain. In this period competitiveness 
thus became the most prominent dimension as the Commission began to focus on the 
creation of an IEM. 
This chapter analyses and explains the challenges of European energy market 
liberalization proposed by the Commission. I will explain how the Commission, to-
gether with other players in the pro-liberalisation bloc, tried to make significant steps 
towards the creation of an IEM. In addition, I will assess the influence and strategies 
of pro-liberalisation and anti-liberalisation groups in the process of energy market 
liberalisation. In the first part of the chapter, the historical and ideological differences 
of energy governors and regulators will be evaluated. Furthermore, I will explain the 
first attempts by the Commission and other players in the pro-liberalisation group to 
lead a neo-Gramscian war of position in order to change monopolistic energy struc-
tures. Moreover, the actions of the anti-liberalisation bloc and the main challenges to 
79 
creating a competitive energy market will be analysed. In addition, I will reveal the 
underlying changes in the energy liberalization positions of certain businesses and 
members. Finally, I will explain how, in this changing environment, the anti-
liberalisation bloc led by France attempted to incorporate new contradictions, in order 
to adapt to this new environment and thus maintain the status quo in European energy 
governance. 
1. Historical context and ideological differences  
1.1. The role of energy regulation in different capital accumulation mod-
els 
Before analysing the Commission’s actions in a war of position on energy lib-
eralisation, one must identify several ideological justifications for energy governance, 
and their historical roots. It should be pointed out that in Europe in the 1980s there 
co-existed distinctive types of economic growth models. Schmith (2003) distin-
guished three post-War models of capitalism: market capitalism characterised by 
Britain, managed capitalism by Germany and state capitalism represented by France. 
For example, in Britain’s market capitalist model that was promoted by the Thatcher 
government, the state generally maintained arm’s length relations with business. It 
sought to limit its role to arbitrating among economic actors while leaving the admin-
istration of the rules to self-governing bodies. Germany’s managed capitalist model 
enabled the state to focus on facilitating business activities through more targeted aid 
to industry by way of regionally provided subsidies and loans, support for research 
and development, as well as education, apprenticeship and training programmes, 
while often leaving the rules to be jointly administered by economic actors (Schmith, 
2003). State capitalist France’s dirigiste or interventionist state, by contrast, sought to 
direct economic activities through planning industrial policy and state-owned enter-
prises, in addition to the ways other states promoted business, while it administered 
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the rules itself, as often as not through the derogation of the rules in favour of busi-
ness. As a result, different accumulation regimes were present across the European 
economic landscape. 
Energy is a primary input to any successful regime of capital accumulation. 
Without a secure energy supply and adequate energy prices, states would not be able 
to ensure continuous economic growth, or social and political stability. Moreover, 
one may argue that different capital accumulation models have a direct influence on 
the way the economic and energy sectors interact. As Paterson (1996:161) claims 
“Much of the differences in industrialised states’ policies can be explained through 
the differing relationship which their economies have to energy: in other words, to the 
place energy has in the overall process of capital accumulation…”. In addition to dif-
ferent capital accumulation approaches there are also distinct types of energy organi-
sation and governance. Hirschhausen and Waelde (2000) distinguish two types of 
Western energy sector organisation: neo-liberal (Anglo-Saxon) and French. The for-
mer allows more competition for power generation and distribution; according to 
Hirschhausen and Waelde (2000:8) “the Anglo-Saxon approach…pursues a very di-
rect approach to privatisation, corporatisation and competition. Wherever technically 
possible, it creates a series of independent companies at the level of power generation 
and power distribution, exposed to competition from each other and from newly 
emerging independent power producers. Transportation – where still necessarily a 
natural monopoly – is opened-up by third-party access of competitors to electricity 
grids or gas pipelines…Under the influence of independent regulatory agencies, com-
petition develops or is promoted by the regulators. The logic of the Anglo-Saxon 
model leads to competition on the level of retail electricity and gas distribution as 
well as power generation and gas extraction and trading”.  
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On the other hand, the French system supports the creation of state-protected 
vertically integrated monopolies which control energy production, distribution and 
supply services. Hirschhausen and Waelde (2000:9) explain “French system, by con-
trast, relies largely on integrated monopolies, protected against competition from out-
side, operating with some forms of supervision/planning by the competent central 
government ministry. Energy is produced, transported and distributed by large, inte-
grated organisations. Energy is available everywhere and under similar conditions”. 
Thus, the organisation of the energy sector could be divided into several distinctive 
types of regulation. 
It could be argued that, in the past, an absolute majority of European countries 
believed in a strong state regulated energy model and were in favour of the French 
approach. Nevertheless, in the changing context of capital accumulation in the 1980s, 
a gradual transition towards a more competitive model of energy governance has 
started to emerge. The UK’s and France’s energy sectors could be analysed in more 
detail as exemplars of neo-liberal and French models of energy governance and regu-
lation in Europe. For example, in France the dominance of planning and public ser-
vice obligation played a significant role in the development of energy sector. This 
obligation was rooted in the aftermath of the World War II when the government cre-
ated EDF (Électricité de France) and GDF (Gaz de France), two national utilities, in 
order to rebuild its energy infrastructure and to provide energy for both industries and 
citizens (Interview 2). Pinto et al. (2004:6) made it clear that “EDF…was created in 
the wake of the Second World War when hundreds of regional power suppliers and 
distributors were nationalised and it had played a crucial role in rebuilding France’s 
war-shattered industrial infrastructure”. Moreover, in the case of France, the govern-
ment encouraged the consolidation of national companies in order to create big ener-
gy champions with all the powers to compete with the largest US corporations. Ac-
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cording to Heuvel et al. (2010:51), the “French government believed that the French 
economy could only be revitalised by the large firms being supported until they be-
came dominant”. The lack of domestic energy resources in France was an important 
reason for the government to step into long-term energy planning and development in 
order to reduce oil-dependence and improve the security of supply. The development 
of the nuclear industry after the 1970s OPEC oil supply crisis required time and sta-
bility. Finon (1996:21) pointed out “This stability was guaranteed by the centralised 
nature of the energy industries, their proximity to the State and the isolating of deci-
sion process from the political arena. The nuclear programme thus became part of the 
great French tradition of “Colbertism”, the tradition of strong state intervention in 
industry and technology”. France, during this period, could therefore be regarded as 
an example of the monopolistic approach in the national energy domain. 
Although the case of the UK serves as an example of the neo-liberal type of 
energy sector regulation, it must however be emphasised that, for much of the post-
war period until the election of Thatcher in 1979, the British energy sector was gov-
erned through publicly-owned firms which dominated following the nationalisation of 
the coal, electricity and gas industries in the late 1940s by the post-war labour gov-
ernment (McGowan, 1996a:134). Helm (2003:1) claims that “Until the 1980s, it was 
a conventional wisdom of the post-war years that markets are hopelessly inadequate 
in providing appropriate energy supplies”. State-owned monopoly companies looked 
like the unquestionable model for successful energy governance. According to Helm 
(2003:17) “With the exception of France, few countries have been quite as obsessed 
as Britain has with the idea that the ownership of industries is crucial to their perfor-
mance”. Nevertheless, in the 1980s changes in the post war accumulation order began 
to emerge. In Europe, Britain began to lead the transition towards a neo-liberal energy 
order. The principles of competition and privatisation began to shape not only Euro-
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pean economic policies, but also energy policy. The provision of energy goods and 
services via publicly owned energy companies was increasingly being presented as 
problematic due to them aggravating problems of overload (Kuzemko, 2015). As 
Helm (2003:2) points out “Security of supply would no longer be driven by govern-
ment, but instead would be the outcome of market forces. The job of government was 
limited to setting the framework within which the scope of market forces would be 
maximised”. The UK serves as a representative exemplar of the neo-liberal type of 
energy governance. Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government saw liberalisation 
and privatisation as fundamental reforms for improving Britain’s economic perfor-
mance. As Nigel Lawson, Secretary of State for Energy under Thatcher’s govern-
ment, pointed out in 1982 “I do not see the government’s task as being to try to plan 
the future shape of energy production and consumption...Our task is rather to set a 
framework which will produce and ensure that the market operates with a minimum 
distortion and energy is produced and consumed efficiently” (Helm, 2004:57,58). 
Thatcher’s stance on energy liberalisation also played a role in exporting a liberal 
market policy orientation to the rest of the European Community, and contributing to 
the launch of the single market. One could argue that one of Thatcher’s most endur-
ing legacies was her staunch support for these single market policies (LSE Public Pol-
icy Group, 2013). 
The French and British cases could be regarded as representative of wider Eu-
ropean energy governance. Other European countries took similar ideological ap-
proaches to handling their electricity and gas industries in a post-war period. For ex-
ample, in the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Belgium, energy sectors were governed 
by large monopolistic companies which were owned by government (Genoud and 
Finger, 2004:31). On the other hand, following the British energy transition, there 
were some shifts in energy policy thinking towards a more competitive approach. In 
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the 1980s and 1990s, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway) 
became the main supporters of a market-oriented approach in the energy domain. 
However, the Germany energy situation was more diverse. There was no uniform 
order in Germany when it came to regulation and government involvement. Matlary 
(1997:34) points out “German energy policy is characterised by a curious mixture of 
market reliance and strong state intervention”. I will analyse in more detail the mod-
els of energy regulation in these countries later in this chapter, where disagreements 
within the Council are discussed.  
2. The emergence of pro-liberalisation and anti-liberalisation blocs (1989-1993) 
Given different accumulation models, and historical and ideological differ-
ences in national approaches to energy governance, it is not surprising that EU coun-
tries split into several distinct groups, namely the pro-liberalisation and anti-
liberalisation blocs. In other words, a major divergence emerged between the EU 
countries which supported the deregulation of national energy markets, as well as the 
creation of common European competitive energy market, and countries which large-
ly relied on their vertically integrated monopolies, protected from external competi-
tion. These divergences between two groups became especially acute and intensive 
during the negotiations and debates over energy market liberalisation, which were led 
by the Commission from the end of the 1980s. I will analyse the specific policies, 
strategies and shifts of these blocs in subsequent sections. However, before going into 
a detailed analysis and explanation, one needs to assess which players belonged to 
these distinct groups.  
It could be argued that, at the end of the 1980s, the Commission together with 
other state and non-state actors led the pro-liberalisation bloc. For example, countries 
such as the UK, Portugal and later the Nordics, expressed strong pro-liberalisation 
attitudes. Moreover, energy intensive industries and global consultancy corporations 
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were also part of pro-liberalisation group. On the other hand, the monopolistic verti-
cally integrated energy utilities and their associations in Brussels, together with 
member states such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands, led the anti-
liberalisation bloc. In addition, Italy, Greece, Belgium and Spain expressed their op-
position to energy market liberalisation (Genoud and Finger, 2004:31). Furthermore, 
the anti-liberalisation bloc was supported by certain civil society associations and 
research centres (European Information Service, 1994). Despite this general descrip-
tion of the composition of these blocs, it should be pointed out that this composition 
changed over time. Important changes in this respect will be discussed in more detail 
in the subsequent parts of this chapter. In the following subsection, I will analyse how 
the pro-liberalisation bloc, led by the Commission, unleashed a war of position in 
seeking to have its long-term growth interests accepted as common European inter-
ests. At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the struggle between pro-
liberalisation and anti-liberalisation groups thus began to shape developments in the 
EU energy sector. 
3. The pro-liberalisation bloc and its attempt to challenge monopolistic energy 
structures 
3.1. The single market as a response to long-term growth challenges 
In the mid-1980s, the Commission of the European Communities (today the 
EU Commission) began a programme of long-term economic revitalisation. The De-
lors Commission proposed an economic programme to create a single European mar-
ket which would bring long-term economic benefits. As was argued earlier, the 
Commission is a long-term pro-growth oriented institution and, compared with some 
national governments, takes a broader view with regards to the interests of capital 
accumulation. In other words, the Commission viewed a single market as a long-term 
development engine which would help to respond to growing internal and external 
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challenges: high unemployment, stagnated growth, declining competition in compari-
son to the US and Japan. In its 1993 White Paper “Growth, competitiveness, em-
ployment: The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century” the Commission 
warned about a legitimacy crisis in Europe caused by major economic and social 
challenges: “we are faced with the immense responsibility…of finding a new synthe-
sis of the aims pursued by society…and the requirements of the economy…This ma-
jor challenge confronts us all” (European Communities, 1993). Moreover, comment-
ing on The Cecchini Report, a study which laid out the benefits of a single market, 
Lord Cockfield, Vice President of the Commission of European Communities, argued 
that “…failure to achieve a single market has been costing European industry dearly 
in unnecessary costs and lost opportunities; that the completion of the Internal Market 
will provide the economic context for the regeneration of European industry in both 
goods and services; and that it will give a permanent boost to the prosperity of the 
people of Europe and indeed of the world as a whole” (Cecchini et al., 1988). The 
single market programme was thus promoted as a tool for tackling emerging long-
term development challenges.   
The European energy sector was for a long time governed primarily at the na-
tional level. However, after 1985, energy became one of the main concerns of the 
broader European internal market programme (Matlary, 1997:1). The Commission 
led the development of European energy policy that, at the end of 1980s and the be-
ginning of the 1990s, began to focus on competitiveness/efficiency and became part 
of the development of single market policy. In 1986, a Council Resolution signalled 
that a new market-oriented approach should constitute the principal mechanism for 
securing energy supply in the Community (European Council, 1986). It could be ar-
gued that in the 1980s the Commission took the first steps for the creation of an IEM. 
Energy policy was discussed in a special White Paper on Energy Policy in 1988, 
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which tried to detect barriers to the creation of an IEM and evaluate the possibility of 
their elimination (Andersen, 2000b). 
One could argue that the revitalization of long-term economic development 
was inseparable from changes in the energy domain. In its 1993 White Paper on 
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, the Commission recognised the strategic 
nature of the energy sector in its new economic development programme. As it was 
stated in the paper, “Energy can no longer be seen as unlimited resource. The relative 
position of energy in the new development model is therefore a key element to be 
considered” (European Communities, 1993). Moreover, the Commission saw energy 
deregulation as a necessary step in increasing efficiency and reducing energy prices, 
thus making the European economy more competitive in relation to its major rivals 
the US and Japan (Interviews 6, 11). As was argued at the time, “The reliability and 
efficiency of energy supplies are key factors in the competitiveness of industry and in 
terms of their effect on the consumer’s pocket… Furthermore, the opening-up of 
markets and deregulation means greater competition and thus greater energy efficien-
cy. The competitiveness of European industry would be generally strengthened as a 
result” (European Communities, 1993). For example, Figure 4 shows that, during the 
mid-1980s, the European chemical industry (representative of energy intensive indus-
tries) had a significant disadvantage to the US in terms of energy prices. As we can 
see from the Graph, this disadvantage reached its peak during the first period of EU 
energy market liberalisation, which I will analyse in more detail in subsequent sec-
tions. Furthermore, responding to new challenges, the Commission called the estab-
lishment of a more integrated energy market a vital ingredient of Europe's economic 
future “The single market is a means of cementing the economic integration of the 
Community and…a means of making it more competitive in a world which is increas-
ingly open to demanding competition. Hence, a more integrated European energy 
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market should reduce energy costs, to the direct benefit of individual consumers but 
also of user industries. The industries…will…become more viable and may increase 
their competitiveness, and the economic growth thus generated will have favourable 
effects on employment, etc”. (European Communities, 1988).  
Figure 4. Average price of energy faced by the EU and US chemical industries, 1985-1997 
 
Source: ESCIMO IEA & Cefic Eurostat analysis 
3.2. Unleashing a war of position 
Given growing long-term development challenges, the Commission and other 
actors in the pro-liberalisation group wanted to change the historical monopoly ap-
proach in energy towards a market-oriented model with a competitive IEM. My theo-
retical approach emphasizes the contested and contingent nature of EU politics, and 
that this contestation takes place across various sites of power (material, discursive 
and organizational). The neo-Gramscian account helps us to explain the strategies and 
actions of the pro-liberalisation bloc in trying to create a hegemonic energy order. By 
assessing how established hegemonic structures are challenged on material, institu-
tional and discursive levels, one can explain the demise of one order and the emer-
gence of another (Gramsci, 1971:180). In addition, Andrée points out that the neo-
Gramscian approach also sheds light on the diverse material, discursive and organisa-
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tional strategies which are used in order to have particular interests accepted as com-
mon interests (Andrée, 2005:159). The objective of the Commission and other players 
was to create a pro-liberalisation hegemonic structure, i.e. consent regarding the 
Commission’s liberalization policies. The following subsections look more closely at 
the pro-liberalisation bloc and try to assess the diversity of material, institutional (or-
ganisation) and discursive actions which were undertaken in a war of position. 
3.3. The pro-liberalisation bloc and the strengthening of the material di-
mension 
According to the neo-Gramscian perspective the material dimension is one 
where certain financial and technological strategies are employed (Sinclair, 1996:10). 
At the beginning of the 1990s the pro-liberalisation bloc was rather weak, and the 
material level was not particularly conducive to articulating a neoliberal view on en-
ergy markets. The Commission attempted to alter the material level in ways that 
would foster its energy policy vision. The first real actions at the European level 
emerged in the 1990s. In order to strengthen the material foundations and to foster the 
development of an IEM, the Commission aimed to identify and finance energy pro-
jects on the basis of their value to the creation of a common energy market. In other 
words, the Commission began to change the material domain of European energy 
policy governance. The guidelines for Trans-European energy networks (TEN-E) 
were thus created in 1990, with an objective to identify projects of European interest 
and to provide financial assistance from the Community for the realisation of these 
projects (Europa, 2007). As was stated in the Commission's communication regarding 
TEN-E, “network development is still shaped by the national dimension, with the 
objective of self-sufficiency at national level, which is no longer strictly compatible 
with the progress towards integration within the Community, particularly with the 
completion of the internal market…It is therefore necessary for the Community to be 
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able to take action by establishing guidelines on electricity and natural gas transmis-
sion networks with a view to encouraging development and full consideration of the 
Community dimension of these networks and of the challenges posed by their grow-
ing interdependence” (European Communities, 1990). Following the adoption of the-
se guidelines, the Commission created various financial support mechanisms and 
programmes. The aim was to finance TENs through a mix of public and private 
sources. As Butcher explains “Any Member State or body within a Member State 
would be entitled to bid for TEN funds to support a project of common interest. The 
decision to grant aid to a project rests with the Commission, with assistance from a 
committee of representatives of Member States for each TEN sector” (Butcher, 
2012). For instance, in 1989 the Commission for the first time allocated EUR 21 mil-
lion for cross-border pilot projects. Following the creation of these pilot projects, in 
1990 the Commission established the INTERREG I/REGEN Community Initiative 
with a budget of EUR 1,082 million. The Information Paper issued by the European 
Commission states that the “REGEN Initiative…aimed to complete some missing 
links in the trans-European network for transport and energy distribution” (EC, 
2000b). In addition, INTERREG II, created in 1994 for a five-year period, allocated 
EUR 2.6 billion for fostering cross-border cooperation (EC, 2000b). The Commis-
sion’s Progress Report on TEN-E called the development of energy transmission 
networks for a fully functioning single market as one of the essential objectives of the 
programme: “If the objective of a single energy market is to reduce costs for the final 
consumer and industry by improving its competitiveness, this objective…can be 
achieved only if the market has a Community-wide energy infrastructure. Improving 
the integration of electricity and gas supply infrastructures thus seems to be an essen-
tial element, enabling, in the long term, the strengthening of economic and social co-
hesion in the community” (European Communities, 1990). In addition to internal en-
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ergy market development the Commission took other external actions. For example, 
in 1995 the Commission initiated INOGATE, an international energy co-operation 
programme. The aim of the programme was to provide financial support to neigh-
bouring countries in order to converge their energy markets with the internal EU en-
ergy market on the basis of EU internal energy market rules and principles. These 
infrastructure developments were financed through the TACIS programme (EC, 
1995b). The 1990s thus saw the Commission initiate its first internal and external 
programmes designed to foster the material dimension of European energy market 
liberalisation. 
3.4. Strategies on the institutional domain 
On the institutional level, the pro-liberalisation bloc attempted to stabilise and 
perpetuate legally binding energy market rules and regulations (Sinclair, 1996). It 
could be argued that the competition and energy commissioners, and their respective 
services, led the development of the first legally binding competition directives. The 
Commission initially focused on the downstream side of competition policy, with the 
price transparency directive being adopted in 1989. With this directive the Commis-
sion for the first time tried to increase the transparency of energy pricing, thereby tak-
ing small steps towards introducing competitive elements into the distribution of elec-
tricity and gas. According to Andersen (2000a) “The Commission had a three-stage 
approach to the introduction of internal market directives in the energy sector. The 
initial focus was on the downstream side of the electricity and gas sectors, but the 
plan was to move upstream as reforms progressed”. During the same year other pro-
posals concerning transit right for the transmission of gas and electricity were put 
forth. Furthermore, the fuel transmission directives were adopted in 1989 and 1990, 
promoting the idea of open access to electricity networks and gas pipelines (Ander-
sen, 2000a). As a result, by the end of the 1980s, the Commission had begun energy 
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institutionalisation by providing new rules and regulations for the downstream sector 
of the energy market. 
While these proposals could be seen as the first real actions in the creation of 
an institutional base for an IEM in Europe, major disagreements between pro-
liberalisation group and anti-liberalisation bloc erupted in 1990 over the Commis-
sion’s proposals regarding three main objectives: abolishing exclusive rights over 
electricity generation and the building of gas and electricity lines; obliging vertically 
integrated companies to unbundle their accounting and management systems; intro-
ducing third party access (TPA) rights to a limited number of high volume gas and 
electricity consumers so they could choose suppliers from across the Community 
(Council Directive, 96/92/EC). The Commission’s decision to completely revamp 
energy governance in Europe went against the particular interests of certain state and 
non-state players. Commenting on the Commission’s proposal Matlary (1997:48) 
explained “A major conflict between the EU governments and the Commission erupt-
ed in 1990, over the issue of third party access for gas and electricity networks. Third 
party access, also called common carriage, means that all suppliers should have ac-
cess to gas pipelines and electricity grids, subject to the payment of a tariff set by 
some independent authority. However, in the energy sector, the gas and electricity 
networks are often owned by energy companies that see the imposition of third party 
access as unjustified intervention in their commercial activity and are resisting it vig-
orously”. One could argue that these directives symbolised a major step in the institu-
tionalisation of long-term EU energy market regulatory mechanisms and rules. Dis-
cussing the importance of the first Electricity Directive, Haghighi (2007:104) points 
out “This directive was the first and most important measure aimed at achieving a 
common European market in energy”. The so-called transit directives for electricity 
and gas were therefore the first and most important steps in attempting to establish a 
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legal framework for energy market regulation, yet they also caused major disagree-
ments between proponents and opponents of energy market liberalisation.  
3.5. Discursive actions 
In a strategy of neo-Gramscian war of position, the Commission focused on 
discursive actions as its ability to change the material and institutional levels was ra-
ther limited. In the material domain, the Commission had limited financial resources. 
In addition, significant changes at the institutional level required the Council’s sup-
port. The Commission and other players attempted to provide a coherent discursive 
case to portray the creation of an internal energy market as a major step in tackling 
long-term challenges. In order to create a justificatory framework for change and to 
strengthen the resonance of its pro-liberalisation discourse, the Commission tried to 
construct equivalential connections between different demands. First, at the beginning 
of the 1990s, the objective to create the IEM was clearly linked to industrial competi-
tiveness and efficiency gains. Introducing the Commission‘s directive, Antonio Car-
doso de Cunha, Director-General of DGXVII (energy), said “the opening up of the 
energy market…will reinforce the competitive position of European industries in the 
world market and allow electricity and gas producers to optimise their performance“ 
(EC, 1989). In addition, the Director-General of DGXVII emphasised the importance 
of the element of industrial competitiveness. Cardoso explained “the idea is to open 
up national markets to Community wide competition and hence reduce industry's 
costs and increase its competitiveness" (EC, 1989). Moreover, European business and 
consumer groups concentrated on the importance of industrial competitiveness. For 
example, the largest European business association, UNICE, pointed out that the Un-
ion's energy policy should focus on ensuring a stable supply, at competitive prices, to 
all sectors which consume energy (FT, 1994a). Furthermore, in a similar way, the 
International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers (IFIEC) urged a reduction in 
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the cost of energy in order to increase the competitiveness of industrial consumers 
(FT, 1994a). As a result, the Commission, supported by certain industrial groups and 
associations, led the construction of pro-liberalisation discourse. 
The pro-liberalisation bloc linked the creation of an IEM with demands for 
energy security. In its 1988 working paper on the IEM, the Commission linked the 
benefits of IEM creation to energy security. As was stated in the document, “It must 
be acknowledged that a more integrated energy market is a significant additional fac-
tor as regards the security of supply for all Member States. Greater interconnection of 
equipment would make it possible to increase both the solidarity between Member 
States and the flexibility of the industry. It would therefore increase the emergency 
resources available in the event of a crisis and create the possibility of additional trad-
ing“ (European Communities, 1988:6). Energy market liberalisation was thus strong-
ly linked to competitiveness and security demands. 
4. The anti-liberalisation bloc and challenges to creating competitive energy 
markets (1989-1992) 
4.1. Control of material capabilities 
Despite the Commission’s long-term orientation and its attempts to strengthen 
the material dimension of the pro-liberalisation bloc, it should be noted that that ma-
jor energy groups and national governments had historical control of the financial and 
technological resources of the energy sector. These players were primarily preoccu-
pied with a short-term interest in capital accumulation. These actors therefore often 
took investment decisions which contradicted broader European interests in the ener-
gy domain. It could be argued that historical state monopolists such as EDF or ENEL 
invested significantly increasing the profitability of production assets, rather than de-
veloping transmission networks (Pinto et al., 2004). Supponen (2011:139) explained 
that “…national and company interests have influence on cross-border transmission 
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investments…national and company interests have contributed to serious underin-
vestment in the European transmission network from the overall social welfare point 
of view…Profitable interconnectors in import directions are sometimes not developed 
at all, such as in the case of German and French planned investments”. At the end of 
the 1980s energy exports were primarily done on the basis of bilateral or trilateral 
agreements between vertically integrated energy utilities or member state govern-
ments. For example, in 1990 three major energy corporations in Portugal (Electricid-
ade de Portugal), France (Électricité de France) and Spain (Redesa) signed a trilateral 
agreement to ensure the supply of 312 MW of electricity to Portugal (FT, 1992a). 
Monopolistic corporations were opposed to any centralised European-wide energy 
regulation, and preferred to work bilaterally on individual cases. It was not in the in-
terest of the energy utilities to create a large internal market which would contribute 
to a loss of their control over prices and regulations. Monopolistic corporations and 
certain national governments were therefore not interested in building interconnec-
tions or accepting the new rules and regulations which would ensure the functioning 
of the IEM. 
4.2. Dominance in the institutional domain 
The anti-liberalisation bloc had strong institutional support during the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s. The Commission was not able to get support from the 
Council during the 1990s due to a blocking majority. According to McGowan 
(1996b:17) “A number of member states continue to resist the transfer of sovereignty 
in energy policy to Community yet they cannot ignore the EU as a constraint of their 
own autonomy”. For example, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy were all 
against the Commission’s liberalisation initiatives in both the electricity and gas sec-
tors. In addition, in 1992 these countries acted as a blocking coalition that rejected 
and returned the Commission’s legal proposals regarding the creation of an IEM. It 
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has been argued that in the early 1990s there was no progress at the Council due to a 
majority of states opposing the plan and with the Netherlands, Germany and France 
asking the Commission for a redraft (FT, 1992b). As a result, at the end of the 1980s, 
anti-liberalisation attitudes were dominant in the Council. 
In spite of the fact that there were some differences in the positions of certain 
states regarding the electricity and gas sectors, there was a strong overall opposition 
to both electricity and gas developments. It could be argued that France led the devel-
opment of the anti-liberalisation coalition: “several EC countries, led by France, op-
posed the third party access proposals because of feared repercussions on their na-
tional security of supply” (Platts, 1992). French Industry Minister Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn pointed out that “France is planning to defend and to promote its energy 
model until it is shown that moves to open up the gas and electricity markets to com-
petition recommended by the European Commission are advantageous to consum-
ers”. (Europe Information Service, 1992a). In addition, Strauss-Kahn warned that the 
Commission’s proposals might hamper future investment possibilities. He argued that 
“Energy supply requires the existence of a public service with all the obligations that 
entails, and which requires heavy and long-term investments. Who is going to bear 
the heavy investments?” (Chemical Week Associates, 1992). France was therefore 
the leader of the anti-liberalisation bloc, opposed to the Commission and other pro-
liberalisation players.  
Germany declared its opposition to the Commission’s attempt to increase 
competitiveness through the implementation of third-party access. Moreover, Germa-
ny regarded the Commission’s proposals in the early 1990s as unacceptable and pre-
ferred to use existing competition law without any increase in regulation (FT, 1992c). 
Some EU energy experts argued that “the government (German) has already sided 
with a number of other large States in trying to reject them (proposals)” (FT, 1992c). 
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Commenting on the Commission’s initiatives, the German industry minister pointed 
out “Instant third party access (TPA) as per the Commission approach would cause a 
revolution in Germany with dispossession of company property - the grid” (FT, 
1992c). Instead of taking major steps towards the creation of the IEM, the German 
government preferred to move more slowly with incremental progress. 
The Netherlands, which presided over the Council in 1991, showed no support 
for liberalisation. The Dutch government expressed its willingness to divert the focus 
of its presidency agenda from internal market developments towards external affairs 
such as the Energy Charter Treaty and the environment (FT, 1991a). Nevertheless, in 
the IEM domain, the Netherlands expressed its opposition to any change, especially 
in the gas sector. As it was argued “in terms of Commission policies within the 
Community, the Dutch are opposed to either a convergence of energy policies 
through creating an energy chapter in the Treaty or in advancing free market mecha-
nisms through the internal energy market. They have strongly opposed the...third par-
ty access ideas. The Dutch have already made it clear they resent the way the Com-
mission announced publicly its intention of acting against its import/export monopoly 
in electricity before informing The Hague and some months before the actions were 
ready” (FT, 1991a).  
Following the Dutch example, the Italian government focused on energy secu-
rity concerns. It could be argued that security of supply was a keynote of Italy‘s ener-
gy policy, and something that strongly affected its attitudes. Commenting on the 
Commission‘s approach regarding the IEM, a senior policy-maker in Italy made it 
clear “EC Energy Commissioner, Cardoso e Cunha, is obsessed with the idea of al-
lowing the final user to buy gas where it is cheapest. If he could, he would have con-
sumers buying on the spot market. Our priority is availability. The price is secondary 
compared to actually having the gas” (FT, 1991b). A clear preoccupation with energy 
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security meant that Italy regarded a market-oriented energy policy as contradicting 
these concerns. Some European energy security experts stated that “The Italian gov-
ernment has been probably the slowest among any of the major EC countries to em-
brace the 'more market' policies of the 1980s. Its politicians and senior officials in 
many cases seem less than wholeheartedly committed to allowing the private sector a 
greater stake in the energy industry, or indeed to the government involving itself less 
in the economy as a whole. They generally still fully endorse the concept that in some 
sectors there are natural monopolies” (FT, 1991b). As a result, the Italian government 
sought to protect the monopoly power of Enel over the electricity trade, something 
that the Commission viewed as an anti-competitive action. 
4.3. Capital accumulation models and energy constrains 
As was argued in a previous section, the pro-liberalisation group faced a 
blocking majority in the Council. The strong opposition from anti-liberalisation coun-
tries such as France, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany with regards to the Commis-
sion‘s energy market liberalisation initiatives, were to a large extent caused by differ-
ent relationships between energy and capital accumulation. National accumulation 
strategies and the role of the energy industry in these historically grown structures 
explains the vigorous opposition to the Commission’s IEM initiatives. In the follow-
ing paragraphs I will analyse the energy governance models in the anti-liberalisation 
countries the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, in more detail.  
The energy sector in the Netherlands was governed by active state involve-
ment. In the Netherlands in the 1980s, the government was focused on reducing the 
number, but at the same time increasing the size of the energy distribution companies, 
thus monopolising the energy market. One could argue that these actions were taken 
in order to achieve greater economies of scale and increase efficiency (Jong, 2006). 
Moreover, using the dirigisme justification, the government intervened in the energy 
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domain and energy policy developments. According to Verkuyl et al. (2005:120) 
“Some vertical integration was…achieved on the production and transmission level 
through the establishment of the Dutch Electricity Generating Board (SEP)…whose 
shares were held by the individual production companies”. The justification of this 
monopolistic structure was based on security concerns. Furthermore, the second 
round of energy restructuring came after the oil crisis in the 1970s when the number 
of energy production companies was reduced from 14 to 4. In the Netherlands, all the 
EU liberalisation initiatives of the 1980s were viewed negatively. The real concern in 
this area was gas where the Dutch government had strategic interests. As Jong ex-
plained “Liberalisation of the energy market was a threat to Gasunie and its monopo-
ly function in marketing the huge Dutch gas resources, including the successful Dutch 
policy for developing the small gas fields” (Jong, 2006:3). In discussions with the EU 
Commission the Dutch minister of economic affairs made it clear “I am and will con-
tinue to be a monopolist” (Jong, 2006:3). The Dutch government thus saw energy as a 
strategic domain which could be sustained by state intervention. 
In contrast with French or British state monopoly models, energy regulation in 
Germany in the 1980s and early 1990s could be defined as a model of territorial (re-
gional) monopolies. Discussing Germany’s electricity sector organisation Heuvel et 
al. (2010:53,54) argued “In Germany the situation is more complicated. Power gener-
ation has been done by private companies for a long time. The local, regional and 
supra-regional distribution and supply companies were owned in many cases by mu-
nicipalities and sometimes together with private utilities”. One could argue that the 
German electricity sector was similar to the French model of regulation, as it was 
dominated by an oligopoly of vertically integrated companies (Heddenhausen, 2007). 
According to Brandt (2006:4) “In the framework of territorial monopolies the produc-
tion, transmission and distribution segments were clearly in the hands of the large 
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network energy supply companies. The municipal utilities participated in the profits 
of the network energy supply companies by capital shares”. Regional monopolistic 
entities were therefore dominant in Germany’s energy domain. 
In Italy, the French model of regulation in the energy domain was justified on 
the basis of security concerns. According to Paoli (1996:111) “For some twenty years 
Italian energy policy was based on the twin assumption that energy supplies, and in 
particular that of oil, were a cause for concern and that direct intervention on the part 
of the State was an effective and efficient way of tackling this problem. Energy policy 
was dirigiste in nature, i.e. it aimed to establish exactly what it was necessary to do 
and it possessed the means to do so through the compliance of the energy supply sec-
tor”. Due to security concerns in Italy, the energy domain was the subject of public 
intervention. As a result, opposition from anti-liberalisation countries such as France, 
Italy, the Netherlands or Germany can be explained by looking at the historical or-
ganisation of their energy sectors. One could argue that these countries saw state in-
tervention in energy domain as the most effective model in ensuring energy security 
and economic efficiency.  
4.4. The promotion of an anti-liberalisation discourse 
4.4.1. Attempts to decouple pro-liberalisation ideology 
With respect to the discursive dimension, the anti-liberalisation bloc attempt-
ed to weaken pro-liberalisation ideology by denying or decoupling the main argu-
ments of pro-liberalisation discourse. Both state and non-state players were actively 
engaged in this ideological struggle. In expressing its opposition the anti-
liberalisation bloc tried to decouple various demands in order to negate the economic 
and social underpinnings of the Commission‘s liberalisation initiatives. The first layer 
of anti-liberalisation discourse came from industrial groups and associations that rep-
resented the interests of vertically integrated corporations. These groups attempted to 
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undermine the pro-liberalisation bloc by decoupling the creation of TPA from debates 
surrounding energy security. As was argued in previous sections, many national busi-
ness groups and associations were active domestically. Nevertheless, from the begin-
ning of the 1990s, the situation began to change and more groups directed their atten-
tion at the EU level. One of the most active groups in Brussels, the European Confed-
eration of Public Sector Energy Distribution Companies (CEDEC), was created in 
1992 with the objective of undermining energy liberalisation proposals. According to 
energy experts, “CEDEC itself was formed in May 1992, as public sector energy dis-
tributors from the five countries (France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Austria) in-
creasingly realised that the Commission's plans to liberalise the energy sector by in-
troducing TPA would undermine their traditional role as monopoly suppliers for a 
single area” (FT, 1994b). It could be argued that the CEDEC attempted to spread an-
ti-liberalisation discourse and make it more difficult for the Commission to legitimise 
its decisions. At one of its annual conferences, the CEDEC opposed the implementa-
tion of TPA by emphasising that the Commission‘s proposals could undermine the 
security of energy supplies. It was argued that the “TPA originally proposed by the 
Commission could not guarantee an optimal energy supply to all consumers. Provid-
ing such a supply...should be the aim of any internal energy market, and this would be 
undermined by opening up the industrial supply market to competition” (FT, 1994b). 
Moreover, the CEDEC called the mandatory TPA system a threat which would not 
serve to optimise energy supply for all purchasers (Europe Information Service, 
1994). 
At the beginning of the 1990s the electricity and gas industry associations 
Eurelectric and Eurogas were established in order to represent the interests of the ma-
jor players. These federations played an important discursive role in trying to break 
the link between energy liberalization and competitiveness. In addition, the anti-
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liberalisation bloc tried to decouple the Commission’s liberalisation policy from eco-
nomic development demands which were historically considered as a necessary 
building blocs to preserving peace in Europe. For example, Eurelectric pointed out 
that the Commission‘s proposals contradicted a number of important economic and 
social goals of the European Community, such as “harmonious economic develop-
ment, balanced expansion, a decrease in regional disequilibria and greater social and 
economic cohesion“ (Europe Information Service, 1992b). Moreover, Eurelectric was 
especially critical of the Commission for creating a captive market. In addition, the 
anti-liberalisation group used a narrative that the electricity sector should not be sub-
ject to competition because it is a unique type of commodity. According to Eurelec-
tric “Actually, TPA results in the appearance of two markets: a free one and a captive 
one" (European Information Service, 1992b). In addition, the European gas industry 
association underlined that the promotion of competitiveness through TPA in the gas 
sector might even increase, rather than decrease, the price of energy. In one of its po-
sition papers, Eurogas warned that “Eurogas finds 'no persuasive evidence either that 
so-called 'gas-to-gas competition' will occur beyond the level which currently exists 
at the European border . . . or that competition, if it did occur, would be in 
the…interest of the consumer” (FT, 1991c). The main argument of the anti-
liberalisation group was that electricity and gas were not classical commodities (such 
as cars or oranges, etc.), where customer choice was the basis of competition.  More-
over, the European gas industry sought to disarticulate the pro-market bloc by stress-
ing that TPA would cause a fragmentation of the EC gas sector and weaken environ-
mental protection. Eurogas compared attempts to liberalise energy markets to risky 
experiments: “Third-party access is a risky experiment endangering security of sup-
ply and environmental protection” (Barnard, 1991). As a result, the energy industry 
and its associations tried to diminish the Commission‘s case for energy liberalisation 
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by stressing that TPA and competition contradicted security, environmental and com-
petitiveness objectives. 
4.4.2. The involvement of civil society groups and organic intellectuals 
One of the obstacles to the Commission's pro-liberalisation war of position 
was the lack of support from civil society groups. Civil society helped to undermine 
pro-liberalisation discourse by linking energy market competition with negative so-
cial impacts. For example, the European Public Services Committee (EPSC), which 
represented 120 trade unions with over 8 million workers in Europe, warned that de-
regulation of energy markets could undermine the policies of public service, energy 
security, democracy, environment and social stability. According to the EPSC “liber-
alisation of production, transport and distribution activities risks upsetting security of 
supply and the utilities’ public service mission. It would also destroy the pluralistic 
energy structures of member states in favour of big transnational companies that 
would 'escape democratic control', jeopardise environmental protection and threaten 
jobs” (FT, 1995a). Moreover, in trying to disarticulate the pro-liberalisation opposi-
tion, civil society groups focused on the sensitive issue of job security. For example, 
Branko Rakidzija, the president of EPSC, underlined the negative social consequenc-
es of deregulation, referring to the UK‘s experience: “thousands of workers have lost 
their jobs in the UK due to liberalisation and another 25,000 in Germany because of 
rationalisation in the sector”. The President of EPSC warned “We know the situation 
in other countries is similar and that predictions foresee the loss of tens of thousands 
of jobs over the next years” (FT, 1995b). Furthermore, at the national level, trade un-
ions organised demonstrations against liberalisation, and argued that the environment 
and job security in the sector would be at risk if energy markets were deregulated, 
while lower prices would not materialise for consumers and small-to-medium-sized 
companies. Civil society groups were therefore active, both nationally and at the Eu-
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ropean level, in attempting to decouple pro-liberal discourse from economic, social 
and security demands.  
Certain organic intellectuals supported anti-liberalisation by facilitating the 
disarticulation of market-oriented energy policy. In the case of the anti-liberalisation 
bloc, the organic intellectuals comprised of research centres and think tanks. Alt-
hough their views were not monolithic, these organic intellectuals sought to negate 
the benefits of energy liberalisation and to warn of potential threats. The Dutch Cen-
tre for Research on Multinational Corporations report stated that the EU liberalisation 
measures, as proposed by the European Commission, ran against public sector inter-
ests: "The Commission policies threatened 250,000 jobs” (Europe Information Ser-
vice, 1994). Moreover, the Economic and Social Council (CES), a French govern-
ment linked think tank which advised lawmaking bodies on questions of social and 
economic policies, expressed fierce opposition to the Commission’s TPA proposal 
and overall deregulation of the energy sector. According to lain Tournebise, a repre-
sentative of CES, the “EC Commission may well use Article 90.3 of the Treaty of 
Rome to force passage of demonopolisation and TPA directives without consulting 
member states. The menace of this is clear in the most recent EC Council meetings. 
Although the commission's stated intent is to correct an insufficiency in intra-
European energy exchanges, in reality the internal gas and electricity markets have 
never ceased growing over recent decades” (FT, 1992d). Organic intellectuals thus 
helped to diminish the ideological case of the pro-liberalisation camp by stressing 
unemployment concerns. 
5. Changes in positions and strategies 1993-1996 
5.1. Structural constrains and changes in national positions 
It could be argued that during the mid-1990s, support for the pro-liberalisation 
bloc was strengthened. In contrast with previous periods, by 1993 one could see 
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gradual changes in the positions of certain national governments. For example, the 
attitudes of the Italian, Dutch and Irish governments shifted from a radical anti-
liberalisation position towards the acceptance the idea of market deregulation and 
TPA (Matlary, 1997:98). Moreover, one of the clearest signs of the changing institu-
tional balance of power, and some success in the struggle for an IEM, was seen with 
growing support for liberalisation in Germany. Some high-level German political 
leaders began to support TPA proposals, arguing that more competition needed to be 
introduced in the electricity and gas sectors. The economy minister described the 
Commission’s proposals as helping to achieve “the aim of a better and more reasona-
bly priced gas and electricity supply for companies and consumers through as much 
competition as possible” (FT, 1992e). Due to certain shifts in the positions of some 
member states, the institutional dimension of the anti-liberalisation bloc was weak-
ened.  
In order to explain gradual changes in the attitudes of certain national gov-
ernments, one must take into account the structural constraints of capital accumula-
tion. It could be argued that, until the 1990s, the majority of European countries were 
against liberalisation due to the economic importance and capital-intense nature of the 
energy industry. Nevertheless, debates surrounding a single European market reached 
their peak in the 1990s and underlined one of the main problems for Europe’s indus-
trial competitiveness: high energy prices in comparison to its main competitors. Table 
1 shows the electricity prices for domestic and industrial consumers in Europe. As we 
can see, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland and Germany, who at the outset were the 
harshest critics of energy deregulation, had some of the highest electricity prices for 
industrial consumers. Moreover, these countries were especially vulnerable to high 
energy costs because of their economic structure. 
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Table 1. The ratio of electricity prices for domestic and industrial consumers 
 
Source: Eurostat 
The economic growth in these countries in the post-War period was to a large 
extent dependent on their export-led manufacture industries which employed thou-
sands of people and constituted a large share of their national outputs (Rhodes, 2015). 
In other words, the success of their accumulation regimes depended on how competi-
tive their manufacturing export industries were, and energy prices played an im-
portant role in the competitiveness of these industries. Some have argued that 
“..energy prices play an important role in overall industrial competitiveness…” (EC, 
1995b). Figure 5 presents variations in electricity prices among the world’s main eco-
nomic powers. In 1992 Germany and Italy were among the least competitive in terms 
of energy prices. Among the economic powers, only Japan had higher prices. As was 
argued in the 1993 Commission’s White paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Em-
ployment, “our competitive position in relation to the USA and Japan has worsened” 
(European Communities, 1993). One could argue that these governments began to 
change their positions because of the structural power of their export-led industries. 
In other words, these countries feared that, in an increasingly globalized world, high 
energy prices would force major businesses to allocate their production to other coun-
tries, thus further undermining economic growth, competitiveness, and employment. 
For example, Hedenhaussen (2007:5) pointed out that “…the realization of the Euro-
pean Common Market…made differences between electric energy prices in the 
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Member States an increasingly important factor for the competitiveness of their na-
tional companies. In fear of the relocation of production to low-price-countries most 
of the Member States shared an interest in the reform of the electricity regime”. The 
changing positions of member states in the early 1990s can therefore be explained by 
taking into account the structural constraints of certain businesses. 
Figure 5. Variations in electricity prices  
 
Source: Silverman, L (1994) 
5.2. Shifts in energy industry position 
Another important reason for changes in the positions of national govern-
ments was shifts in the attitudes of certain energy industries that had previously re-
fused to accept energy liberalisation. For instance, in the early 1990s, Eurelectric 
switched its position from opposition to TPA towards support for the introduction of 
more competition in the energy domain. Matlary (1997:98) pointed out “The most 
significant change of position was recorded when Eurelectric went from opposing 
third party access to accepting it…”. Similar changes occurred in other national do-
mains. For example, in the Netherlands, the Dutch electricity industry changed its 
position to for the Commission’s attempt to deregulate the EU energy market. As en-
ergy experts made clear “Until now, the Dutch producers…have been opposed to in-
troducing more competition. But in their joint response to the report, the need for 
third party access (TPA) is endorsed by the SEP, the main producers and the distribu-
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tors, represented by Energie Ned” (FT, 1994c). In Germany there were some reports 
that one of the largest utilities in the country, RWE-Energie, had begun to unbundle 
their accounts and become more willing to apply a market approach (FT, 1992e). The 
chairman of the RWE explained “we are prepared to accept more competition“ (FT, 
1992e). Furthermore, at the beginning of the 1990s Ireland’s energy sector began to 
show its acceptance of the idea of energy liberalisation. The Irish Electricity Supply 
Board (ESB) organised its own restructuring, and participated in feasibility studies 
regarding the opening up of the energy market to competition. As was pointed out in 
one study, “Adopting the dictum that actions speak louder than words, ESB has re-
sponded to the Commission's moves towards an internal energy market by compre-
hensively restructuring its business” (FT, 1993). As a result, in the mid-1990s, chang-
es occurred in the positions of several European energy utilities. 
In order to explain gradual shifts in the position of the energy industry, one 
must take into account not only the actions of the pro-liberalisation bloc, but also un-
derlying changes in the strategies of the energy businesses. In the 1990s some energy 
corporations saw new profit opportunities. Heddenhausen (2007:5) explains that 
“Many electricity supply companies from Member States had started to enter the re-
formed electricity markets of Eastern Europe, which made it difficult for them to op-
pose liberalisation of their home markets…”. Given the Commission’s attempts to 
push for energy liberalisation, the monopolistic energy corporations took an oppor-
tunity to adapt to this transition and thus to potentially derive the most benefits from 
it. These utilities began to reconsider their business models in order to compensate for 
the potential loss of stagnant domestic markets. In other words, a strategy of interna-
tionalisation began as a response to European market liberalisation. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, energy utilities saw an opportunity to invest in cheap energy en-
tities and thus gain a large share of new Eastern and Central European markets. Ac-
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cording to Groot (2013:15) “This has provided firms in the EU power sector with a 
stimulus to develop international portfolios, leading to a phase of cross-border mer-
gers and acquisitions in Europe”. For example, major European energy utilities such 
as EOn, RWE and Enel began to look for assets in Central and Eastern Europe and to 
benefit from privatisation opportunities and investment needs in those markets (Heu-
vel et al., 2010:23). One European energy expert pointed out “The big thing was an 
opportunity to invest in other countries. Energy companies understood that the break-
down of domestic monopoly and the acceptance of market deregulation tallowed 
them to expand internationally. This was really a crucial thing which contributed to 
transformation of national attitudes on energy liberalisation” (Interview 8). Energy 
corporations thus began to change their positions due to new opportunities for expan-
sion and greater profit.    
 5.3. Support on ideational domain 
In addition to structural changes in the strategies of certain state and non-state 
actors, there were also changes in the ideological domain. One could argue that, since 
1993, the ideological power of the pro-liberalisation coalition has been strengthened. 
On the contrary from the previous period, in 1993 one could see the rise of the neo-
Gramscian “organic intellectuals” which helped to consolidate the power of the ne-
oliberal bloc at the European level. One of the World’s most influential management 
and consultancy corporations, McKinsey, contributed to the transformation of the 
attitudes of certain state and non-state actors by actively promoting arguments for 
energy market deregulation and ideologically supporting the pro-liberalisation bloc. 
For example, in 1993 in its journal McKinsey Quarterly, the company’s experts pub-
lished several studies which criticised the model of vertical integration: “Do not ver-
tically integrate unless absolutely necessary. This strategy is too expensive, risky, and 
difficult to reverse. Sometimes vertical integration is necessary, but more often than 
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not, companies err on the side of excessive integration” (Stuckey and White, 1993). 
McKinsey attempted to reconcile competition goals with those of security and conti-
nuity of supply, and environmental protection (FT, 1994c). The consultancy group 
stressed the importance of open access to the network in providing substantial cost-
savings for energy consumers. (FT, 1994c).  
McKinsey took the role of organic intellectual in persuading certain industrial 
groups, associations and governments to accept the deregulation of the energy (elec-
tricity) market. McKinsey contributed to changes in the positions of Dutch and Irish 
energy groups regarding electricity market liberalization by providing consultations 
in this respect. In 1994 the Dutch electricity sector hired McKinsey to investigate 
how it could properly protect its interests given the Commission‘s discussions regard-
ing market deregulation and TPA (Matlary, 1997:98). Moreover, in Ireland, McKin-
sey was commissioned by the state-owned ESB to provide a report to evaluate the 
possibilities for energy market liberalisation (FT, 1993). The report called for the re-
structuring of ESB, from a vertically integrated company to a horizontal alignment of 
business units under a corporate core. Furthermore, in the early 1990s some energy 
companies such as Vattenfall, with the help of McKinsey, conducted intensive anal-
yses which examined how they could adapt to a deregulated electricity market. As 
result, McKinsey contributed to changing corporate positions on energy market liber-
alisation. Nevertheless, McKinsey was not able to muster a strong pro-liberalisation 
historical bloc which could counter existing monopolistic structures in the energy 
domain. 
6. New strategies against energy market liberalisation 
6.1. French proposal and the strategies of transformismo and heresthetics 
Given shifts in the attitudes of certain state and non-state actors in the mid-
1990s, the anti-liberalisation bloc tried to assimilate the potentially dangerous idea of 
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competition. As was previously argued, some vertically integrated utilities and na-
tional governments began to accept the fact that growing competition and liberalisa-
tion was inevitable. It could be argued that changing attitudes towards market deregu-
lation were a turning point that allowed some players in the anti-liberalisation bloc 
led by the French government to change from a total resistance to energy liberalisa-
tion towards a strategy of transformismo and a gradual acceptance of the idea. Ac-
cording to the neo-Gramscian account, dominant players often attempt to protect their 
position in the process of passive revolution by via a strategy of transformismo. This 
strategy can serve as strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous 
ideas (Cox, 1983). The French government, together with EDF and other utilities, 
came up with the idea of accepting the general line of energy liberalisation, but seek-
ing to make it consistent with their monopolistic position. In other words, the actions 
of the anti-liberalisation bloc were directed towards the assimilation of the liberalisa-
tion idea. An alternative vision of deregulation thus linked market competition de-
mands with public service obligations. The idea was to put forward a narrative that a 
monopolistic structure of energy governance would be more secure and effective in 
ensuring the classical post-war goal of egalitarian nation building, which defined the 
provision of infrastructure as a national or at least public task. In other words, while 
accepting the principle of competition for electricity generation, the French argued 
that technical networks for transportation and distribution, the main elements to a se-
cure and reliable public service provision, should be controlled via a monopoly struc-
ture (Jabko, 2006). In the neo-Gramscian tradition, the anti-liberalisation bloc there-
fore tried to assimilate the idea of liberalization by linking market competition to pub-
lic service demands. 
The anti-liberalisation group used heresthetical manoeuvres at the institutional 
level in order to create certain choice situations and thus manipulate outcomes. Dur-
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ing the protracted and complicated negotiations regarding energy market liberaliza-
tion, France was not able to pursue a strategy of systemic opposition to energy market 
reform. France thus acted strategically in order to recapture the political initiative and 
increase support in the Council. According to Eising and Jabko (1999:19) “…those 
French officials who were close to the negotiation realized that the French position 
must evolve, otherwise there was a risk of being outvoted in the Council”. Instead of 
TPA, the French government proposed a single buyer concept as an alternative model 
of deregulation that aimed to preserve monopoly-governing structures, while at the 
same time allowing some level of competition. The single buyer model envisaged that 
a single entity would operate the network, and buy and sell all the electricity, generat-
ed under competitive conditions (Midttun, 1997). In other words, this single buyer 
entity would manage energy deals with producers and consumers negotiating between 
themselves import arrangements only. The single buyer had the convenient conse-
quence that it would preserve its de facto monopoly, whilst apparently conceding de 
jure competition (Helm, 1993). Some recognised France’s strategic manoeuvring re-
garding the creation of an IEM and argued that the single buyer option would offer 
less access to the market than a negotiated TPA model. As Eising and Jabko 
(1999:19) state, “…the Single Buyer proposal was a tactical move in a strategy de-
signed to maintain a maximum degree of freedom…”.   
With the launch of the single buyer proposal, France was able to split member 
states in the Council. The single buyer model helped the French government to co-opt 
support for the anti-liberalisation bloc at an institutional level. For example, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Belgium expressed their interest in a single buyer model as a way 
forward for EU energy market liberalisation. Some analysts pointed out “Aside from 
France, Greece would be interested in the single buyer idea. Greece has long had a 
problem with the idea of TPA, negotiated or mandatory, arguing that its geographical 
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situation on the edge of the Union, coupled with low natural resources, obliges it to 
concentrate on security of supply, rather than increased competition. Ireland also be-
lieves that the single buyer would fit more closely with the proposed restructuring of 
its electricity industry, than would the Commission's ideas. And on first reading, the 
broad outlines of the future structure of the Italian electricity sector, after ENEL's 
sell-off, also sound conveniently close to the French initiative” (FT, 1994d). In the 
Council, France was thus able to get tacit support for its single buyer proposal. As 
some commentators underlined “Most people see aspects (of the single buyer) which 
appeal to them nationally” (FT, 1994d). Moreover, with its single buyer proposal 
France was able to refocus the debate in the Council from radical opposition to TPA 
towards the harmonization of single buyer and negotiated TPA. In other words, 
France was able to reframe the debates on energy market liberalization. Alain Juppe, 
the French Prime Minister at that time, pointed out that the single buyer proposal was 
a win-win option as it ensured liberalization on the one hand, as well as equality, se-
curity of supply and quality of service, the three main principles of public service, on 
the other (Les Echos, 1995). In addition to the competition dimension, which was 
underlined by the Commission and pro-liberalisation bloc, France together with other 
players, was able to add a public service dimension to the Council debates on energy 
market liberalisation. According to Bond (1996) “For France, the most important par-
agraphs…are those that put the principle of public service on a par with competition”. 
France’s industrial minister Yves Galland argued that “The two objectives are not 
incompatible” (Schwartzbrod, 1995). The minister also stressed that public service 
was the big winner: “It preserves the core missions of the continuity of supply, equal 
treatment, the quality of service. I say to the Council that France does not intend to 
jeopardise this great success” (Schwartzbrod, 1995). In the context of gradually grow-
ing support for the creation of an IEM, the anti-liberalisation bloc began to reconsider 
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its position regarding internal energy markets, and began to seek to manipulate cer-
tain outcomes. For instance, using the single buyer option, the French government 
wanted to allow more exports of its electricity, which suffered from nuclear over-
capacity and low-domestic prices, and to increase its profits while keeping access to 
its market controlled under the pretext of public service obligations (Matlary, 1997). 
As a result, the French single buyer proposal helped to refocus the debates surround-
ing energy market deregulation. 
6.2. Divisions within the Commission and incremental steps towards lib-
eralisation 
The French single buyer proposal constructed different choice situations and 
eventually led to disagreements within the Commission between energy and competi-
tion commissioners. The EU competition directorate denounced the single buyer pro-
posal, stressing that the energy sector should not be given an exemption from the EU 
competition law. Moreover, the competition commissioner described the single buyer 
proposal as too weak and inefficient as the power companies would still be able to 
preserve their import/export monopolies. As Midttun (1997:268) pointed out “…the 
Commission condemned the French single-buyer model as a further weakening of its 
proposal, calling it ‘an import monopoly by other name’”. On the other hand, the EU 
energy commissioner criticised the competition commissioner, stressing that he was 
in charge of energy policy, not the DGIV (competition directorate), and that if TPA 
and single buyer models were compatible then he would accept it. According to 
Matlary (1997:57) “Obviously there are strong disagreements about how to create an 
IEM, not only between the Commission, member governments and interests groups, 
but also between directorates”. By constructing the choice situations in a heresthetical 
way, the French proposal divided the EU Commission as the position expressed by 
the competition commissioner went against the strategy of DGXVII (Energy); i.e. to 
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integrate TPA and the single buyer competition models. As a result, the French alter-
native liberalization proposal caused divisions between different commissioners on 
how the process of energy liberalization should be conducted. 
Although the process of forming a coherent liberalisation policy moved for-
ward, after five years of negotiations and the Commission’s attempts to bridge na-
tional gaps, the results were, however, modest. After eight years of negotiations, 16 
presidencies, and many rounds of talks, electricity and later gas directives were even-
tually adopted. These directives were substantially weakened in comparison to the 
Commission‘s initial proposals in the early 1990s. According to Helm (2003:376) 
“The Commission stuck to its ambition to liberalise energy…”. Monopolistic energy 
utilities, together with state and non-state allies, used their material, institutional and 
discursive power to slow down progress towards an IEM. Helm (2003:377) points out 
that “By the mid-1990s...the best that could be achieved was a small incremental 
step”. This logic of incrementalism was evident with the adoption of two directives: 
the electricity market directive in 1996, and the gas market directive in 1998. For in-
stance, the 1996 electricity directive was watered down to include single buyer and 
regulated TPA models as alternatives to mandatory TPA. Eberlein (2012:156) argues 
that “While key milestones in the development of an integrated energy market, the 
first pieces of legislation prescribed…only incremental and moderate market opening 
by setting minimum thresholds”. It could be argued that one of the reasons for the 
weakness of the energy directives was their very slow timetable and generality. As a 
compromise, the directives demanded a minimum share of power consumption to be 
open for free contracting, amounting to 25% in 1997, 28% in 2000 (consumers ex-
ceeding 20 GWh) and 32% in 2003 (consumer threshold 9 GWh) (Eikeland, 2012). 
The 1998 Gas Directive left it open for member states to decide on the pace of re-
forms. According to Eikeland (2012:19) “The directives offered only a general 
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framework for energy market liberalisation, failing to harmonise national procedures. 
Member states could opt for either a system of regulated third-party access or the less 
transparent negotiated-access model. They could choose a single-buyer system (a 
compromise option brought in by France) in which one single firm would still control 
imports of energy into its area, advocated to ensure that governments still had the 
powers to induce public service obligations (PSOs)”. The 1996 Electricity Directive 
and 1998 Gas Directive therefore provided the first coherent steps in market liberali-
sation for a limited number of industrial customers, but at the same moment failed to 
secure the transparency of market information and non-discriminatory access to infra-
structure. 
Conclusion 
The historical institutionalist approach employed in this chapter sheds light on 
the distinctive role of the EU Commission in leading the development of long-term 
energy liberalization policy. Moreover, the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework 
helps to highlight the dynamics of contestation between pro-liberalisation and anti-
liberalisation blocs. Due to its state-centrality, the liberal intergovernmentalist per-
spective would only focus on the national context without explaining the important 
role of Commission and other players in promoting pro-liberalisation policies in Eu-
rope. Although supranationalists would take into account the importance of Commis-
sion in their analysis, they would nevertheless not be able explain that the logic for 
energy liberalisation stems from the Commission’s long-term pro-growth policy ori-
entation rather than from a functional spillover effect. Moreover, in my approach I 
argue that the Commission’s long-term policy orientation is a “path-dependent” fea-
ture historically embedded in the Commission’s logic. This forward-looking devel-
opment orientation helps to explain the Commission’s pro-liberalisation stance in the 
EU energy domain. The Commission viewed the creation of a common energy mar-
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ket in Europe as a long-term policy to increase the EU’s efficiency and reduce energy 
costs, thereby making the European economy more competitive and resilient in the 
future. 
The use of the neo-Gramscian analytical concepts provides a richer and more 
systematic understanding of the dynamic processes of political contestation surround-
ing energy liberalization at the EU level. It reveals the use of variety of different 
strategies and actions by different groups, in the material, institutional and discursive 
domains. Compared with conventional frameworks which are often engaged in 
somewhat stagnant debates over structure versus agency, my theoretical account 
seeks to resolve this dualism. While I take into account the importance of macro-
political and economic structural constraints in explaining the resistance of national 
government to energy market liberalization, the neo-Gramscian concept of war of 
position explains the implementation of material, institutional and discursive strate-
gies to shape these policies. I argue that on material dimension, at the end of the 
1980s, the Commission embarked on its first actions to identify and finance energy 
projects on the basis of their value for the creation of a common energy market. 
Moreover, the Commission started its energy market institutionalisation by providing 
rules and regulations to create a consensus for energy market liberalisation. Discur-
sively, the Commission and other players attempted to provide a coherent case that 
portrayed the creation of an IEM as an essential step for tackling long-term challeng-
es. The neo-Gramscian account therefore allows us to provide a more detailed and 
dynamic explanation of contestations surrounding energy deregulation as it brings 
together the material, institutional and discursive strategies deployed by those groups 
which sought to have their particular interests accepted as common European inter-
ests.   
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The neo-Gramscian perspective helps to account for phenomena that would 
otherwise be difficult to perceive. The neo-Gramscian concept of transformismo and 
Riker’s logic of heresthetics help to explain what happens when the dominance of the 
anti-liberalisation group was challenged. In the case of energy market liberalisation, 
in the 1990s the anti-liberalisation bloc began to lose its hegemonic dominance. In 
response, the bloc sought to bring about the widest possible coalition of interests and 
to absorb counter-hegemonic ideas. This strategy is conducted at the discursive level 
by trying to expand, incorporate and rearticulate the arguments of the status quo. The 
concept of transformismo can be operationalised by post-structuralist logics and, 
moreover, the concept of heresthetics helps to explain attempts by the anti-
liberalisation bloc to counter the Commission’s TPA model through the promotion of 
the single buyer proposal. The analytical concepts of transformismo and heresthetics 
thus reveal the strategic nature of the discursive and institutional actions taken by the 
anti-liberalisation bloc in order to accommodate certain demands and preserve its 
monopoly status. 
Progress surrounding EU energy market liberalization policy was rather mod-
est. Due to a lack of support from civil society groups and organic intellectuals, the 
Commission and other players were not able to create a strong and unanimous pro-
liberalisation bloc. The Commission was not able to unite players in support of its 
liberalization policy. The adopted electricity and gas directives were thus too flexible 
and too slow in their implementation time-frame. On the contrary from the Commis-
sion’s initial energy market liberalisation objectives, the agreed directives failed to 
eradicate monopolistic tendencies, nor to harmonise national standards for energy 
market competition. As a result, there was only little progress made in the direction of 
coherent competitive internal energy market policy and the Commission was not able 
to fully eradicate monopolistic nature of European energy sector. Moreover, growing 
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external and internal challenges contributed to a situation where, at the end of the 
1990s, the liberalization dimension began to lose prominence. There was consequent-
ly a shift towards a new energy paradigm, away from marketization towards energy 
security under growing climate change constraints. In the following chapter, I will 
assess these emerging challenges and analyse how the Commission and other state 
and non-state actors tried to lead a war of position in favour of nuclear power in re-





The attempts to address security and climate challenges through nu-
clear option constraints 
Introduction 
As was argued in the previous chapter, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the 
competitiveness dimension was top of European energy policy agenda. The Commis-
sion proposed energy liberalisation initiatives in order to open up national energy 
markets, to create a proper regulatory environment for the functioning of an IEM, and 
to deal with energy monopolies or vertically integrated energy companies which con-
trolled all sections of the value chain: production, distribution and supply. It was con-
sidered at this time to be a necessary action to ensure long-term growth and the com-
petitiveness of European economy. According to Helm (2007:42) “To date, European 
energy policy has been almost entirely focused on liberalisation and competition. The 
aim of the 1992 Single Market Programme was to complete the internal energy mar-
ket...”. Nevertheless, due to changing economic, energy supply and environmental 
circumstances, the liberalisation dimension began to lose prominence at the end of the 
1990s. A new century brought a shift towards changes in the energy paradigm away 
from the markets towards energy security and climate change constraints. As Helm 
(2007:47) pointed out “For the last two decades of the twentieth century, these fail-
ures were largely masked by excess supply and low fossil fuel prices…this context 
has gradually changed. Europe now faces serious security of supply problems and, at 
the same time, the climate change challenge has become urgent”. At the end of the 
1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, one could see attempts to address energy secu-
rity and climate change challenges through a nuclear response. As Helm claims “To 
date, each challenge has been addressed separately” (2007:37). Given growing exter-
nal challenges, the Commission saw the emerging contradictions between the existing 
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regime of energy supply and the long-term economic development of Europe. As a 
result, the Commission acted as a strategic entrepreneur and led the transition towards 
a new energy order which would ensure long-term European interests. Nuclear was 
considered as a potential way of addressing emerging long-term contradictions. This 
chapter thus focuses on the nuclear side of the response to addressing growing securi-
ty and climate contradictions. Although there were certain developments in renewable 
domain and the EU ETS at the end of the 1990s, the main contestation with respect to 
European energy policy was still with regards to nuclear power and its role in the EU 
energy order. In the following chapter I will analyse how, in the mid-2000s, European 
energy policy discussion shifted even more towards climate concerns, with the main 
emphasis on a low carbon policy response. However, in this chapter I will explain an 
attempt by at least part of the Commission and other players to use the nuclear option 
as the first bridge in creating an historical bloc and leading the transition towards a 
long-term energy policy which would accommodate both energy security and climate 
dimensions.  
This chapter analyses the transition towards a new energy policy since the end 
of the 1990s. In the first part I will assess why EU energy policy discussion shifted 
towards security of supply and climate objectives. Moreover, I will explain the role 
and the interests of the EU Commission in leading the creation of an integrated ener-
gy policy. In addition, the material, institutional and discursive strategies used by dif-
ferent actors in the energy policy debate will be evaluated. In the last part, I will as-
sess the challenges which limited pro-nuclear progress with regards to energy policy 
integration. 
1. The external factors and new energy paradigm 
Before turning to an analysis of the Commission’s leadership in promoting a 
new energy paradigm, the importance of external conditions and circumstances can-
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not be neglected. It could be argued that changes in the EU energy policy were af-
fected by the new energy and environmental circumstances of the 1990s. These were 
not causal factors that automatically changed the EU energy policy landscape, yet 
they played an important role in making certain elements more visible and urgent. It 
could be argued that shifts towards an integrated energy policy were influenced by 
two simultaneous phenomena, the Kyoto process and the “oil shock” (fuel crisis) 
which occurred in the 1990s. I will analyse and explain the importance of each of 
these factors in more detail. 
1.1. The effects of Kyoto Protocol    
One of the factors that contributed to changes in energy policy was growing 
European solidarity with regards to a new energy-climate policy approach. This soli-
darity stemmed from the Kyoto negotiations and the Commission’s willingness to 
lead the transition towards a sustainable low carbon future. Although the Kyoto pro-
tocol was ratified in 1998, it first began to influence the Commission‘s energy policy 
agenda during the first half of the 1990s. During the Kyoto negotiations, the Com-
mission was very active in trying to persuade other countries on board, as it feared 
that otherwise the whole process would collapse. For example, Keppler (2009:218) 
claims “It is fair to say that Europe has been the principal global champion of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the set of greenhouse gas emissions reduction objectives solemnly 
pledged at the third conference of the parties held in Kyoto in 1997. Without Europe-
an leadership and political pressure the Kyoto Protocol would not have been able to 
assemble the necessary qualified majority to come into force”. Growing climate 
change concerns have been one aspect of EU efforts to tackle problems of long-term 
sustainability. McGowan (2009:32) states that the Commission “…has set an exam-
ple for the international community by developing its own mechanisms for tackling 
climate change, which could provide the basis for a global model”. With the signing 
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of the Kyoto Protocol and growing evidence of detrimental effects of climate change, 
the environmental (sustainability) dimension of EU energy policy became more 
prominent. Loyola de Palacio, the vice-President of the European Commission and 
the Commissioner of Energy and Transport, pointed out that Europe needs “An ener-
gy policy which addresses the world’s environmental challenges and also cares about 
future generations obviously contributes to sustainable development. As an example, 
we can consider the commitments made by the EU in Kyoto in 1997” (Palacio, 2000). 
The Kyoto Protocol was thus not an exogenous shock to which the Commission re-
acted opportunistically, but a chance to make climate change an inseparable part of 
the EU energy agenda. In other words, the Kyoto process and the Commission’s lead-
ership in it had an impact on changes in the EU energy policy, and the Kyoto con-
straints became inextricable part of EU energy policy. 
1.2. The oil crises and the shift towards energy security 
At the turn of the new century oil prices began a fundamental shift upwards 
despite opposite expectations. Prices first doubled from around $10 per barrel, and 
then gradually began to increase further. As we can see from Figure 6, throughout the 
1990s oil prices were stable or even decreasing. However, since 1999 prices have 
increased substantially. For example, in February 1999, the oil price reached a 25 
year low with $11 per barrel. However, in the period up to September 2000, the oil 
price climbed to a peak of close to $35 per barrel. After being stable for some period, 
oil prices increased again in late October and November to an average of about $32 
per barrel (IMF, 2000). In today’s context, the rise in the oil price may not seem sig-
nificant. However, compared to the trends of the 1990s, the difference is obvious. 
Only 10 years ago, in response to the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait in 1990, the oil price 
reached these levels. As the International Monetary Fund (IMF) report indicated “In 
October and November, 2000 the world oil price averaged over three times higher 
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than its February 1999 low, and, excluding the Gulf war period, reached a 15 year 
high in both real and nominal terms” (IMF, 2000). In addition, Helm (2007:36) 
claims that “very cheap oil - and gas - came to the end…but so, too, did the excess 
supply conditions across the energy sector (including in oil refineries and oil and pet-
rol delivery systems)”. 
Figure 6. Key crude oil spot prices in US dollars/barrel 
 
Source: IEA. Key World Energy Statistics, 2012 
The reasons for these increases in the oil price are related to a demand/supply 
miscalculation: as the demand of oil started to recover after the 1998 Asian crisis, 
Opec slashed oil production levels. According to some analysts “What happened is 
the convergence of three economic influences. After twice failing to cut output...Opec 
tried again. It has been helped by a coincidental fall in world oil stocks. This is partly 
a result of the emergence from recession of the economies in Europe and East Asia. 
In short, demand was growing just as the Opec producers were aiming to reduce out-
put” (Smith, 1999). Consequently, at the end of the 1990s, there was an oil price 
shock due to these demand-supply miscalculations.     
Growing oil/fuel prices caused massive protests throughout Europe, causing 
significant disruptions in some countries. Hauliers and farmers in Spain, Ireland, Po-
land, Germany and Greece blocked main roads and refineries. Protests in the UK led 
to shortages, panic buying, traffic chaos, and the disruption to the work of the emer-
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gency services. Due to the seriousness of the situation, the UK government held a 
series of emergency meetings discussing how to get fuel out of the refineries (Mor-
gan, 2000). Some reports suggested that the financial costs of the week-long protests 
were significant. According to the “Impact of September 2000 Fuel Price Protests on 
UK Critical Infrastructure“ report: “The impact of the protest was much deeper than 
anticipated because it struck at a particularly vulnerable point of the UK economy. 
The disruption in the energy sector created a chain reaction among other sectors such 
as transportation, health care, food distribution, financial and government services 
due to their interconnectivity and interdependencies. The financial impact of the 
week-long fuel drought was estimated at close to £1 billion“ (PSEPC, 2005). Howev-
er, it could be argued that the worst situation was in Belgium where hauliers' protests 
spread across the country, bringing commuter traffic to a standstill and forcing some 
businesses and schools to close. Moreover, lorries, taxi and bus drivers joined the 
protests as they parked across city boulevards, motorways and border crossings with 
Germany, France and the Netherlands (CNN, 2000). Furthermore, the halt of supplies 
from oil depots and refineries led to a situation when petrol stations were running low 
on fuel. As a result, these protests paralysed many countries in Europe. Reacting to 
the situation, the Belgian Prime Minister at the time, Guy Verhofstadt, made a tele-
vised address where he stated “The people's patience is at its end. Our economy, the 
prosperity of our people, is in danger” (Collett-White, 2000). These rises in the oil 
prices and the subsequent protests thus had a clear impact on energy policy develop-
ment. 
1.3. The Commission’s long-term response  
Due to its path dependent forward-looking pro-growth orientation, the Com-
mission viewed the rapid increase in oil prices and subsequent fuel protests not only 
as the threats to physical security of supply, but first and foremost as long-term risks 
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which would curtail economic growth and the competitiveness of the European econ-
omy. However, the Commission’s long-term view is often contested by certain state 
and non-state players which try to protect their particular (often short-term) interests 
at the expense of long-term European interests. In order to promote its broader view 
and to create a hegemonic energy policy, the Commission attempts to use certain stra-
tegic actions in the institutional, material and discursive domains. I will analyse and 
explain these strategies in the subsequent parts of this chapter.   
In accordance with a historical institutional account informed by a neo-
Gramscian perspective, it is postulated here that, in the early 2000s, the Commission 
viewed previously mentioned developments as potential long-term threats which 
could lead to crisis. Cox distinguishes crisis from cyclical downturn: “..the economy 
must undergo some structural change in order to emerge from a crisis. Cri-
sis…signifies a fundamental disequilibrium…” (Cox, 1987:273). In the context of a 
growing disarticulation between energy policy and sustainable long-term models of 
economic growth, the EU Commission stated “A successful economy depends on a 
secure energy supply. The price of oil has long been a determinant of economic per-
formance, with high oil prices associated with high inflation and high interest rates 
leading to higher unemployment” (EC, 2000c: 3). Following the increase in oil prices, 
and at a the time of growing climate pressures, in 2000 the Commission adopted the 
Green Paper on the Security of Energy Supply in which it emphasised the crucial role 
of energy for Europe’s economic prosperity, and the need to preserve a sustainable 
and viable growth model in a volatile environment. In the Green Paper the Commis-
sion contested the European energy policy status quo: “The dramatic rise in oil prices 
which could undermine the recovery of European economy, caused by the fact that 
the price of crude oil has tripled since March 1999…reveals the European Union’s 
structural (long-term) weaknesses regarding energy supply…Without an active ener-
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gy policy, the European Union will not be able to free itself from its increasing ener-
gy dependence” (EC, 2000a: 2, 3). In addition, the Green Paper acknowledged the 
importance of long-term energy policy planning to the creation of a functioning of 
European economy: “The European Union must take better charge of its energy des-
tiny. We are obliged to acknowledge that, despite various crises besetting the Europe-
an economy in the last 30 years, there has not been a real debate on the choice of en-
ergy sources and even less on energy policy regarding security of supply. The oil 
price increase prevailing since 1999 makes it (debate) urgent” (EC, 2000a: 3). Fur-
thermore, at the same time growing environmental challenges were also considered as 
detrimental to long-term economic and social developments. The Green Paper under-
lined the negative consequences of climate change for sustainable development: “…if 
nothing is done…this would raise sea levels by between 15 and 95 cm. Coastal areas, 
but also entire islands and archipelagos, could be wiped off the map as the ice melts 
and oceans swell. The consequences could be catastrophic since they combine with 
other aggravating factors linked to economic activities as a whole and land use. 
Droughts and floods are expected to be more severe…shaking the foundations of ag-
riculture” (EC, 2000a:48). Margot Wallstrom (2003), the commissioner responsible 
for the environment, established a clear linkage between climate change and long-
term challenges to economic growth: “Mankind simply cannot afford to take these 
risks. And let us always remember that climate change is far more than an environ-
mental issue – it is a challenge to future economic sustainability as well”. Given these 
new challenges, the Commission saw that one way of achieving energy security was 
by reducing overall demand, and demand for fossil fuels, which would also address 
issue of climate change. The security and climate dimensions thus began to be viewed 
as fundamentally connected. In the following part of this chapter, I will analyse the 
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promotion of the nuclear option in order to address issues of energy security and cli-
mate change. 
2. Attempts to integrate energy policy  
2.1. The promotion of nuclear energy 
In its initial response to growing long-term challenges at the end of the 1990s, 
the Commissioner for energy viewed nuclear as a potential solution to the dual chal-
lenges of energy security and climate change. Although there were other develop-
ments in an attempt to create an integrative approach, such as the adoption of indica-
tive targets for renewable energy in 1997, at this time the focus of energy policy con-
testation in Europe remained on the future of nuclear development. The Energy Di-
rectorate, run by the Spanish Commissioner Loyola de Palacio, was in charge of the 
nuclear option. The European dimension to nuclear energy first arose in 1957 with 
the signing of the Euratom Treaty, with the objective of coordinating Member States' 
research programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, because of the 
far-reaching consequences of nuclear to national security, all key nuclear power deci-
sions regarding safety and radioactive waste questions have always been addressed at 
the national level. Since the 1986 Chernobyl incident, European public opinion has 
been increasingly anti-nuclear and nuclear was not often discussed at the European 
level during the 1990s. According to Buchan (2009:175) “…the 1986 Chernobyl ac-
cident, that had cowed the Commission into silence on nuclear matters through most 
of the 1990s”. In spite of its importance, this incident was not the only issue which 
kept European institutions and member states silent on nuclear. The conditions of 
energy supply at this time were largely favourable to the fossil fuel industry, and this 
made nuclear energy uneconomic. There was therefore very little investment in nu-
clear during this period. The excess supply of oil and especially gas coming from 
former Soviet countries, and the stability of oil and gas prices throughout of the 
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1990s, did not lead to any urgent energy security challenges. There was a similar 
mood surrounding environmental issues as increasing supplies of post-Soviet gas, 
which in terms of CO2 emissions is considerably less polluting than coal, created fa-
vourable conditions to justify the existing energy status quo.  
Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s the situation began to change. Concerns 
regarding climate change and air pollution, as well as a growing dependence on ener-
gy imports, led some in the Commission, with the leadership of the Energy and 
Transport Commissioner, to consider nuclear power as a necessary element in tack-
ling Europe’s long-term development challenges. According to Palacio “In the fore-
seeable future, we need nuclear power to keep emissions down. There are risks, but 
they are calculable. There is no other option” (Euractiv, 2007). Moreover, nuclear 
was seen as a long-term investment with high upfront, but low lifecycle costs, given 
its high capacity and long plant lifetimes. The Commission thus considered nuclear as 
an economically wise option in the long run. As Palacio argued “nuclear energy re-
mains a very attractive economic option if it is properly managed” (Palacio, 2004).  
In other words, in an attempt to create a hegemonic order which would address both 
energy security and environmental challenges, the Energy Commissioner embarked 
on a neo-Gramscian war of position, a struggle which brings to light the diversity of 
material, discursive and organizational (institutional) strategies that can be adopted by 
a group seeking to have its interests accepted as the common interests. In the follow-
ing subsections I will explain how state and non-state actors led the development of 
the pro-nuclear order across the three dimensions of the historical bloc. 
2.2. The promotion of nuclear power through the material dimension 
The neo-Gramscian account defines the material dimension as one where fi-
nancial and technological strategies are deployed (Levy and Newell, 2004). It is ob-
vious that, in comparison with member states and even large industrial and energy 
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corporations, the Commission has limited financial resources. However, despite these 
limitations the Commission has contributed to the consolidation of the material di-
mension by cooperating with the nuclear industry in funding research projects, creat-
ing investment opportunities and providing financial contributions for nuclear energy 
developments. For example, the Commission initiated the creation of the Fifth and 
Sixth Framework Programmes which set out the priorities for EU research, techno-
logical development and demonstration (RTDD) activities for the periods 1998-2002 
and 2002-2006. Part of this programme was devoted to the Euratom framework 
which covered research and technological improvements in the nuclear sector. Of the 
Fifth Framework Programme’s budget of 13.7 billion Euro, 1.2 billion Euro were al-
located to the Euratom programme (FP5) (Forsstrom, 2000). The same amount was 
also distributed under the Euratom programme for the period 2002-2006 (FP6). 
Moreover, the objectives of these programmes encompassed strategic support for nu-
clear companies and associations in order to allow them to develop new nuclear tech-
nologies and address the technological faults and controversies which previously im-
peded public support for nuclear expansion. According to Hans Forsstrom (2000: 2, 
3), the Commission’s Head of Unit for nuclear fission and radiation protection, “The 
strategic goal of the…programme (FP5) is to help exploit the full potential of nuclear 
energy in a sustainable manner, by making current technologies even safer and more 
economical and by exploring promising new concepts. Research…focuses on issues 
that currently hinder the fuller exploitation of nuclear energy (e.g., cost, waste dis-
posal, public attitudes) and aim to demonstrate the availability of practical solutions 
to the outstanding scientific and technical problems and public concerns)”. It could be 
argued that one of the main objectives of both the FP5 and FP6 programmes was to 
address nuclear waste management, an issue which has always been the main counter 
argument in anti-nuclear discourse. The EU Energy Commissioner Palacio pointed 
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out that “The EU needs to spend at least 30 times more on nuclear waste management 
research” (EC, 2003). So, despite the Commission’s financial limitations, it tried to 
strengthen the material domain by strategically guiding investment, creating funding 
opportunities for new nuclear innovations, and incentivising solutions to certain pub-
lic concerns such as nuclear waste management and safety.   
2.3. The pro-nuclear bloc and discursive formations 
On the discursive level, the pro-nuclear bloc attempted to present nuclear as 
an inevitable part of creating an integrated forward-looking energy policy. DG Ener-
gy, the Energy Commission, business groups, and other non-state actors which en-
compassed pro-nuclear bloc, tried to link the discourse of nuclear energy with other 
energy, social and economic demands. First, the nuclear option was promoted as an 
equivalential connector which linked both demands for CO2 reduction and security of 
supply. In other words, the discourse was framed in order to depict the nuclear option 
as an inevitable part of any solution that dealt with the two fundamental energy prob-
lems of this time: the dependence on volatile energy imports and rising CO2 emis-
sions. Discussing the need to keep the nuclear power option open, Taylor (2002) 
claimed “This is not just because it is one of our most secure energy resources – very 
diversified sources of supply, a fuel whose high energy density makes it easy to 
stockpile and extensive fuel cycle facilities within the Community result in an ex-
tremely low risk of supply interruption. But also because it is the only major source 
of electricity that does not produce any significant quantities of greenhouse gases”. In 
addition, the promotion of the EU Nuclear Package was also linked to security de-
mands, and Taylor mentions that security of supply and climate constraints were one 
of the main driving factors behind the promotion of the nuclear package (Taylor, 
2002). Furthermore, the EU Energy Commissioner, using the post-structuralist logic 
of equivalence, created a pro-nuclear myth that linked the issues of nuclear to wider 
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demands regarding quality of life, social wellbeing and economic growth. Loyola de 
Palacio (2003a) made clear that “The citizens have to realise that when they say no to 
nuclear at the same time they say no to air conditioning, heating and the other ad-
vantages of electrification and therefore economic growth and employment. If they 
say no to nuclear they should add that we accept more CO2 emissions”. The nuclear 
myth was used in order to reinforce a public sense of the inevitability of the nuclear 
option, i.e. if the public wanted to continue enjoying the benefits of modern life, then 
it should accept nuclear power. In order to strengthen the case for nuclear acceptance, 
Loyola de Palacio emulated Margaret Thatcher’s in arguing that “there is no alterna-
tive”, stressing the fundamental importance of nuclear in tackling the challenges of 
both security and climate (Palacio, 2001). The Energy Commissioner explained “The 
production of nuclear energy has been increasing. This is the reality and, with the 
challenge of climate change, the EU cannot avoid nuclear energy for the foreseeable 
future” (Gow, 2004). At the level of the Commission, pro-nuclear discourse was thus 
situated within broader discourses of energy dependence, climate change, and social 
and economic wellbeing. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the case for EU wide 
regulation and leadership on nuclear power, the Commission described current regu-
lation as "insufficient" and took the opportunity to promote its Nuclear Package legis-
lation. Palacio criticized the nuclear regulation regime by using a metaphorical ex-
pression which compared the state of nuclear safety in Europe with safety regulations 
for bathing beaches. The Energy Commissioner claimed that “…the current state of 
nuclear safety in Europe was "insufficient" to the point that regulations for swimming 
beaches were tougher than those for nuclear power stations” (AFP, 2002). As a result, 
the Commission linked nuclear debates with the issues of energy security, climate 
change, economic policy, and safety. 
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At the discursive level, the Commission acted in several stages. At the first 
stage, these actions were directed towards the creation of a broad pro-nuclear coali-
tion that would address and discursively link growing energy security, climate 
change, and competitiveness challenges. As a result, in 2001 the Commission created 
the Michelangelo Network (Micanet) with the main objective of fostering discourses 
of surrounding the competitiveness and sustainability of nuclear energy in the EU and 
elaborating a common European position on the future of nuclear energy (EC, 
2001b). The Commission stated that the aim of the Michelangelo program was to de-
velop a European nuclear development strategy that corresponded to the actual needs 
of industries facing tough challenges of competitiveness and sustainability (EC, 
1999:28). Moreover, the network worked as a discursive hub through which coopera-
tion and partnerships between different pro-nuclear actors were established. One of 
the Commission’s research papers defined the Michelangelo Network as “the basis 
for a long-term stable partnership between the main European organisations of nucle-
ar industry, which will probably be the only way to support future large projects in 
Europe” (EC, 1999:28). The network helped to consolidate the positions and dis-
courses of various actors, including research institutions, universities, and business 
groups from different European countries. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning 
of the 2000s, the Manicet project thus served as a tool of facilitating discursive and 
organisational consensus.  
Pro-nuclear business groups were involved in the creation of discursive mean-
ings and promoted the pro-nuclear myth through the slogan “there is no alternative”. 
For example, the largest European business association in Brussels, UNICE (today 
Business Europe), and the largest nuclear industry association, the European Atomic 
Forum (Foratom), underlined the importance of nuclear for security and climate solu-
tions. According to UNICE (2001:5) “The first priority should be to make it clear to 
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the public at large that nuclear energy is an option that is indispensable for tackling 
the climate change problem. The need to encourage nuclear energy is also a function 
of its very positive role for the security of energy supply”. Foratom strengthened the 
linkage of nuclear energy expansion and energy security by using a generative 
methaphor which described nuclear energy as a “ robust and stable buffer” against 
external changes that could affect other sources of energy supply (Foratom, 2001). In 
other words, by linking the promotion of nuclear energy with the idea of a buffer, 
Foratom wanted to create the perception that nuclear power is an important safeguard 
for tackling the issues of Europe’s energy security. European business groups thus 
attempted to underline the importance of the nuclear option for secure and climate-
friendly energy solutions. 
The nuclear industry also played an active role in trying to broaden the pro-
nuclear discursive alliance. In order to increase support from the renewable energy 
sector, pro-nuclear groups acted strategically and discursively linked the promotion of 
nuclear and renewable energy. The pro-nuclear group wanted to attract some of the 
renewable energy industry and environmental groups into a pro-nuclear coalition. 
Moreover, the group tried to establish common ground with the renewable energy 
sector by stressing, at the ideational level, that the two sources of energy share com-
mon features, i.e. low carbon emissions. The pro-nuclear lobby was instrumental in 
discursively constructing and employing categories such as “low carbon fuels”, 
“CO2-free energy sources”, “low- and non-CO2 emitting sources”, thus linking re-
newables and nuclear energy into a unifying category which underlined their envi-
ronmentally-friendly features and detached them from unsustainable carbon rich 
sources such as gas and coal. In addition, the UNICE and Foratom underlined the 
need to have both baseload and intermittent power generation capacities, stressing 
that renewable energy together with nuclear energy should play an important role in 
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Europe’s future energy mix (UNICE, 2001). Foratom (2001) claimed “All energy 
technologies have a role to play in meeting our needs within acknowledged con-
straints. It is important to develop renewable energies and energy conservation tech-
nologies so that they can reach their full potential. It is appropriate now to reassert the 
valuable contribution that nuclear makes to meeting the need for abundant and clean 
baseload electricity in the EU”. The nuclear industry lobby thus used discursive ac-
tions in order to bring support for nuclear energy development. 
The neo-Gramscian account underlines the importance of “organic intellectu-
als”, individuals and/or groups who help to establish educational relationships as well 
as providing coherent justificatory frameworks for change. In the midst of the strug-
gle over nuclear energy in the early-2000s, the European Nuclear Education Network 
(ENEN) was created. Through co-operation between universities, research organisa-
tions, regulatory bodies, and those industries involved in the application and use of 
nuclear technology, the ENEN aimed to further develop expertise in the nuclear 
fields as well developing a common nuclear safety culture throughout Europe 
(ENEN, 2014). Being a member of ENEN, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission contributed to the network’s education activities by providing 
financial and technical support. For example, the Commission’s JRC cooperated with 
the ENEN in providing a forum for PhD students to present their research work to 
their fellows and colleagues in the nuclear domain, as well as promoting the research 
work of PhD students in the nuclear filed. Moreover, in nuclear debates, the European 
Nuclear Society (ENS), the largest society for nuclear science, research and industry 
in Europe, played the role of organic intellectual. The ENS combines national nuclear 
societies from 22 countries in Europe, plus Israel, and has a membership of more than 
20,000 professionals from industry, the academic world, research centres and authori-
ties (ENS, 2013). The High Scientific Council, a group of senior scientists belonging 
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to the European Nuclear Society (ENS), tried to provide coherent and scholarly justi-
fied discursive frames for future nuclear development. The High Scientific Council 
linked the increase of nuclear power capacity with solutions to the challenges of cli-
mate change and growing energy demands. As was argued in an ENS statement: “The 
European Nuclear Society believes that the World’s capacity for generating electrici-
ty from nuclear energy must be increased substantially if we are to meet the ambition 
targets for reducing world-wide emissions of carbon dioxide while also meeting the 
projected growth in demand for electricity” (ENS, 2003a). In addition, the High Sci-
entific Council of the ENS promoted the myth that nuclear is an inevitable solution 
for future energy security and environmental challenges “…we do not think that nu-
clear power is the only answer to the problem of supplying more energy while reduc-
ing carbon emissions, but we are convinced there is no solution without it” (ENS, 
2003b). Moreover, the ENS discourse emphasised the safety and security of Western 
nuclear technologies. It attempted to contradict anti-nuclear arguments and show that 
the most sensitive issues of nuclear safety could be properly managed. According to 
an ENS statement “The safety record of the Western technology-based power plants 
is very good, with no loss of human life due to a reactor accident in almost 10,000 
commercial reactor-years of experience” (ENS, 2003a). Furthermore, the ENS fo-
cused on a narrative of the economic competitiveness and stability of nuclear power: 
“Nuclear energy is economically competitive with other sources of energy in many 
countries. Once build, nuclear power plants can produce electricity at a predictable 
cost almost regardless of fuel price fluctuations” (ENS, 2003a).  
2.4. Institutional strategies   
In a process of hegemonisation, the neo-Gramscian account underlines the 
importance of the institutional dimension in which a particular order is established 
and perpetuated (Cox and Sinclair, 1996). At the EU institutional level, the EU com-
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missioner for energy, together with the Commission’s Energy Directorate, led the 
creation of pan-European regulatory mechanisms and rules in the early 2000s in order 
to introduce a common European approach to nuclear safety standards. As a result, in 
2002, the Commission proposed The Nuclear Package, draft legislation which strived 
to introduce this common European approach. The package contained a range of pro-
posals, including principles of safety for nuclear installations, rules for the manage-
ment of radioactive waste, and financial support for nuclear installations (Euractiv, 
2004a). With this package, the European Commission attempted to significantly in-
crease its power over nuclear safety regulation. In other words, the package was an 
attempt to institutionalise, through rules and regulation, the development of nuclear 
energy. The Commission recognised that one of the main obstacles to nuclear energy 
was public acceptance, something that was strongly influenced by anxieties regarding 
safety and the absence of clearly defined and established procedures for the manage-
ment of radioactive waste (House of Lords, 2005). Despite its obvious preoccupation 
regarding the safety and sustainability of nuclear, one could argue that the Commis-
sion wanted to not only to address these challenges, but also to reinvigorate support 
for the developments of nuclear in Europe and take control of regulation of the sector. 
Derek Taylor, the head of the nuclear energy, waste management and transport unit in 
the Commission, argued that “Nuclear cannot develop without a consensus that gives 
it a long enough period of stability, bearing in mind the economic and technological 
constraints of the industry. The Commission endorses the view that there is a need to 
keep the nuclear option open” (Taylor, 2002).  
Opposition to the Commission’s proposal was strong. Due to the structural 
dependence of its economy on the nuclear sector, France was the only country which 
supported the Commission’s proposal. Since the 1970s, France has been a pro-nuclear 
country with 80 per cent of its power generation produced by nuclear stations. More 
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importantly, France, a significant player in the world’s nuclear market, has promoted 
new nuclear technologies and installations which have contributed to economic 
growth and employment. As Axelrod (2006:15) points out “France has supported the 
Commission’s position… because of its influential role in developing the best prac-
tices of safety requirements for nuclear reactors as part of Western European Nuclear 
Regulators Association (WENRA). France may hope to continue its leadership role”. 
It could be argued that, with the adoption of the Commission’s initiatives, France saw 
the potential for a “nuclear renaissance”, not only in Europe but also more widely, 
thus contributing to the growth of one of the most important industrial sectors in the 
country. However, the European Parliament was divided on the issue of the nuclear 
package. Some Parliament committees were more willing to accept these legislative 
proposals than others (Axelrod, 2006). I will discuss the opposition from the Council 
and the Parliament in more detail in subsequent parts of this chapter where I discuss 
nuclear constraints and setbacks.  
2.4.1. Heresthetics and the creation of institutional support 
In order to build institutional support, the pro-nuclear group’s strategy was not 
limited to rhetorical actions. There was also an attempt to strategically manipulate 
certain dimensions, i.e. to use Riker’s concept of “heresthetic”, a logic which con-
structs choice situations in order to achieve the preferred outcome (Riker, 1986). The 
EU Commission’s Energy Directorate thus attempted to expand the dimensionality of 
the issue. In other words, it linked the promotion of the Nuclear Package with the is-
sue of EU enlargement. It could be argued that the Commission acted in a heresthetic 
way in order to expand the dimensionality of energy issues, i.e. to argue that the en-
largement and the intake of new member states with unsafe soviet type nuclear reac-
tors required a centralised European regulatory mechanism run by the Commission. 
As Taylor stated “The objective of the nuclear package, in particular of the proposed 
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new legislation, is to try to provide better guarantees of a high level of nuclear safety 
throughout an enlarged European Union” (Taylor, 2002). Moreover, in a conference 
speech about the nuclear package, Palacio underlined the importance of European-
wide nuclear regulation in the context of enlargement: “The future of nuclear power 
is a specific element for a guaranteed supply of energy, all the more so if we bear in 
mind the forthcoming enlargement of the EU. With a view to the enlargement of the 
EU, I have wished to increase security throughout the life cycle of nuclear installa-
tions” (Palacio, 2003b). Given that some candidate countries used old soviet-type 
reactors which were considered unsafe, the pro-nuclear bloc aimed to evoke an asso-
ciation with poor levels of energy governance in Europe. DG Energy and the com-
missioner for energy and transport thus used enlargement as a heresthetical issue in 
order to push for nuclear and to promote the EU Nuclear Package: “…Loyola de Pa-
lacio…commissioner for energy as well as transport, decided to exploit impeding 
enlargement to East Europe to advance a more proactive EU nuclear power” (Buchan, 
2009: 175, 176).  
Given the Commission’s heresthetics, certain EU member states from the anti-
nuclear group found themselves in a difficult situation. For example, at the beginning 
of the 2000s Austria and the Czech Republic had a conflict over the closure of Czech 
Temelin nuclear power plant, a soviet-type nuclear plant which was built near the 
Austrian border. Due to safety concerns Austria demanded the closure of this plant, 
otherwise it would veto the entrance of the Czech Republic into the EU. Austria thus 
found itself in a difficult situation as, on the one hand it hoped that the adoption of 
EU Nuclear Package with European rules and regulations for nuclear energy could 
ensure a higher level of safety and help deal with old soviet type nuclear power sta-
tions. However, the irony was that, with the latter strategy, the uniform EU standards 
which were envisaged in the Nuclear Package could actually lend support to the nu-
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clear industry by allaying public fears about the risks associated with the nuclear op-
tion, as well as helping to reduce capital costs for new reactors. According to Axelrod 
(2006:8) “Public acceptance of nuclear power plants might grow if there were equally 
high safety standards throughout the EU”. Given the enlargement situation, the Nu-
clear Package generated a political dilemma for some members in the anti-nuclear 
group. On the one hand, if they rejected the Nuclear Package then they would be less 
able to deal with the threats from the old soviet-type reactors still in use in some of 
the accession countries in the Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia and Czech Republic). However, on the other hand, if they accepted the 
package then they would revive public support for nuclear energy as safety concerns 
would no longer be seen as so pressing. In order to enhance support for its Nuclear 
Package, the Commission therefore acted in a timely manner in order to expand the 
dimensionality of the nuclear debate.  
Despite these heresthetical attempts and other strategic actions, the pro-
nuclear bloc led by the Commission’s Energy Directorate was not able to increase 
institutional support for the promotion of nuclear power. During debates regarding 
the EU Nuclear Package, there remained a clear opposition in the Council. A majority 
of member states, excluding France, were against more stringent nuclear regulation 
from Brussels. According to Axelrod (2006:16) “Major opponents to a Community-
wide approach that were able to substantially reduce the proposed scope and binding 
compliance mechanisms have been: the United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden and Ger-
many. The first four states have enough votes to block the legislation”. Moreover, the 
Nuclear Package proposed by the Commission in 2002 was re-submitted, and watered 
down considerably, before final agreement was achieved at the end of 2004 (Euractiv, 
2004b). In the following section I will assess the main challenges and limitations to 
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promoting nuclear power hegemony and adapting to EU-wide nuclear policy regula-
tion.  
3. Institutional and discursive challenges to create pro-nuclear historical bloc 
3.1. Divisions within the EU Commission 
The neo-Gramscian perspective views hegemony as a broad base of consent 
(Levy and Egan, 2003), and divisions within the Commission itself hampered the 
promotion of nuclear hegemony. It could be argued that, due to competing long-term 
visions within the Commission, it was difficult to find consensus on future European 
energy policy developments. As has been argued, Energy commissioner Loyola de 
Palacio promoted the nuclear option, and the main split within the Commission was 
between the Energy and Environment Directorates, with the latter led by Commis-
sioner Margot Wallstrom. According to Mahony (2002): “The debate has put the split 
in the Commission between DG environment and DG energy into sharp relief. On the 
one hand, Ms Palacio is arguing that nuclear energy can help the EU meet its Kyoto 
Protocol commitments. Margot Wallstrom, the environment commissioner, on the 
other hand, is completely opposed to this, arguing that it is not a viable option”. It 
could be argued that Commissioners Wallstrom (environment), Schreyer (budget), 
Verheugen (enlargement), Diamantopoulou (employment/social affairs), Kinnock 
(administrative reform), Fischler (common agriculture) and President Prodi were all 
against nuclear development and instead preferred the development of renewable en-
ergy sources combined with actions on the demand side. On the other side, Commis-
sioners Basquin (research), Bolkestein (internal market and services) and Patten (ex-
ternal relations) all supported Loyola de Palacio and DG Energy’s nuclear initiatives 
(The Green 8, 2002, Interview 21, 25). There were therefore disagreements within the 
Commission on a long-term vision for energy policy.  
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This lack of consensus within the Commission undermined nuclear energy 
hegemonisation at the European level. The first evidence of clashes regarding nuclear 
issues was seen during public debates on the Commission's Green Paper on the Secu-
rity of Energy Supply at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Present-
ing the results of public debates, Palacio attempted to establish an equivalence be-
tween the use nuclear energy and a reduction in CO2 emissions. She argued that “Nu-
clear energy and renewable sources of energy are the only way to cut down on CO2s” 
(Mahony, 2002). In addition, the EU Energy Commissioner wanted to detach energy 
policy discussions from moral issues. Palacio added “you shouldn't have moral 
judgements on energy sources” (Mahony, 2002). The pro-nuclear position expressed 
by the Energy directorate was criticised by other commissioners. Due to these disa-
greements, in 2002 the Commission was not able to find common ground on the 
adoption of a final report on its 2000 Green Paper on the Security of Energy Supply. 
As some analysts pointed out “The report was to have been tabled before the Seville 
European Council, but disagreement between Commissioners blocked its adop-
tion….it seems more likely that several Commissioners objected to the link drawn by 
Energy Commissioner Loyola de Palacio between honouring the Kyoto climate 
change commitments and use of nuclear energy” (European Information Service, 
2002). Some commissioners tried to decouple the issue of nuclear power from the 
debate on emission reductions. For example, the Commissioner for environment fo-
cused on the problem of nuclear and linked the use nuclear energy with pollution. She 
provided a broader definition of pollution, focusing not only on CO2 emissions but 
also on nuclear waste. According to Wallstrom “…energy still has an image as a pol-
luter. It is fed by atmospheric emissions, nuclear waste, the destruction of habitats 
due to the construction of dams, the risks associated with the transportation of oil the 
most recent mishap threatening the unique Galapagos islands” (Wallstrom, 2001). In 
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other words, Wallstrom denied the low carbon nature of nuclear power by placing it 
in the same basket as fossil fuel energy resources. Moreover, the Environment com-
missioner tried to decouple nuclear from economic competitiveness and stability de-
mands. Focusing on the narrative of energy market liberalization, the Environment 
Commissioner questioned the economic credentials of nuclear power. As Wallstrom 
explained “Liberalisation is also changing the market for energy investments by 
shortening the required payback time. Therefore, capital-intensive energy sources, 
such as nuclear, are less likely to figure in the energy portfolio under the conditions 
of a liberalised market” (Wallstrom, 2001). As a result, the divisions within the EU 
Commission were one of the factors which limited overall progress towards the pro-
motion of the nuclear option. 
3.2. Opposition in the Council 
Despite the Commission’s heresthetics and other strategic actions to build up 
institutional support for nuclear energy, there was a strong opposition against the nu-
clear option in the Council. Most EU member states expressed their intensions to 
phase out their nuclear power plants. In addition, by the early 2000s, five out of the 
eight Member States with nuclear installations introduced or announced moratoriums. 
According to Umbach “…five (Germany, Sweden, Spain, Netherlands and Belgium) 
out of eight EU member states (the other three are France, the United Kingdom and 
Finland) with nuclear power…adopted or announced a moratorium on nuclear power 
or decided to give up nuclear energy production” (Umbach, 2008: 14, 15). For exam-
ple, in Germany in the early 2000s a political conflict emerged and, thanks to the 
strong influence of the Green Party, in 2002 Germany adopted a law according to 
which Germany’s 19 nuclear reactors would be closed down after reaching 32 years 
of operation (DW, 2003). However, the plan was criticised by many politicians and 
energy businesses. As was stated “the plan is coming under increasing criticism from 
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energy companies and opposition politicians, who say the prohibitive cost of renewa-
ble energy and recent blackouts in the United States prove the country still needs its 
nuclear plants” (DW, 2003). Moreover, Italy was an early pioneer of nuclear technol-
ogy, but all plants were shut down by 1990 in accordance with a referendum that fol-
lowed by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 (BBC, 2009). In Belgium in 2003, a law was 
passed which banned the construction of new nuclear power plants (BBC, 2003). 
Since the end of the 1970s, Austria had been staunchly anti-nuclear and was one of 
the first European countries to start focusing on the use of alternative energy sources, 
primarily biofuels. Chairing the presidency of the EU Council at the end of the 1990s, 
Austria paid particular attention to the development of renewable energy. As was ar-
gued “the Austrian Presidency of the EU is naturally concerned to add its weight to a 
number of Community actions in the field of renewable energy sources like solar en-
ergy, wind and wave power, geothermal energy, biomass and energy crops” (Europe 
Information Service, 1998). The UK, with the adoption of a white paper on its energy 
future in 2003, was also sending ambiguous signals regarding nuclear development. 
Roche (2005) pointed out “While the White Paper did not rule out the possibility of 
building new nuclear power stations at some point in the future if it proves ‘neces-
sary’ to meet the UK’s carbon targets, it said that current economics make it an unat-
tractive option and there are important issues of nuclear waste to be resolved”. There 
were thus growing anti-nuclear attitudes in most EU countries.   
3.3. Structural constraints  
There is no doubt that, in national governments’ opposition to the Commis-
sion’s pro-nuclear position, public concerns played a vital role. However, one should 
not neglect the importance of structural constraints and systematic dependence on 
economic growth/capital accumulation in explaining the positions of certain EU 
countries. It could be argued that the anti-nuclear stance in countries such as Germa-
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ny and the UK can be explained by analysing the role of certain businesses.  On the 
contrary from the EU Commission, member states are often constrained by short-term 
particular interests. According to Paterson (1996:158) “The state is then seen as nec-
essarily involved in the process of reproducing these background conditions. Marxist 
state theorists, such as Bob Jessop, outline how the state in capitalist society has the 
securing of capital accumulation as one of its main functions”. Moreover, states have 
different capital accumulation strategies and policies, and accumulation requires con-
ditions of access to particular energy resources to be met. In other words, energy is 
the lifeblood of every economy. It could be argued that differences in attitudes to-
wards nuclear can be explained by looking at the different relations that certain econ-
omies have with regards to energy. As Paterson (1996:161) explained “…to the place 
energy has in the overall process of capital accumulation, and the corresponding 
power this confers on those fractions of capital involved in energy production”. The 
structural power of capital thus influences the way states react to certain policy pro-
posals. 
After several incidents such as Three Miles Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 
1986, the image of the nuclear industry was damaged and public trust was low. 
Moreover, in the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened new opportunities 
for major European oil and gas companies to invest and gain access to cheap and 
easily accessible fossil fuel deposits. For example, in the early 1990s, BP, Royal 
Shell, Ruhrgas and ENI were the dominant European companies making huge in-
vestments in gas and oil exploration and production sites in Russia, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan. Due to excessive supply and limited demand the price of oil and gas was 
low throughout the 1990s. The competing relationship between gas and nuclear was 
underlined by Helm (2012:134) “if the gas price is expected to soar then nuclear is 
much more economic. If it falls, then it is priced out of the market”. Given that gas 
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and nuclear are competing sources for power generation, cheaper and relatively low 
CO2 emitting gas was considered, at least in some European countries, as a new stra-
tegic resource for viable and sustainable capital accumulation. One could see how this 
strategic shift took place in some member states. For example, in explaining the anti-
nuclear attitudes the role of Green Party in Germany should not be neglected. Never-
theless, one should also take into account broader changes in the relationship between 
energy and capital accumulation. The evidence of this transition can be seen in the 
strategic merger between two large European energy companies in 2002: EOn and the 
gas corporation Ruhrgas. This move symbolised the growing strategic role of gas in 
Germany’s overall power generation capacity. The merger allowed Ruhrgas to in-
crease its financial clout in order to make strategic investments in growing gas pro-
duction in Russia and other post-Soviet countries. The structural power of EOn-
Ruhrgas increased not only because the new company became the biggest energy 
corporation in Europe, employing thousands of people and paying billions in taxes, 
but also because having signed a long-term contract with Gazprom it was responsible 
for the stable supply of energy to the country, a major condition for successful eco-
nomic growth. The German government, preoccupied with short-term interests, saw 
nuclear as uneconomical as there was the possibility of getting a stable supply of 
abundant and cheaper gas. The structural constraints of this new shift were evident 
when the German government, despite competition infringements, decided to approve 
the Eon-Ruhrgas deal. Although the Federal Cartel Office in Germany blocked the 
merger of the two companies, Schröder’s government overruled the competition au-
thority under the pretext of the industrial and energy security interests of the country 
(Falck and Heblich, 2007). 
Similar tendencies were seen in the UK in the early 2000s. The government 
was concerned about a plateau in the production of North Sea oil and a reduction in 
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gas reserves. At this time, energy analysts pointed out that the supply/demand ratio 
was deteriorating, and that Britain would soon become a net gas importer (Reuters, 
2001). Moreover, in terms of a cost-benefit analysis for power generation, the UK 
government viewed the gas option as more attractive than nuclear. Some argued that, 
by 2025, gas-fired stations could produce 70 per cent of British electricity needs 
(Taylor and McNulty, 2004). According to MacKerron (2004:1959) “The UK Gov-
ernment’s stated primary reason for rejecting nuclear power at present is economic. 
This reflects the fact that at current and foreseeable market prices and market struc-
tures, private investors do not find nuclear power an attractive option”. MacKerron 
further explained the benefits of combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) “At an imme-
diate level, they have clearly been the cheapest option…CCGTs were also a low risk 
option, well-suited to the new market conditions of liberalisation” (MacKerron, 
2004:1959). The government’s decision to suspend nuclear development was made 
around the time when British Petroleum (BP) made the largest foreign investment in 
the history in the Russian oil and gas fields, and merged with Russian energy corpora-
tion TNK. One of the main goals of this consolidation for BP was to expand its natu-
ral gas business, which was seen as strategic. Furthermore, BP was a vital company 
for the UK economy in terms of tax payments and employment, and most of the UK’s 
pension funds invested in BP and thus depended on the success of its operations 
(BBC, 2010). In order to ensure the success of its capital accumulation, the UK gov-
ernment was focused on short-term actions to ensure the provision of the most cost-
effective energy at this time. Showing support for BP’s strategic investments in Rus-
sia, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, together with the Russian President, pre-
sided over the signing of TNK-BP agreement. Commenting on the agreement, Blair 
underlined that the deal ensured both security and economic growth (BBC, 2003). 
Reynolds (2003) pointed out that “One reason for the cosy atmosphere during the 
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state visit to Britain by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, is the mutual interest of 
both countries in the sale of vast amounts of Russian natural gas to Britain. For Rus-
sia, it will mean billions of dollars; for Britain, it will mean keeping the lights on”. 
Concerns regarding the stability and affordability of energy supplies, and the role of 
BP in the UK’s economy, could be thus be viewed as structural constraints which 
prevented the British government from having a more positive attitude towards nu-
clear developments. 
3.4. The role of civil society and anti-nuclear discourse 
One of the main setbacks in the pro-nuclear war of position was the inability 
of the pro-nuclear coalition to acquire support from, and spread its message across, 
civil society. On the contrary, European civil society organisations were very active 
in mobilising public support against nuclear development. At the discursive level, 
environmental groups used the post-structuralist logics of difference to counter pro-
nuclear discourse. For example, seeking to detach the role of nuclear from the promo-
tion of integrated energy policy, green civil society groups emphasised that nuclear 
technology was not a reasonable solution for either growing energy dependence or 
climate challenges. First, in terms of energy security, environmental groups described 
nuclear as the “insecure energy option” (Greenpeace, 2001). However, compared 
with the Commission, the essence of this narrative was to focus on military rather 
than energy insecurity, underlining the importance of the September 11 terrorist acts 
in the US. Responding to the consultations of the EU Green Paper, some environmen-
tal groups made it clear that “Following September 11th attacks in the US there can 
be no future for nuclear power. The fact that anti-aircraft missiles and fighter aircraft 
are being stationed around nuclear facilities across the world shows that nuclear pow-
er is vulnerable to attack. The risks are so great from a nuclear disaster following any 
sort of attack, that a decision to close all nuclear facilities must be taken immediately. 
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An energy technology such as nuclear power, which can bring about such wide rang-
ing and long term damage to human health and civilisation, can never be considered 
an ‘energy security’ option; nuclear power is an ‘insecure energy’ option” (Green-
peace, 2001). Supporting these arguments, Friends of the Earth focused on the dan-
gers posed by unresolved nuclear waste management (Taylor and McNulty, 2004). In 
addition, Inforse-Europe, an international network for sustainable energy, emphasised 
the security of supply problems of nuclear caused by the insecure nature of nuclear 
technologies. According to the Inforse-Europe report on the 2000 Green Energy Pa-
per “…whole series of reactors might have to be stopped at once, after an accident in 
one reactor, or if a flaw is found in the reactor design. We cannot agree with the con-
clusion that there is a need for research and development in new reactor types” (In-
forse-Europe, 2004). Compared with the nuclear industries, renewable energy busi-
nesses did not see the possibility of reconciling nuclear and renewable energy op-
tions. Organisations such as the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) argued 
that nuclear was a threat to national security, not a solution, as there are other viable 
and more secure supply side options, which pose no threat to national security, and 
which enjoy more public and political support than nuclear power (EWEA, 2001). As 
a result, environmental groups, together with the renewable industry, raised security 
concerns and portrayed nuclear as an insecure energy option.  
Moreover, environmental groups underlined the lack of competitiveness of 
nuclear power by linking it to growing energy market liberalisation. The joint report 
prepared by major European environmental organisations such as BirdLife Interna-
tional, Climate Action Network (CAN), European Environmental Bureau (EEB), 
Friends of the Earth Europe, Friends of Nature International, Greenpeace, the Euro-
pean Federation for Transport and Environment, and the WWF, explained “The liber-
alisation of the energy market will make it even more difficult for nuclear power to 
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revive, due to the high investment intensity required. Nuclear power is not competi-
tive without state aid. The EU subsidies for nuclear are still higher than those for al-
ternative energy sources” (The Green 8, 2002). Environmental NGOs also sought to 
decouple the issue of nuclear development from demands to tackle climate change. 
Groups such as CAN argued that nuclear had nothing to do with responses to climate 
change (FT, 2001). Instead of focusing only on the issue of CO2 emissions, the anti-
nuclear bloc extended the debate towards wider issues of environmental protection. 
According to Greenpeace “…statements that nuclear power is an option for combat-
ing climate change is completely misleading and shows the Commission’s lack of 
understanding on such issues. Nuclear power’s role in undermining real energy solu-
tions to climate change, namely energy saving and renewable energies, are well doc-
umented throughout the European Union. Nuclear generation, nuclear materials and 
associated practices pose unacceptable risks to people and to the wider environment 
both today and long into the future” (Greenpeace, 2001). Anti-liberalisation discourse 
was thus aimed at arguing against the economic and environmental benefits of nucle-
ar power.    
Anti-nuclear discourse against the adoption of the Nuclear Package focused 
on several issues. The objective was to turn the discussion away from safety concerns 
towards debates on the revival of the powerful nuclear industry. First, civil society 
groups described the package as a “fraud” and denied its benefits for nuclear safety 
and security. Second, some called the package a “nuclear survival package”, and 
argued that it would help to strengthen the influence of the nuclear industry. In a de-
tailed letter to EU environment ministers, Greenpeace called the Nuclear Package a 
“camouflaged kit”. By using these metaphors, the environmental groups wished to 
emphasise the deceitfulness of the package. The Greenpeace EU adviser, Arjette Ste-
vens, claimed “The reality is that what is being proposed is a nuclear survival pack-
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age, not safety enhancement. Vice- President de Palacio is pro-nuclear and it would 
appear she is willing to do almost anything to throw this dying industry a lifeline. 
Greenpeace is not fooled by her rhetoric and the Environment Council should not be 
fooled either” (Greenpeace, 2002). Friends of the Earth shared this argument, stress-
ing that the Nuclear Package represented a co-ordinated effort to prepare the ground 
for the further development of atomic power in an enlarged EU (Euractiv, 2004a). 
In order to win public support, civil society groups organised various public 
demonstrations against nuclear power. For instance, during the nuclear discussions at 
the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, Greenpeace targeted individual 
countries, as well as EU institutions, to demonstrate the security problems of nuclear 
plants. In 2002 Greenpeace activists invaded a nuclear power plant in Belgium and 
erected a wind turbine as a symbol of the advantages of renewable energy over nucle-
ar. Moreover, Greenpeace activists stormed the Jose Cabrera nuclear facility in Zorita 
(Spain) and scaled the dome of the plant, from which they unfurled a banner with an 
anti-nuclear message. Concerns about the physical security of the plant were raised 
following this incident. Further, in 2003 Greenpeace invaded Britain's flagship nucle-
ar power facility at Sizewell. Commenting on this action, Greenpeace used metaphor-
ical expression and compared the security of the nuclear power plant with the security 
of a nightclub. In order to emphasise this lack of security, one of Greenpeace activists 
argued: “Sizewell is easier to get into than a Norwich night-club. It is a terrifying 
thought that if we can do this then anyone can. We wouldn't do anything to interfere 
with the plant but if terrorists targeted a nuclear power station it would be deadly. 
These places contain stores of dangerous radioactive waste, nuclear fuel, as well as 
the reactor itself. Sabotage could spread radioactive fallout for miles around” (Green-
peace, 2003a). In 2003 Greenpeace activists delivered 15 barrels of fake radioactive 
waste to the front of the European Parliament, drawing attention to this ongoing issue 
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(Greenpeace, 2003b). Environmental groups thus waged public campaigns in order to 
justify their discursive arguments and to demonstrate the serious security flaws of the 
nuclear option. 
Given a lack of domination over the institutional and discursive domains, the 
Commission was not able to create a long-term energy order based on the promotion 
of nuclear energy. The Commission thus reduced its ambitions and watered down the 
Nuclear Proposal, taking a much less prominent role on nuclear issues than initially 
envisaged. As has been argued in this chapter, this war of position in favour of the 
nuclear option suffered major setbacks in the institutional and discursive domains, 
and the divisions within the Commission and among member states weakened the 
pro-nuclear historical bloc. Moreover, pro-nuclear groups were not able to muster 
support from civil society. Growing internal and external challenges in the mid-2000s 
sharpened contradictions in European energy policy. Due to increasing evidence of 
the seriousness of global warming and its effect on the European economy, as well as 
emerging global energy supply crises, the climate change dimension became an even 
more urgent issue. In the mid-2000s, the Commission and other players began to ad-
dress these challenges by moving away from the nuclear option, and focusing more 
on renewable and green energy developments. In the following chapter, I will there-
fore analyse and explain the development of the low carbon historical bloc. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that historical institutionalism, informed by the neo-
Gramscian approach and a post-structuralist perspective, can provide a comprehen-
sive explanation of EU energy policy changes. This approach is able to explain the 
early-2000s shift towards energy security and the climate dimensions in particular. 
Moreover, this approach can account for the role and reaction of the Commission in 
addressing energy security and climate change challenges. Nevertheless, it is not able 
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to explain why certain external events or crisis arose as external shocks. One could 
argue that a lot of what drove developments in the EU energy domain in the early 
2000s were exogenous to EU processes. Compared with realist-oriented and liberal 
intergovernmentalist views of the Commission as a passive player which implements 
signals from member state governments, I argue that the Commission has been lead-
ing the creation of long-term energy policy. Historical institutionalism informed by 
the neo-Gramscian tradition allows us to explain that reactions to and changes in EU 
energy policy were partly driven by the Commission’s wider policy orientation that is 
embedded in its historical make-up. In this chapter I explained that, in the early 
2000s, debates surrounding the response to security and climate issues were largely 
focused on the nuclear option. One could argue that the Commissioner for energy, 
and other relevant actors, saw the nuclear option as a viable solution to addressing 
long-term development challenges, such as growing dependence on energy imports as 
well as deteriorating climate change phenomenon, in a coherent way. Moreover, this 
approach can also explain the counter-reaction to nuclear by other parts of the Com-
mission and member states. As has been argued, this approach takes into account dif-
ferent visions of what constitutes long-term energy policy. In addition, historical in-
stitutionalism can explain that the discrepancy between the Commission’s long-term 
orientation, and the often short-term interests of national governments, was locked-in 
via the historical creation of European institutions in the early 1950s. On the contrary, 
the supranationalist logic of spillover does not take into account the path-dependent 
feature of the EU Commission’s forward-looking policy orientation when explaining 
change. Moreover, constructivists would argue that the Commission’s actions cannot 
be detached from the socialization effect of the EU environment. Yet the constructiv-
ists are not able to explain those somewhat unexpected actions by the Energy Com-
missioner that focused on nuclear power against the background of fierce opposition 
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at the EU level. In this chapter I have therefore argued that at least some commission-
ers and actors within the Commission saw nuclear as the best option to successfully 
address security and climate challenges.   
My theoretical approach is better able explain the underlying factors which in-
fluence states’ positions in the process of EU energy policy development. This ap-
proach explains why the majority of member states did not support the Commission’s 
pro-nuclear position. Due to processes of capital accumulation, member states are 
restrained by the structural power of certain businesses. In this chapter I showed how, 
in the 2000s, the interests of national governments, including the UK and Germany, 
were structurally constrained by the growing power of expanding oil/gas businesses. 
The struggle between the long-term European interests of the Commission and the 
particular interests of member states therefore diminished the pro-nuclear hegemonic 
order.  
I treat the Commission as a proactive player which used a war of position to 
lead the creation of a new hegemonic order. Some theoretical perspectives, such as 
neorealism, structural Marxism or supranationalism, provide overly structural expla-
nations. My theoretical approach instead seeks to reveal agency factors in explaining 
how the Commission, or at least certain parts of it, together with its allies, contributed 
to the process of pro-nuclear hegemonisation through the use of material, institutional 
and discursive strategies. At the material level, the Commission created investment 
opportunities and provided financial contributions for nuclear energy development. 
Moreover, at the institutional level, the Commission attempted to form broad pro-
nuclear coalitions which would enhance the competitiveness and sustainability of 
nuclear energy in the EU. The Michelangelo Network was created to solidify the pro-
nuclear coalition and to develop new ideas and solutions in the nuclear domain. At 
the discursive level, pro-nuclear advocates focused on the linkage of nuclear energy 
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with energy, social and economic demands, and pro-nuclear business groups empha-
sised the importance of nuclear for dealing with security and climate issues. 
This theoretical approach also explains what happens when certain players use 
the logic of heresthetics in an attempt to manipulate actions in order to construct 
choice situations and achieve desired outcomes. In this chapter I explained how the 
pro-nuclear group used heresthetics in order to strategically manipulate certain di-
mensions and strengthen the institutional domain. In other words, the pro-nuclear 
bloc led by the Commission attempted to expand the dimensionality of nuclear de-
bates by linking the adoption of the Nuclear Package with the process of EU en-
largement. The linkage symbolised a heresthetical moment in which the promotion of 
the Nuclear Package caused a political dilemma for some anti-nuclear actors who 
feared that a rejection of the proposal would undermine broader European regulation 
of nuclear safety, especially in the context of the accession of new member states 
with old soviet nuclear technologies. 
Another important contribution of this theoretical approach is that it allows us 
to unravel strategic discursive contestations at the ideational level. Certain perspec-
tives (e.g. neo-realism) assume that actors have fixed interests that they pursue, and 
that it is less important how certain narratives are constructed and how certain ideas 
are framed. Liberal intergovernmentalists focus on the ideational struggle in relation 
to the formation of domestic preferences without focusing on the European level. 
Moreover, although neofunctionalists and constructivists stress the role of socializa-
tion and deliberation at the EU level, they do not reveal the dynamics, processes and 
mechanisms of discursive struggle. An important part of my explanation develops the 
post-structuralist political logics, as well as other important rhetorical elements, 
which help to identify the making and breaking of arguments in the development of a 
hegemonic order, thus addressing gaps in the explanation of changes in the European 
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energy domain. In chapter 4 these logics showed the dynamics of the battle over nu-
clear energy, i.e. revealing how pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear players attempted to link 








The war of position towards low carbon energy policy  
Introduction 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, at the end of 1990s and the begin-
ning of the 2000s, responding to long-term accumulation challenges, the Commission 
created an equivalential linkage between energy security and climate (environmental) 
demands. Since 2005, the climate change dimension has become dominant, though 
with a continuing importance for the security of energy supply. In the mid-2000s, the 
communication of the EU energy policy began to focus on the issue of decarbonisa-
tion. It could be argued that what happened in the mid-2000s was, according to a neo-
Gramscian account, the advent of an “organic crisis” caused by a chain of exogenous 
energy security and environmental shocks, leading to a growth in the Commission’s 
activism in promoting ideas for an alternative energy order based on a low carbon 
ideology. It could be argued that the failure to find a consensus on the nuclear policy 
option contributed to this gradual shift towards low-carbon, green energy develop-
ments. The climate dimension began to transform energy policy in the EU to such an 
extent that it has developed a hegemonic dynamic. All of these challenges had an im-
pact on EU energy policy discussions. Since the mid-2000s, the Commission, togeth-
er with other players, has pursued a war of position in trying to create a new low car-
bon historical bloc. In this war of position the bloc attempted to diversify and link 
together a range of demands in order to confront the carbon-constrained accumulation 
model which was considered as unsustainable. Nevertheless, as I will argue in the 
following chapter, given the economic crises and contradictions over competitive-
ness, the historical bloc started to crumble in 2010 as the accumulation-legitimation 
crisis in the EU became more acute and short-term accumulation demands substan-
tially downplayed talk regarding long-term decarbonisation.  
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This chapter analyses and explains the formation of the low carbon historical 
bloc. Moreover, I will explain how the Commission and other players used the oppor-
tunity of an emerging organic crisis to embark on a war of position in an attempt to 
repackage EU energy policy in a hegemonic way. The aim was to convince the public 
and other stakeholders that a sustainable low carbon energy policy was important, not 
only for climate (environment) issues, but also for economic competitiveness and 
security, i.e. to link these different demands together. In the first section, the effects 
of gas and oil supply disruptions, the oil shock, and a growing level of negative envi-
ronmental incidents will be evaluated. The emergence of the organic crisis in the 
2000s will be assessed. Moreover, the increasing prominence of “ideological” energy 
triangle will be identified. Furthermore, I will assess the role and positions of state 
and non-state actors in the creation of this historical bloc. In the subsequent part, an 
explanation of how the Commission and other players led the ideological war of posi-
tion in trying to create a sustainable low carbon historical bloc and a new hegemonic 
order will be provided. In addition, I will assess the role of organic intellectuals in 
consolidating this low carbon historical bloc. In the final part, I will explain not only 
the emergence of this hegemonic formation, but also the growing opposition to low 
carbon policies.  
1. Contradictions and shocks of the EU energy policy  
1.1. The effects of supply crises and natural disasters 
In 2004 the energy situation changed dramatically when crude oil prices in-
creased by about 30$ per barrel to levels not seen since the 1980s (BBC, 2004). This 
was the greatest surge in oil prices since the 1970s. The causes for these changes can 
be related to several factors. It could be argued that continuing energy supply chal-
lenges have strengthened the security dimension of EU energy policy. Following an 
increase in energy security concerns at the end of the 1990s, the year 2003 could be 
159 
considered as one of the worst in terms of security of supply. First, 2003 saw an oil 
strike in Venezuela when managers at the state-run oil monopoly, PDVSA, tried to 
force out President Hugo Chávez by shutting down the flow of oil for months. Oil 
production collapsed significantly (The Economist, 2003). Second, in the same year, 
social unrest in Nigeria caused a disruption of oil production and exports. This was 
caused by the armed groups involved in the lucrative business of stealing crude oil 
from pipelines in Nigerian Delta (BBC, 2004). Third, oil production was severely 
disrupted due to sabotage attacks on oil facilities following the US invasion of Iraq 
(BBC, 2004). Major supply disruptions thus had an influence on growing concerns 
regarding oil prices at this time.   
In the mid-2000s, security of supply as well as economic growth were serious-
ly affected by a growing frequency of natural disasters. For example, in 2005, Hurri-
cane Katrina hit the US oil industry in the Gulf of Mexico. McNulty and Hoyos 
(2005) pointed out that “damage assessments from Hurricane Katrina pointed to 
worse-than-expected delays in restarting refineries, sending oil prices to new rec-
ords”. By destroying platforms and ports in the Gulf of Mexico, where about 50 per 
cent of US crude refining capacity is located, the hurricane heightened concerns about 
further rises in petrol prices. The OECD chief economist, Jean-Philippe Cotis, said 
that the rise in oil prices as a result of Hurricane Katrina was a major economic shock 
(Cotis, 2004). In order to limit the economic impact of soaring fuel costs in the after-
math of hurricane Katrina, the EU discussed the issue at a special meeting of finance 
ministers in 2005, focusing on long-term EU energy policy debates (BBC, 2005). 
This serious natural disaster thus triggered discussions regarding the sustainability of 
Europe’s energy order.  
Climate change and extreme weather conditions, which hit Europe in 2003 
and 2005, also had a significant impact on Commission-led discussions regarding 
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Europe’s long-term economic sustainability. The heat waves in France and other Eu-
ropean countries, torrential rains in Romania, violent storms and heavy rains in the 
Balkans, and devastating floods in cities and towns across central Europe pushed dis-
cussions of climate change to the top of the EU energy policy agenda. Following the-
se events, Stavros Dimas (2006), the EU Commissioner for Environment, stressed the 
dangers that a changing climate could inflict on Europe’s economic development 
model: “As Hurricane Katrina reminded us so brutally, climate change threatens the 
prosperity and even the very stability of our societies if we do not succeed in bringing 
it under control. It is one of the gravest challenges in front of us”. As a result, the cli-
mate dimension began to play a more prominent role, becoming a common denomi-
nator linking an integrated energy-climate policy in the EU. 
1.2. Growing global oil demand and decreasing European production 
Supplementary effects of the exceptionally fast growth in global oil demand 
contributed to the surge in oil prices. In the first half of 2000s, rapid growth in the 
world‘s economy drove huge increases in oil demand. Due to oil production cuts in 
Venezuela, Nigeria and Iraq, in 2004 demand significantly outpaced supply causing 
drastic increases in the oil price. In addition, the decline in the North Sea oil produc-
tion has elevated Europe‘s energy dependency. According to an Institute for the 
Analysis of Global Security report: “…the North Sea is about to lose its prominent 
role as one of the world’s leading oil domains” (IAGS, 2004). Figure 7 shows histori-
cal trends in North Sea oil production. As we can see from the graph, oil supply 








Figure 7. The North Sea oil production in million barrels per day. 
 
Source: US Energy Information Agency 
Dependence on imported oil has been rising due of the widening gap between 
European production and demand. As a consequence, in the Ecofin meeting of EU 
finance ministers in 2005, ministers expressed their concerns regarding the effects of 
oil price shocks on the EU economy and called on oil supplier countries to produce 
enough fuel to meet global demand (Desai and Carrel, 2005). Moreover, the EU 
Commission made it clear that booming oil and gas demand and growing volatility in 
energy markets posed a direct threat to viable long-term economic growth. According 
to Piebalgs (2007a) “…world energy demand is set to increase by more than 50% by 
2030. Demand for oil alone is expected to grow by 41% during this period. This level 
of sustained growth is unprecedented. The risk that this brings to the world's economy 
is obvious. Oil and gas reserves are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few 
countries that control them carefully through a national monopoly company”. 
1.3. The effects of the Russian gas supply crisis 
The Russian-Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009 were significant incidents 
which strengthened and consolidated the development of the EU’s energy policy. 
Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine as a result of price disagreements (Koren and 
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Bukkvol, 2007:9). Due to 80 per cent of Europe‘s gas imports coming through 
Ukraine, EU countries began to feel the consequences of this dispute (Stern, 2006). 
The EU was gravely affected as Hungary, Poland, Austria, Slovakia and Romania 
faced cuts in their gas supplies. Moreover, the Hungarian supply was reduced by 40 
per cent. Stern argued that “The fall in volumes delivered to European Union coun-
tries caused an outcry all over Europe” (Stern, 2006a:8). The dispute between Russia 
and Ukraine re-emerged in January 2009. As a result, in the winter of 2009, deliveries 
of gas to Europe through Ukraine were drastically reduced. The majority of EU 
member states were adversely affected.  
The Table 2 shows the seriousness of the 2009 crisis in EU countries, where 
most were affected in one way or another.  
Table 2. Consequences of the 2009 gas crisis  
Bulgaria Supplies from Russia delivered via a pipeline across Ukraine completely halted. 
The government began rationing gas supplies to industry, warning that stocks 
may run out in a matter of days. Several thousand households in eastern Bulgaria 
were left without gas heating. Dozens of schools were shut and some companies 
were closed. The country had no alternative supply. 
Czech Rep. The country's supplies of Russian gas halted completely. Reserves were used, and 
extra supplies came via a separate pipeline bringing in mainly Norwegian gas. 
Germany Some energy-heavy industries were warned about possible supply reductions. 
The country gets gas through an alternative route through Belarus and Poland.  
Italy Daily supply was reduced by 30 percent and Italy boosted its use of gas reserves 
by 57%. Italy had an alternative in increasing gas supplies from North Africa. 
Slovakia Slovakia declared a state of energy emergency after it lost 70 percent of its gas 
imports. 
Source: Author 
The gas crises contributed to the strengthening of the relationship between 
climate change, security of supply and economic development, and the EU Commis-
sion called for the creation of a common European energy policy. Following the 2006 
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gas crisis, an emergency meeting of energy experts was convened in Brussels. Given 
the shortages of gas, the Commission saw how vulnerable the Union was in terms of 
both economic and social stability (BBC, 2006). Discussing lessons learnt from the 
2006 gas crisis, the EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs stated that “it is clear 
that Europe needs a clearer and more collective and cohesive policy on security of 
energy supply. To date, the issue...is only really considered at national Member State 
level; but in reality we need a much greater European-wide approach on this issue” 
(Piebalgs, 2006). The gas crises in Europe thus contributed to a growing momentum 
in European energy policy. 
2. The emergence of an organic crisis 
It could be argued that these growing contradictions and shocks lead to the 
emergence of an organic crisis in Europe. By “organic”, Gramsci referred to systemic 
and long-term contradictions. An important aspect of organic crisis is the emergence 
of transformative political agency. Compared with other periods, the simultaneous 
environmental and security crises in the mid-2000s helped the Commission to gener-
ate momentum towards a new low carbon order. The organic crisis in the energy do-
main went beyond just economic issues, also posing moral and ethical questions 
about the sustainability of the existing economic and energy order based on the use of 
fossil fuels. The existing energy order began to lose its legitimacy, creating an oppor-
tunity for a low carbon historical bloc capable of disseminating a decarbonisation 
ideology. The question of legitimacy was raised when the European public began to 
view climate change as the most important environmental issue facing the continent 
(Adele and Withana, 2008). Moreover, an organic crisis raises questions about socie-
tal change and a changing social order. In this respect, in the mid-2000s, energy and 
climate issues became a part of a wider discussion regarding societal change, i.e. how 
to turn the EU into a low carbon society. As Barroso (2007a) explained “There is 
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widespread consensus that we must pursue the road towards low-carbon society. And 
we must do so on the basis of a shared vision, in Europe and beyond”. In addition, 
Barroso (2006) identified several features of the emergent organic energy crisis “Eu-
rope's energy landscape is changing, and changing fast...Firstly global energy demand 
is expected to increase by 60% by 2030. Secondly, mature hydrocarbon reserves in 
Europe are declining. Today the EU imports about 50% of its energy. Thirdly, the 
price of oil and gas is rising. Fourthly, our climate is changing with disastrous conse-
quence to the World”. A key indication that the EU accumulation and energy regimes 
were faced with a crisis rather than a conjunctural adjustment came with the evalua-
tion of official attitudes in the Commission regarding long-term energy and economic 
challenges. The EU energy commissioner Piebalgs warned about an unsustainable 
energy path. According to Piebalgs (2009) “we are heading for a global energy crisis. 
The world is moving on a totally unsustainable and ultimately unrealistic energy path, 
based on increasing fossil fuel consumption and increasing world population. The 
challenges of energy security and climate change call for a new openness in energy 
policy thinking. We need to think the unthinkable...We must use all opportunities to 
build up energy diversity and energy cooperation“. Furthermore, the Commission 
considered the existing growth model based on the use of fossil fuels to no longer be 
viable in the long run. As Barroso (2007b) explained “Europe is being exposed to 
increasingly intense competition for global energy resources from other countries, 
and is becoming ever more dependent on oil and gas imports from geopolitically un-
certain regions. This, I fear, is going to be increasingly unsustainable. But there is 
hope on the horizon. I believe we are now standing on the brink of a Third Industrial 
Revolution: the Low Carbon Age. We are not there yet. But once again, it is Europe-
ans who are leading the way”. Given the emergence of an organic crisis in the 2000s, 
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the Commission was thus led to question the viability of the carbon based energy or-
der. 
3. Response to the crisis 
3.1. The emergence of an ideological energy and climate triangle  
Although it could be argued that supply disruptions and environmental disas-
ters helped to accelerate shifts towards a new EU energy policy paradigm focusing on 
climate, energy security and competitiveness, these shocks and contradictions did not 
in themselves produce fundamental changes in the EU energy domain. They instead 
created a terrain more favourable for the dissemination of certain modes of thought 
and arguments. In other words, they created gaps in EU energy policy which needed 
to be filled by groups capable of acquiring and leading support for new ways of think-
ing about energy, climate and economics. According to a neo-Gramscian perspective, 
the reaction to this organic crisis involved the promotion of ideas for an alternative 
energy order. As a result, the shocks and contradictions were triggers for the Com-
mission and other actors to link different demands and to promote a new low carbon 
energy ideology. The concrete ideological frames and narratives of this new thinking 
will be analysed in the following parts of the chapter, which deal with the war of po-
sition and hegemonisation of the sustainable low carbon energy policy order. In the 
2000s the energy order based on the use of fossil fuels began to lose legitimacy as 
new security, economic and environmental shocks and contradictions became serious 
threats to political and economic stability. The Commission and some other state and 
non-state actors led the neo-Gramscian hegemonisation towards the creation of low 
carbon energy order. As was argued by the Commission “The European economy 
faces a challenge in adapting to the demands of a low-emission economy with secure 
energy supplies. But the challenge can be met, and it also opens the door to new op-
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portunities” (EC, 2008a). The Commission thus took an opportunity to lead the de-
velopment of a new sustainable low carbon historical bloc. 
In developing a low carbon energy future the Commission presented energy 
and climate as integral policy domains. It argued that there could be no trade-off be-
tween the two issues, and that they must be addressed together. As has been pointed 
out, the historical institutionalist approach informed by a neo-Gramscian perspective 
suggests that the Commission differs from national governments, not least because it 
has a path-dependent long-term view on economic growth. In other words, the Com-
mission viewed emerging challenges as potential triggers of a long-term organic cri-
sis. On the contrary from previous energy strategies, the 2006 Green Energy Paper: A 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy called for an inte-
grated energy-climate policy which would include climate, security and competitive-
ness dimensions in the creation of Europe’s low-carbon energy future. Piebalgs 
(2007b) described Europe’s low-carbon energy future as “A future that reinforces 
Europe’s competitiveness safeguards, our environmental objectives and ensures our 
security of supply”. In other words, the Commission pursued its low carbon future by 
balancing the goals of sustainable energy use, competitiveness and security of supply. 
The Commission sent a clear signal that all three objectives should be promoted in an 
integral way. In comparison, in the 1995 Green Paper, the main attention was directed 
towards liberalisation and market integration. The Commission made it clear in its 
1995 energy communication: “Energy policy must form part of the general aims of 
the Community‘s economic policy based on market integration, deregulation...” (EC, 
1995b). Moreover, in the 2000 Green Paper the main topic was growing energy de-
pendence and the security of the energy supply (EC, 2000a). The mid-2000s thus saw 
the Commission begin to develop a low carbon energy and climate strategy which 
attempted to balance decarbonisation, competitiveness and security demands.  
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3.2. The promotion of emission cuts, renewables and efficiency  
Throughout the history of the EU, energy and climate challenges have been 
dealt in separate and contradictory ways. In the 1990s the Commission led an unsuc-
cessful attempt to promote a common fiscal regulation within the framework of 
CO2/energy tax. In addition, as was argued in the previous chapter, at the end of the 
1990s and the beginning of 2000s the Commission tried to take the first steps towards 
energy and climate integration through a push towards nuclear energy. Moreover, the 
initial steps in the renewable energy domain were made in 1997 when, for the first 
time, the Commission adopted indicative targets for renewable energy. Furthermore, 
with regards to energy efficiency, the first actions were taken in early 2002 with pro-
posals to regulate products, buildings and trade. With regards to all of these policy 
initiatives, even at the level of the Commission‘s there was a split between different 
commissioners and their directorates. 
A new integrated energy and climate policy consisted of an emissions cuts, an 
increase in renewable energy sources and the promotion of energy efficiency solu-
tions. For example, the Commission, in one of its official energy documents ex-
plained, “Public opinion has shifted decisively towards the imperative of addressing 
climate change, to adapting Europe to the new realities of cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions and developing our renewable, sustainable energy resources. A political 
consensus has crystallised to put this issue at the heart of the European Union's politi-
cal programme: a guiding theme for the Union, central to the Lisbon strategy…” (EC, 
2008a). The EU Energy Commissioner distinguished these objectives as the main 
elements of Europe’s long-term energy-climate integration. Piebalgs claimed “...to 
tackle climate change...is closely related to energy. There are two principal ways in 
which we can achieve this: energy efficiency and the wider use of renewable energy. 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme is another instrument which will help to achieve 
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cost-effective emission reductions in the energy sector and in energy-intensive indus-
tries” (Information Daily Staff Writer, 2006). The Commission viewed the integration 
of energy and climate targets as a long-term strategy for the development of a low 
carbon energy order. For instance, Barroso (2008b) underlined the broader view and 
integral nature of the proposal: “The EU's climate and energy package…represents a 
green "new deal" which will enhance the competitiveness of EU industry in an in-
creasingly carbon-constrained world. Moving to a low carbon economy will encour-
age innovation, provide new business opportunities and create new green jobs”. In 
other words, the Commission viewed the energy and climate package as a long-term 
strategy that would generate savings, create jobs and lead to a sustainable future for 
the planet. In the following parts of this chapter I will explain how the Commission 
and other actors led war of position in the creation of a new low carbon energy future 
through material, institutional and discursive strategies. 
4. Unity in the Commission and support in the Parliament 
Compared with the previous Commission, where there were major disagree-
ments with regards to different long-term visions, the first Barroso Commission 
worked closely to ensure a successful transformation towards energy decarbonisation. 
Due to a variety of policy areas the Commission’s various departments and agencies 
had different visions on how EU energy policy should be developed. According to the 
neo-Gramscian approach, hegemony rests on a broad base of consent (Levy and 
Egan, 2003). In order to construct hegemonic order at the European level there thus 
needs to be internal consent and coherence with regards to the Commission’s long-
term orientation. As was argued in the previous chapter, one of the reasons for the 
failure to create a pro-nuclear hegemonic order was the lack of unanimity and coher-
ence with regards to the Commission’s long-term energy vision. The Commission 
was not unanimous in the early 2000s when it came to the nuclear option. In order to 
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create consent and coherence over the energy policy future, the Commission’s Secre-
tariat General (SG) led by Secretary-General Catherine Day acted strategically at the 
organizational and discursive levels. One could argue that Day was the engine behind 
the low carbon agenda in the Commission (Dreger, 2014) The SG contributed to the 
creation of a common and coherent energy vision through the use of organizational 
tactics within the Commission. Referring to the creation of this vision within the 
Commission, one EU official argued that “Most of the commissioners expressed sup-
port towards stronger climate change policy. It took a team effort by the central secre-
tariat run by Secretary General Catherine Day to get an integrated energy policy ap-
proach in the Commission” (Interview 3).   
At the organizational level, the SG, led by Day, increased its agenda-setting 
power by initiating significant changes in the decision making structure within the 
Commission itself. By changing the Commission’s organisational work the SG acted 
in a heresthetical way. Riker (1986) defines agenda setting as a heresthetic strategy 
through which one could frame debates and construct choice situations. According to 
Dreger (2014:143) “…the increased prominence of the SG in the climate and energy 
package coordinations has to be seen in a more general transformative organizational 
trend within the Commission: the SG…has undergone significant changes…”. For 
example, in order to influence energy and climate policy proposals at earlier stages, 
before they reach the Cabinets, Day introduced the idea of an “upstream co-
ordination agenda. As Dreger (2014:143) claimed “The energy and climate package 
is a prime example of this shift and was possible one of the most important test cases 
for the SG itself…Day introduced the idea of an ‘upstream co-ordination agenda’, 
which can be defined as a ‘conscious attempt to influence proposals at earlier stag-
es’…before the discussion reaches the Cabinets – that is, while the proposal is devel-
oped in the services. On high-profile priorities - this gives the SG - and through the 
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SG, the President to the Commission - the opportunity to decisively influence the po-
litical agenda and outcome of the Commission”. Moreover, the task of putting differ-
ent long-term visions into one narrative allowed the Commission to pursue the so 
called knowledge-utilisation strategy. According to Dreger (2014:144) “SG…relied 
heavily on a strategy of becoming the ‘major brain of the Commission’. The SG and 
its Secretary General had their finger on the pulse and access to knowledge floating 
around within and between DGs”. Having extended its coordination powers, the SG 
thus became a mediator between different commissioners and their respected ser-
vices.  
The SG acted as a political entrepreneur in building synergies between differ-
ent services in the Commission regarding the low carbon policy agenda. As Rifkin 
(2011:66) pointed out “To her great credit, Catherine Day, responsible for coordinat-
ing the various initiatives of the Commission’s departments and agencies, was relent-
less in her efforts to keep the various sustainable development efforts on track, mind-
ful of the need to find synergies and coherency between all of the many projects be-
ing pursued”. The SG organized various internal events and workshops in order to 
foster coordination of the low carbon agenda within the Commission. For example, 
the Secretary-General tried to promote greater coordination by organizing the annual 
meeting of the European Commission Secretariat-General, with the presence of 23 
Director Generals and 600 senior staff of the executive branch of the European Un-
ion. 
In order to fully utilize its greater agenda setting powers, the SG realized that 
it needed to rely on a discursive struggle rather than on the power of authority. Day 
acknowledged that in the process of building a strong and coherent low carbon histor-
ical bloc, the main challenge was to move beyond the issue of environment and to 
incorporate energy security and competitiveness elements into a coherent narrative. 
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According to Day (2006) “If you look at the whole world environment/sustainable 
development nexus, I think that it is coming more together…on the energy side, I 
think you can see that climate dimension is very clearly now mainstreamed into ener-
gy policy – we are looking actually to move away from our carbon dependence. But 
what I do see is that the process is gradually getting better, mixing different parts of 
the agenda together, and as long as we have the coherent overall framework, it will 
come together, but it will take time”. Moreover, Jeremy Rifkin, a prominent activist 
and public speaker, contributed to the mobilization of the low carbon bloc in the EU 
Commission by providing ideas and insights about the leading role of Europe in the 
21st century low carbon revolution. Delivering a keynote address in the annual meet-
ing of the European Commission, Rifkin (2007) insisted that Europe must lead a new 
post-industrial revolution: “The European Commission should establish a Third In-
dustrial Revolution “master plan” and institutionalize a formal operating network 
made up of the appropriate cabinet secretariats, community agencies, technology plat-
forms, and joint technology initiatives. The master plan should establish joint goals, 
along with specific targets and benchmarks, with the objective of having a rudimen-
tary”. As a result, the SG, together with Rifkin, played an important discursive role in 
incentivizing a coherent and unanimous low carbon vision within the Commission. 
The momentum towards an integrated low carbon energy policy was generat-
ed by close cooperation between Commissioners Piebalgs (Energy), Stavros (Envi-
ronment), Kroes (Competition), Verheugen (Enterprise and Industry), Potochnik 
(Science and Research), Almunia (Economic and Monetary Affairs) (Interview 19). 
These Commissioners and their respective services cooperated in order to put the EU 
in a leading position with regards to sustainable low carbon energy developments. In 
addition, the establishing of the High Level Group (HLG) on Competitiveness, Ener-
gy and the Environment in the Commission strengthened the collaboration between 
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different services. The aim of the HLG was to unleash European growth potential by 
further integrating competitiveness, energy and environmental policies (EC, 2005). 
The group also examined the links between industrial, energy and environmental pol-
icies to make sure those initiatives in each area are mutually compatible. Moreover, 
high ranking officials in the Commission underlined the importance of growing chal-
lenges and contradictions in bringing a common understanding to within the Com-
mission “What happened in the mid-2000s was a combination of things. One, the end 
of cheap oil happened at that point in time. Secondly, the Russians…shut down the 
gas pipes in 2006. So I think that added a sense of urgency that was also a real energy 
security issue out there. Eventually, climate change, energy security and competitive-
ness dimensions were linked together” (Interview 24). The Commission thus man-
aged to establish a unanimous position regarding the creation of a low carbon energy 
future.  
The climate change agenda was vigorously supported in the European Parlia-
ment. In the mid-2000s, Parliament was pro-green, not least because of the strong 
presence of the Green Party which strengthened backing for the Commission’s initia-
tives. Moreover, some argue that the Parliament of the mid-2000s was strongly fo-
cused on low carbon policy debates. According to one MEP who was actively in-
volved in energy policy discussions and negotiations “a lot of the arguments were 
focused on green energy agenda. The Green Party together with the main parties 
played active and prominent role in these debates. You will find that in the middle of 
the 2000s there was a strong momentum towards low carbon agenda irrespective of 
the political spectrum” (Interview 15). Furthermore, the EU Parliament, together with 
the Commission, could be regarded as the institution that is least constrained by the 
short-term interests of capital. Due to this growing support, the Commission was thus 
able to lead the formation of a strong low carbon historical bloc. 
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5. The strengthening of the material foundations of the low carbon energy bloc 
Although there were some movements towards green energy development in 
the EU at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the material base for a 
low carbon energy future was weak. The Commission has thus took some important 
steps in strengthening the material dimension of its historical bloc. In order to foster 
the role of sustainable businesses, to incentivise research and the development of 
green technologies, and to make these technologies competitive and accessible in the 
market, the Commission initiated various financial support mechanisms. For exam-
ple, in its Seventh Research and Development Programme (FP7) that was adopted in 
2006, the Commission focused on the development of low carbon energy and cost-
effective technological solutions. From a total budget of EUR 50 billion, EUR 4 bil-
lion was allocated to energy and environmental sectors. Moreover, the FP7 Energy 
programme included some 30 topics on renewable energies, CCS, smart electricity 
networks, and energy efficiency. The whole spectrum from fundamental research to 
applied research and demonstration activities was included (EC: 2011d). In explain-
ing the objectives of the FP7, the Commission pointed out that “The objective 
of energy research under FP7 is to aid the creation and establishment of the technolo-
gies necessary to adapt the current energy system into a more sustainable, competitive 
and secure one. It should also depend less on imported fuels and use a diverse mix of 
energy sources, in particular renewables, energy carriers and non-polluting sources“ 
(EC, 2012).  
In 2003 the “Intelligent Energy – Europe” (IEE) programme, with EUR 730 
million of funds available, was started by the Commission to help organisations im-
prove their energy sustainability through targeting three main objectives - greater en-
ergy efficiency, greater use of renewables, and better transport and mobility (EC, 
2013a). The aim of the programme was to create better conditions for renewable en-
174 
ergy and energy efficiency. According to the Commission “The main areas covered 
are energy efficiency, new and renewable resources and energy in transport as well as 
integrated initiatives which combine several of these or address more than one eco-
nomic sector at the same time” (EC, 2013b).  
In order to accelerate the development of specific renewable technologies, and 
to find solutions to particular low carbon energy issues, the Commission, together 
with the renewables industry, TSOs (Transmission system operator) and research or-
ganisations initiated several funding programmes. For instance, the TWENTIES pro-
gramme run by a 26 partner consortium aimed to foster wind energy penetration in 
Europe. The Commission pointed out that “A major player pushing for a greener fu-
ture is the EU-funded TWENTIES ('Transmission system operation with large pene-
tration of wind and other renewable electricity sources in networks by means of inno-
vative tools and integrated energy solutions') project, which will help pick up the pace 
of new wind power technologies across Europe” (EC, 2010b). In addition, the renew-
ables industry and research universities and institutions were also involved in solar 
energy research and development initiated by the Commission. The DiGesPo project 
planned to incorporate small thermodynamic solar powered and hybrid system into 
residential buildings in order to generate heat and electricity (Digespo, 2013). The 
Commission thus sought to accelerate innovation in energy technologies by helping 
these European industries turn the threats of climate change into new investment op-
portunities. 
6. Actions at the institutional level 
The Commission tried to stabilise and perpetuate a particular order at the EU 
institutional level. In other words, the Commission attempted to institutionalise a sus-
tainable low carbon future into a specific set of rules and regulations that were incor-
porated in the EU energy and climate package which was proposed by the Commis-
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sion in 2006. According to Skjaerseth (2013:19) “Favourable external and internal 
conditions for linking energy and climate policies had placed the issue firmly on the 
Commission’s agenda”. With this energy and climate package the EU realisation of 
low carbon economy gained considerable traction. As has been argued: “The package 
of measures proposed by the European Commission represents a coherent and com-
prehensive path to preparing Europe for the transition towards a low-emission econo-
my. Measures are designed in a way so that they are mutually supportive. They offer 
the right way to maintain the momentum and deliver on Europe's ambitions for cli-
mate change, energy security and competitiveness” (EC, 2008a). Moreover, the pro-
motion of the 2008 energy and climate package was seen as a response to new post-
Kyoto targets, especially given the new rounds of international negotiations. A high-
level Commission official who was involved in the negotiations explained that the 
continuation of the Kyoto process had an influence at the beginning of the war of po-
sition “The Kyoto Protocol indicated that seven years before the targets would end (in 
2012), the negotiations would start on the second phase of targets. That was Novem-
ber 2005 and it was agreed to start new negotiation process of post 2012 targets. But 
the EU had no position of what should these targets be. So the Commission took up 
the task in 2005 to have a paper to define of what it could be. What could be our posi-
tion in international negotiations? Of course the thinking in the Commission was that 
in order to continue our international leadership in climate change area, first, we 
should show an example and adopt a very ambitious targets at home” (Interview 27). 
The main objective of the package was to adopt the so called “20 20 20” targets: A 
20% reduction CO2 emissions from 1990 levels; raising the share of renewable re-
sources to 20%; and a 20% improvement in the EU's energy efficiency (EC, 2008a). 
According to Barroso “This package represents an opportunity for Europe to show 
itself at its best. Tackling an issue of fundamental long-term importance. Using the 
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EU's continental scale to best effect. Turning political consensus into practical action” 
(Barroso, 2008a). The Commission therefore proposed the EU energy and climate 
package to as an instrument to institutionalise the new energy order. In addition, the 
adoption of the 2008 package was seen as the first manifestation of Europe’s leader-
ship in the low carbon policy area. 
7. Discursive strategies and the role of civil society  
In its ideational war of position, the Commission and the low carbon energy 
bloc encompassed different interests and linked together a range of demands into a 
project that publicly contested the unsustainable carbon-based accumulation regime. 
The political logics of poststructuralist theory could help us to track how the issue of 
energy policy was repackaged in order to reflect the more universal character of the 
change required, i.e. to convince the public that our economic potential is at stake if 
there are no changes in the way that we generate energy and fuel. The aim was to 
show that the actions envisaged in the EU energy and climate package could tackle 
the environment, security, and competitiveness challenges facing EU energy policy. 
The political logics approach can shed light on how different demands were linked, 
different discourses created and articulated, and how economic, political and social 
differences were mitigated in the name of a sustainable low carbon future. In a war of 
position, the Commission, together with other players, thus gradually began to build a 
discursive historical bloc. 
The Commission underlined that actions on renewable and efficiency promo-
tion could help to tackle three energy policy challenges: climate change, competitive-
ness and energy security. First, the promotion of renewable energy was linked to the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. As was argued by the Commission: “The re-
newable energy target is closely linked with our greenhouse gas emissions target. 
Without significantly increasing the share of renewable energy in the EU's energy 
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mix it will be practically impossible to meet the EU's objectives for reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions” (EC, 2008b). Moreover, this narrative underlined the im-
portance of renewables for energy security, especially in terms of reducing volatile 
energy imports. According to the Commission “From a security of supply perspec-
tive, EU renewable energy is mostly generated in the EU. This means that it is less 
subject to supply disruptions and mitigates fuel price increases. It makes sense, there-
fore, to produce more of our own energy, and from a growing variety of renewable 
energy sources. A diverse supply of energy is a more secure supply of energy” (EC, 
2008b). The Commission thus promoted renewable energy as a solution to climate 
and energy security challenges. 
The Commission argued that investments in the renewable energy and energy 
efficiency domains would help to promote economic growth and the competitiveness 
of the European economy. As was explained, the “...change offers a stepping stone to 
modernise the European economy, orientating it towards a future where technology 
and society will be attuned to new needs and where innovation will create new oppor-
tunities to feed growth and jobs” (EC, 2008a). In addition, the “first mover” meta-
phor, focused on economic benefits and innovations, was promoted in order to justify 
decisive changes in the energy order. According to Dobrev (2013:285) “The first-
mover advantage (FMA) is a metaphor that is often evoked to summarize a variety of 
factors that may contribute to the positive economic performance of early entrants in 
new or substantially reorganized markets and industries”. In other words, the Com-
mission stressed that Europe’s leadership in producing renewables and green energy 
technologies would bring positive long-term economic benefits. An official from DG 
Climate Action pointed out: “Climate change will not go away. You can delay your 
actions or even ignore, but climate challenges will not disappear. So the question we 
faced was do we want to be the first mover? And the Commission said that the EU 
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should be the first mover. At the very beginning we saw the benefits in doing things 
first. The development of these low carbon technologies domestically increases our 
long-term competitiveness” (Interview 23). The Commission therefore focused on 
innovation in order to justify the argument that actions in the low carbon area would 
strengthen European competitiveness and provide growth opportunities. 
At the discursive level, the low carbon energy bloc attempted to build support 
for a further expansion of green energy ideology. The bloc employed an array of dis-
cursive actions. As was explained in the previous section, the Commission aimed to 
bring different players (capital groups, research organisations) together in a discursive 
coalition that would provide a unanimous ideological narrative of the low carbon en-
ergy future. In addition, the Commission began to build networks of support for its 
low carbon energy future. For example, the Covenant of Mayors (CoM) network was 
launched to bring together regional and local authorities in support for a common low 
carbon energy policy orientation. Introducing the policy initiative, the Commission 
made it clear: “The Covenant of Mayors is the mainstream European movement in-
volving local and regional authorities, voluntarily committing to increasing energy 
efficiency and use of renewable energy sources on their territories” (Covenant of 
Mayors Office, 2013). One of the key objectives of this initiative was to spread the 
message of low carbon developments and to raise public awareness through the con-
ferences and thematic workshops on issues such as energy efficiency, the use of re-
newable energy sources, and links between energy and climate change (Covenant of 
Mayors Office, 2013). It should be pointed out that, with the introduction of the CoM 
movement, the Commission mobilised local and regional actors to fulfil EU low car-
bon objectives. Moreover, the Sustainable Energy Week (EUSEW) has become a 
platform through which various players, including public authorities, energy agen-
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cies, private companies, NGOs and industry associations meet together to discuss 
future energy and climate guidelines (EUSEW, 2006).  
Civil society groups contributed to the formation of the low carbon energy or-
der by strengthening its ideological dimensions. The strength and success of the war 
of position rested on the active participation of civil society groups which helped to 
consolidate the low carbon energy bloc. Civil society tries to create the consensual 
legitimacy that the historical bloc needs by emphasising the issues of ethics, morality 
and justice. Moreover, these groups help to transmit certain modes of behaviour, ex-
pectations and values within society, which are consistent with the hegemonic order 
(Cox, 1983). For example, in the war of position, the low carbon historical bloc led 
by the Commission engaged with civil society groups in order to enhance the legiti-
macy of transition towards a low carbon energy future. For this reason, on the initia-
tive of President Barroso, the Commission organised an informal dialogue that 
brought together twenty high-level representatives of various religions, i.e. the leaders 
of Christianity, Judaism and Islam in Europe. The meeting “Climate change: an ethi-
cal challenge for all cultures” focused on the ethical and moral issues of climate 
change (EC, 2008c). During the meeting Barroso called for active participation of the 
church in spreading the message of a sustainable low carbon future. According to the 
President of the European Commission “Climate change obliges all of us to take ur-
gent action. Each part of civil society must contribute to ensuring a sustainable future 
of our planet. Thanks to their outreach and role in our societies, religions and com-
munities of belief are well placed to make a valuable contribution in mobilising them 
for a sustainable future. Let's unite in our common endeavour...” (EC, 2008c). In ad-
dition, the President of the European Council added: “The environment is not only 
natural but also a sacred place. Climate change requires us to rethink how we channel 
imagination, ingenuity and entrepreneurship into creating a world, free of dependence 
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on fossil fuels, and yet prosperous and connected as never before” (EC, 2008c). 
Moreover, H.E Anders Harald Wejryd, Primate of the Lutheran Church of Sweden, 
added that religion has a duty to engage in combating climate change, since this issue 
raises questions of morality, justice and equity. (COMECE, 2008). 
The Catholic Church acted in several areas. First, the Commission of the 
Bishops' Conferences of the European Community (COMECE), an organisation of 
Roman Catholic bishops in Europe, organised conferences and seminars both with the 
public and the EU officials, set up expert groups, and provided certain discursive 
frames. For example, in their plenary assemblies in 2008, the COMECE together with 
the leaders of EU institutions discussed the implementation of ambitious policies to 
address the issue of climate change. Moreover, the COMECE Bishops set up a reflec-
tion group on “Climate change and Christian Lifestyle” chaired by the former EU-
Commissioner Dr. Franz Fischler. This group presented a report which underlined 
that climate change raises the question of survival for a large part of mankind, that 
strong political leadership is not enough, and that ethical debates are needed to win 
over not only the minds but also the hearts of citizens, and thus convince them to dis-
tance themselves from certain lifestyles (COMECE, 2008). The church and its organ-
isations targeted the symptoms of unsustainable ways of life, modes of production, 
and patterns of consumption. The COMECE report on climate change argued that 
“The Catholic Church and all the Christians are best placed to propagate such chang-
es in lifestyles, through concrete proposals and by their modest examples” 
(COMECE, 2008). Religious leaders thus have acted as a platform to spread low car-
bon culture.  
Environmental organisations played an important role in promoting the low 
carbon energy order. The influence of these groups in the EU stems from their ability 
to represent public opinion and the concerns of European citizens. As one EU official 
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pointed out “maybe environmental NGOs have less direct access but for example if 
all of the main NGOs so let’s say Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace or WWF are say-
ing the same thing and saying it together and vocally, then there is a fear that if you 
are being criticised by all three of these groups at the same time – it becomes difficult 
to sustain the legitimacy of certain policies or inaction in the eyes of the public” (In-
terview 3). The largest environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth, and the WWF, acted across three different domains: the provision of ideologi-
cal influence, cooperation with other players, and the organization of public cam-
paigns. Although acting in different ways and with different tactics, environmental 
NGOs often collaborated with each other within the framework of Climate Action 
Network Europe (CAN), the largest umbrella group of environmental NGOs support-
ing the transition towards a sustainable low carbon energy regime. A high-level offi-
cial from one of these environmental groups stated: “WWF has been closer to big 
businesses because of different partnerships it has. As for the Greenpeace, they al-
most have no connections with big business. Trying to influence big businesses to 
tackle their environmental footprint, we shared that intelligence with Greenpeace 
which had more activist role by moving masses, activating a lot of campaigners and 
speaking in different way about some of the same topics. We all worked collabora-
tively. Even if the approach was different the end goal has always tend to be the same 
thing, a goal to foster the emergence of low carbon future. We saw the benefits of 
different positions and we tried to maximize them” (Interview 5).  
The environmental NGOs tried to provide ideological support for the low car-
bon bloc, as well as generating a positive or negative atmosphere with regards to par-
ticular actions or inactions by publishing reports and organising meetings, workshops, 
seminars, and conferences. For example, following the sequence of environmental 
issues in 2005, some NGOs took the opportunity to name and shame inadequate Eu-
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ropean climate policies and to argue for stricter and more efficient actions. The WWF 
scholarly report, Climate Change and Extreme Weather Events in Europe, stated 
“Many parts of Europe are now suffering from extreme weather events. Countries and 
communities are crying out for help. Is this the Europe of the future...? Summer 2005 
should serve as a strong call to the European leaders that the best way to ensure that 
disasters become less frequent and less extreme in the future is to cut greenhouse gas 
emissions”. (WWF, 2005b). Furthermore, these NGOs argued that an increase in en-
ergy security, a reduction in energy imports, and growth in jobs and the economy, are 
achievable through a low carbon policy orientation. Greenpeace stated that “Europe's 
energy policy is at a crossroads. Important issues are at stake; energy security, stabil-
ity of supply, growing demand, the risks of nuclear power, employment opportunities 
for thousands and the urgent need to cut emissions and head off climate change. An 
answer delivering sustainable, cost-effective and secure energy is within reach: ener-
gy savings and renewable power” (Greenpeace, 2010). 
Some environmental NGOs cooperated with business in order to amplify their 
arguments and persuade certain capital groups to reduce their CO2 emissions. Ac-
cording to an energy expert from one of the largest environmental NGOs in Brussels: 
“We understand if only NGOs are saying one thing that is only going to have a cer-
tain amount of influence. But if NGOs and businesses are saying similar things then it 
carries more weight“. (Interview 1). For instance, Greenpeace in cooperation with the 
European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), the main renewable energy businesses 
association in Europe, published "Energy [R]evolution”, an influential and respected 
report which underlined the importance of low carbon energy in the creation of a se-
cure, sustainable and economically prosperous energy future (EREC, 2008). Moreo-
ver, the report emphasised the importance of reducing dependence on volatile and 
insecure energy imports by investing in renewable energy. As was stated in the report 
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“Other fuel prices have also shot up. Coal, gas and uranium have doubled or even 
tripled in the same timeframe. By contrast, most renewable energy sources don’t need 
any fuel. Once installed, they deliver energy independently from the global energy 
markets and at predictable prices. Every day that another community switches to re-
newable energy is an independence day” (EREC, 2008). Furthermore, arguments 
provided by civil society groups such as WWF and the European Trade Union Con-
federation (ETUC) underlined the potential of renewable energy and other green 
technologies to create jobs and to foster economic growth. This was partly an attempt 
by civil society groups to negate economic costs argument which were often raised by 
opposing players. For example, the WWF, in its position statement on the Jobs and 
the Climate & Energy Package, pointed out that the EU energy and climate package 
of policies may indeed foster job creation: “Overall...the move towards greener op-
tions would be beneficial for the EU economy due to the longer supply chain and 
higher labour intensity of the environmental-friendly sectors...The EU’s climate 
package is a good combination of policies that can deliver ‘win-win’ and mitigate 
negative spillovers. The EU can improve the probability of creating new labour mar-
kets” (WWF, 2008). In their partnership with business, civil society groups thus 
sought to enhance the creation of a low carbon bloc.    
Civil society groups tried to bring together progressive energy companies to 
persuade them to include climate factors in their production costs, and to adopt a low-
carbon discourse in their communication strategies. For example, initiatives such as 
the Climate Savers were developed in order to engage with business and industry on 
climate and energy, to inspire change in their thinking and ideology regarding climate 
solutions, and to encourage business groups to transform into low-carbon leaders 
(WWF, 2013a). In addition, the Power Switch campaign organised by the WWF pro-
vided opportunities to inspire a change in thinking about climate solutions among 
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companies, as well as enabling them to act as agents of ideational change within their 
spheres of influence. In other words, the aim was to showcase work being done and 
profile champions of climate action through the traditional media, webinars, videos 
and social media (WWF, 2005a). On the other hand, business has increasingly sought 
coalitions with NGOs as a source of legitimacy. Fuchs (2007:145) claimed “The sup-
port of civil society is especially important since public opinion can play a determi-
nate role”. Environmental groups therefore played an important role in trying to at-
tract more players into the low carbon energy bloc.    
Environmental NGOs supported a sustainable low carbon war of position by 
campaigning and representing certain strands of opinion that were not necessarily 
promoted by anyone else (Interview 10). For instance, in 2009, more than 300 Green-
peace activists were arrested for blocking the exits to the Council of Ministers' build-
ing in Brussels where EU financial ministers were gathered to discuss issues regard-
ing climate change funding. They demanded that action was taken against climate 
change (Greenpeace, 2009). In the Gramscian account, the historical bloc is likely to 
be weak without roots in civil society (Cox, 2006). Civil society groups were engaged 
in the process of campaigning, helping to increase public awareness of the challenges 
of climate change, developing and legitimising certain ideational frames, and bring-
ing different groups together. In other words, civil society groups tried to raise Euro-
pean public awareness about the dangers of climate change. Public concerns in the 
EU about the dangers posed by climate change have been growing significantly 
throughout the 2000s. The results of the 2008 Eurobarometer survey “Europeans’ 
attitudes towards climate change“ revealed that climate change has become a major 
concern for EU citizens. More specifically, 62% felt that “global warming/climate 
change” is among the most serious problems facing us (EC, 2008d). The public was 
more concerned about climate change than about other problems such as “interna-
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tional terrorism”, “armed conflicts”, and “a major global economic downturn” (EC, 
2008d). 
8. The role of organic intellectuals  
In the neo-Gramscian tradition organic intellectuals contribute to solving col-
lective action problem by providing motivating myths that create a collective will 
among the group aiming for transformation. They help to transcend particular forms 
of common sense and to create another that is closer to the leading group. According 
to Cox “Intellectuals play a key role in the building of an historical bloc. They per-
form the function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies and 
organisations which bind together the members of…an historical bloc into a common 
identity” (Cox: 1996:132). In this research I use the concept of organic intellectuals 
more broadly emphasising primarily their organising, educative and stimulating po-
wers in establishing a justificatory framework for change rather than their organic 
linkage to certain social class. Organic intellectuals such as academics, scientists, en-
ergy experts, climate activists provided certain myths and other rhetorical elements in 
order to strengthen the ideological dimension of low-carbon transformation. These 
intellectuals helped to overcome a collective action problem by promoting certain 
motivating myths regarding a low carbon energy future. 
The US economist and social theorist, writer, and political advisor Jeremy 
Rifkin could be regarded as one of the organic intellectuals that helped to organize 
the low carbon bloc’s collective will through the development and transmission of a 
wider myth of a third industrial revolution, or the creation of a post-industrial revolu-
tion, led by the EU. As Rifkin (2011:2) pointed out “…the Third Industrial Revolu-
tion will create thousands of businesses and millions of jobs, and usher in a funda-
mental reordering of human relationships, from hierarchical to lateral power, that will 
impact the way we conduct business, govern society, educate our children, and en-
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gage in civic life”. The Third Industrial Revolution was promoted as a unifying myth 
to encompass the diversity of interests of the low carbon bloc. Rifkin described the 
third industrial revolution as a plan that would not just allow us to avert the cata-
strophic consequences of climate change, but also to reinvigorate Europe’s economic 
future. According to Rifkin (2011:6) “The Third Industrial Revolution offers the hope 
that we can arrive at a sustainable post-carbon era by mid-century and avert cata-
strophic climate change. We have the science, the technology, and the game plan to 
make it happen. Now it is a question of whether we will recognize the economic pos-
sibilities that lie ahead and muster the will to get there in time”. Rifkin distinguished 
the role of the EU in bringing the energy revolution to reality: “It is time to address 
the energy crisis and turn it from adversity to an economic opportunity. Europe creat-
ed the first industrial revolution…Europe can make the third one. We can all work 
together with politicians, companies and NGOs. But we have to believe in it because 
we can make a change” (cited in Euractiv, 2008a). The call for a new industrial revo-
lution resonated positively with the European Commission. For example, Crooks 
(2007) stated that “Jeremy Rifkin is nothing if not provocative. His vision of a "third 
industrial revolution" in energy use has brought his ideas to the heart of power in the 
European Union. Jose Manuel Barroso, the European Commission's president, used 
the phrase in a speech in Madrid last month. Other EU leaders have been picking up 
on the theme, most notably Angela Merkel, the German chancellor”. After the meet-
ing with the President of the EU Commission, Rifkin argued that “President Barroso 
has been very aggressive on moving towards the third industrial revolution. The 
meeting between Barroso and hydrogen, construction, scientific and industry leaders, 
as well as political leaders...I spent a long time with each of them to explain that we 
have to turn this from a punishment into an opportunity” (cited in Euractiv, 2008a). 
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Rifkin and his narrative of the third industrial revolution therefore contributed signifi-
cantly to the consolidation of the low carbon bloc.  
Lord Nicholas Stern, an academic from the LSE, is another organic intellectu-
al who helped to strengthen the collective will of the low carbon bloc, and increase 
feelings of solidarity by promoting a motivating idea about the benefits of early ac-
tion on climate change. In his review, Stern presented scientific evidence about seri-
ous global risks caused by climate change and called for an urgent global response to 
tackle these new challenges. Moreover, the Stern review for the first time provided 
comprehensive economic arguments calling for early action against climate change: 
“…the benefits of strong, early action considerably outweigh the costs…Tackling 
climate change is the pro-Growth strategy for the longer term, and it can be done in a 
way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich and poor countries. The earli-
er effective action is taken, the less costly it will be” (Stern, 2006b). Stern‘s argu-
ments were widely accepted and used to justify the move to a low carbon energy fu-
ture. It was a powerful argument that created solidarity within historical bloc about 
the need to act urgently. Stern’s argument became a point of reference for many play-
ers as it was widely used in the Commission‘s studies, member state’s positions, and 
NGO and business reports. In other words, Stern’s analysis enabled the low carbon 
historical bloc led by the Commission to pursue a unified economic argument. It was 
argued that, in terms of long-term growth and the competitiveness of the European 
economy, it would be more beneficial to make the necessary changes sooner than 
later. Stern was thus able to reconstruct one of the main economic arguments which 
has since been used by the low carbon bloc to establish a justificatory framework for 
the transition towards a low carbon future. As was argued by a high-level official in 
the Commission: “Stern opened political debates and showed that the way economists 
traditionally treated climate change and the way they compared costs over the longer 
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term was not sound. Stern explained that the way some of the economist treat costs-
benefits analysis just does not work. Stern Report opened up very interesting debates 
around that” (Interview 23). Stern could thus be regarded as taking the role of a neo-
Gramscian organic intellectual in providing an alternative cost-benefit analysis that 
strengthened the ideological force of a new sustainable low carbon historical bloc. 
The Commission used Stern’s arguments to counter the proposition that in-
vestment in a low carbon future would lead to higher energy prices. His analysis 
helped to create a narrative of urgent action and to divide arguments regarding costs 
into two different dimensions: short-term and long-term. In other words, by adding a 
long-term comparative costs dimension, the Commission wanted to justify higher 
energy prices in the short-term. According to Piebalgs (2007c) “future price hikes are 
inevitable. If we do not pay this 5% now, we will pay later 20 or 50% more because 
of the oil prices going up. It is quite clear that given the current rate of consumption 
and reserves, it cannot be that in five years’ time we will have oil prices at $60 per 
barrel, forget about it! For gas prices, it is the same”. As a result, the Commission 
argued that the benefits of early and strong early action would considerably outweigh 
the higher short-term costs. 
Gramsci argued that every relationship of hegemony is necessarily an educa-
tional relationship. Organic intellectuals provided evidence of the seriousness of cli-
mate change in order to establish a justificatory framework for change. In 2007, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), together with Former U.S. Vice-
President Al Gore, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to accumu-
late and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay 
the foundations for the measures needed to counteract such change (The Nobel Foun-
dation, 2007). In 2007 the IPCC provided the most detailed summary of the climate 
change situation ever undertaken. The report was very influential among different 
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actors which often cited certain parts of this document in their public pronounce-
ments. Furthermore, Gore’s work had an important ideational influence. His movie 
An Inconvenient Truth, which won many international awards, had a significant edu-
cational role in spreading the climate change agenda, not only in the EU but also 
globally, and contributed to the struggle for a sustainable low carbon order. Gore’s 
movie helped to develop and demonstrate visual and mental images of the multi-
dimensional effects of global warming, as well as to legitimise a variety of actions 
against climate change. The educational character of the movie was confirmed by the 
fact that it became a part of the school curricula in countries such as Germany, Spain, 
the UK, the US, and Canada. The movie was well received in Europe, and European 
political leaders praised Gore for his leadership in building awareness of the impacts 
of climate change. Dimas acknowledged that “The fight against climate change is 
now rightly recognised as a strategic priority by the European Union.... Within the 
space of a few short months, the Stern Review, Al Gore's film An Inconvenient Truth, 
the latest IPCC report and not least the warmest winter on record have triggered a 
public and political awakening” (Dimas, 2007).  
A significant role was played by Denis Tirpak, Bill Hare and other climate 
scientists who, in 2005, gathered for a scientific symposium on the stabilisation of 
greenhouse gases organized in the UK (Defra, 2005). This group of climate experts, 
who could be regarded as organic intellectuals, changed the discussion on the "safe" 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. From this time onwards everybody in 
the Commission, member states, and civil society began to talk about the need to 
keep to the 2C degrees target. There were no politicians in the Commission, member 
states, or non-governmental organisations who did not refer to this widely accepted 
limit. In other words, the 2C degrees storyline became embedded in low carbon dis-
course. Discussing the increasing role of the 2C degrees discourse for energy and 
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climate integration, a high level energy official in the Commission pointed out that 
“the 2 degrees limit came with extremely warning discussion how to avoid climate 
catastrophe. The feeling around 2007 and 2008 was that if we do not act now, it 
would be too late. This feeling was very strong. Colleagues from energy house had a 
lot of discussions on these issues with people in the environmental directorate. The 
consensus that energy and climate needs to be approached in urgent and coordinated 
way was very strong at that time” (Interview 20). Organic intellectuals thus had an 
influence on discussions regarding the limits of atmospheric concentration of green-
house gases. 
Some organic intellectuals promoted a peak oil metaphor to increase anxiety 
regarding energy security. For example, from 2006, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) began to produce warning reports about the challenges meeting the balance of 
oil supply and demand in a short-term future (IEA, 2006). In other words, the IEA 
triggered the “peak oil” narrative which had a significant effect on EU energy policy 
debates. The IEA chief economist Fatih Birol explained “I think we should leave oil 
before it leaves us. That should be our motto. So we should prepare for that day - 
through research and development on alternatives to oil, on which living standards we 
want to keep and what alternative ways we can find” (Schneider, 2008). According to 
Chevalier (2009:25) “In a time of tight supply, high and volatile prices, anxiety about 
security of supply and environmental concerns, the “peak oil” debate is raging”. The 
“peak oil” discussion therefore helped to strengthen the ideational narrative of the 
low carbon bloc by increasing the urgency to pursue an alternative to the fossil fuels 
energy order.   
9. Strategic political moves: heresthetics and building support in the Council 
The Commission had strong support for its low carbon leadership in the 
Council of Ministers. However, the EU is not a state and the Commission is not a 
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government in a state-centric way. In order to establish historical bloc, the Commis-
sion thus had to act strategically, not only by analysing the situation in the Council 
but also by using its agenda setting power, technical expertise and by forging coali-
tions between like-minded players. Referring to the energy domain, Day (2006) ar-
gued that “the Commission is being quite skilful in using its expertise and capturing 
the political will, like on energy for example…I think now a combination of internal 
and external factors have brought us politically to the point to seeing that we want to 
have a common approach. And the Commission’s technical expertise as well as its 
policies now comes into play”. It could be argued that the Commission was looking 
for an opportunity to promote its long-term agenda. As Day (2006) stated “one of the 
strengths of the Commission has been, and will be in the future, our ability to 
think about 15-20 years’ framework – which most member states have great difficulty 
with. They have a much shorter political attention span. We are trying to deal with the 
long-term issues…”.  
The Commission acted strategically and used heresthetics in order to strength-
en its institutional power and to acquire more support from other groups. According 
to Shepsle (2003:309) “Politicians frame the evaluation of outcomes by others in or-
der to improve the chances of the ones they most desire — they seek…to alter agent 
preferences”. Heresthetics is achieved by the use of a variety of strategic devices, in-
cluding the manipulation of certain dimensions. One could argue that, in the context 
of enlargement, the Commission attempted to strengthen institutional support for the 
2008 energy and climate package by coherently linking the adoption of legislation 
with the issue of energy security. As some energy experts have argued: “The en-
largement constitutes an important input to the EU energy policy decisions. The en-
largement…broadens the spectrum of the energy security preoccupations related to 
energy security…” (Belyi, 2003). Those states which joined the EU in 2004 were ex-
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tremely vulnerable in terms of energy security, and were worried that total depend-
ence would increase economic and social development risks. In addition, some new 
member states relied on one (often unpredictable) energy supplier, i.e. a monopolist 
which could dictate prices and supply conditions. Figure 8 shows the gas and petrole-
um dependency rates of the countries which joined the EU in 2004. The graph shows 
that these member states had significant dependency rates (and thus energy security 
vulnerabilities). 
Figure 8. The level of energy dependence in 2002: from 0 (no dependence) to 100 (absolute de-
pendence)2 












Source: Eurostat, 2002 
As we can see from the graph, in terms of gas dependency, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slovakia were almost 100 per cent dependent. 
In terms of dependency on petroleum products, Poland, Slovenia, Malta, Latvia, Cy-
prus, and Czech Republic were considered to be the most vulnerable. Furthermore, 
                                                      
2 There is no information about gas dependency for Cyprus and Malta because at that time neither of 
these states imported gas. 
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these countries had faced serious supply problems in the past. For example, the 2006 
and 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas crises affected most of the countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In the context of growing energy security challenges and energy and 
climate discussions, the Commission manipulated the decarbonisation policy dimen-
sion by bringing to the fore the issue of security of supply. The Commission tried to 
get some new member states on board, especially those which were less preoccupied 
with climate issues, like Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, by 
linking the adoption of the energy and climate package with energy security. For ex-
ample, due to its significant reliance on coal, Poland was not willing to accept new 
climate targets. In other words, the Commission figured out that it could alter the 
preferences of certain member states, and strengthen its hegemonic bloc, by making 
the security dimension of the low carbon agenda more visible. In order to strengthen 
support in the Council, the Commission proposed to EU member states a sort of cli-
mate/security trade off, i.e. to accept climate issues if they want their concerns over 
security reflected in Europe’s future energy agenda. Given the 2006 and 2009 gas 
crises and deteriorating relations with the Russian Federation, the largest exporter of 
oil and gas to the European Union, some countries saw the situation as an opportunity 
to get at least some energy security guarantees instead of nothing at all. In addition, 
discussing the adoption of the 2008 energy and climate package, Barroso acknowl-
edged that the linkage was used as a strategic manoeuvre to expand support in the 
Council: “Coal and steel was to reconcile the former enemies, Germany and France 
…Honestly, some countries in Europe were not so enthusiastic in the agenda about 
climate change, but they were concerned about energy security. So we linked both. If 
the Commission had just proposed a climate change agenda, it would be very difficult 
to have consensus” (Euractiv, 2009). As a result, the Commission attempted to strate-
gically manipulate the EU energy agenda by repackaging the issue of energy policy. 
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10. Growing support in the Council 
Growing support from EU member states strengthened the Commission’s 
leadership in the war of position. First, as has been argued, by heresthetically manipu-
lating energy security and climate issues the Commission managed to strengthen its 
low carbon energy bloc. Support for long-term EU energy policy was reflected in the 
changing attitudes of the most powerful EU countries. An official who worked in the 
Council of Ministers at that time explained “… it was good politics. Economy was in 
good shape at that time; people were not worried about that. And it was a space for 
politicians to think about long-term, how to improve the things that they were doing. 
The momentum of political backing for anything the Commission did on energy and 
climate was huge. It was Chirac in France, Merkel in Germany, and it was Blair in the 
UK” (Interview 13).  
Although one could argue that positive economic conditions played a role, we 
should not however neglect the importance of structural constraints in explaining the 
growing support for low carbon from certain member states. In order to explain this 
growing support, the relationship between the energy industry and capital accumula-
tion must be considered. Beginning in the 2000s, the changing attitudes of the largest 
oil and gas industries, and other energy corporations, with regards to green energy 
investments was an important structural factor contributing to growing low carbon 
support. Moreover, these industries were strategic sectors responsible for successful 
capital accumulation in certain member states (Meckling, 2011). According to some 
renewable energy analysts “...industry’s investments represent pragmatism, since oil 
companies see that long term they won’t be able to meet demand with conventional 
oil and gas. Oil companies…don’t want to…wake up one day to find the renewables 
world exploding with profits they aren’t sharing. We’re not talking about oil compa-
nies turning into green activists. It’s tied to their view that this is economically ration-
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al” (Wells, 2012). In addition, Hauvel et al. comprehensively explained changes in 
the structure of the European market: “Developments in the international energy mar-
kets and the changing policy environment in the 1990s dramatically changed Eu-
rope’s market structure. It changed at both the member state and European levels” 
(2010:18). These changes occurred because of several internal and external factors. 
First, in the 1990s, the major energy companies suffered massive blows to their prof-
its because of a protracted period of falling oil prices. Losing billions from their prof-
its, some of these companies decided to diversify their portfolios of energy invest-
ments. In other words, these corporations saw an opportunity in a multi-energy strat-
egy and green energy agenda. The Clingendael report supported this argument: “A 
generation portfolio that consists of several sources seems to be attractive because it 
spreads the risks and enables a switch to other sources when needed” (Hauvel et al., 
2010:35). Second, some companies invested because European targets and incentives 
stimulated a high demand for renewables. Some argued that “…the green agenda of-
fered new opportunities for growth” (Hauvel et al., 2010:24). Third, due to growing 
public concern about the environment, and the Commission’s strong commitment to 
supporting decarbonisation policies, some industry players wanted to build a new 
green image for their corporations and industries. Newell and Paterson (2010:51, 52) 
explained “Climate change is being mainstreamed into the business strategies of lead-
ing companies as part of a broader shift from...a “compliance model“ to an “account-
able business“ model, where the court of public opinion is a decisive as the court of 
law once was in driving business response”. Since the beginning of the 2000s the 
largest oil and gas corporations in Europe, and the largest utilities, have intensified 
their investments in renewable energy projects. According to Wells “On the way to a 
renewable energy future big oil companies has become the biggest investor in the 
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race to create green fuels. In the last decade, the industry says, it has put $71 billion 
into zero- and low-emission and renewable energy technologies” (Wells, 2012). 
The objective to respond to new challenges led companies such as British Pe-
troleum (BP) to invest in low carbon energy projects and to seek to change their pub-
lic image. For example, in 2000 the company changed its name to Beyond Petroleum 
in an attempt to win over environmentally aware consumers (BBC, 2000). As BP 
CEO John Browne explained “It is about new future. You make such decisions once 
in a while to bring it more in tune with the thinking of that time” (BBC, 2000). For 
example, BP has invested $7 billion in alternative energy since 2005 (BP, 2013). In 
addition, from 2005, BP’s alternative energy division grew from several hundred to 
5000 employees (BP, 2013). Furthermore, BP expressed support for the adoption of 
the EU energy and climate package (Conn, 2008). In the mid-2000s the other giant 
fossil fuel corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, created a renewables division and made 
considerable investments in the solar and wind sectors. Discussing Shell‘s decision to 
invest in the green energy sector, some energy experts acknowledged that the compa-
ny could not afford not to invest because they saw opportunities to make more money 
in these sectors (Wells, 2012). 
BP and Dutch Shell are important companies for the British and the Dutch 
governments in terms of tax payments, employment, energy production, and national 
pride. Moreover, as was argued in the last chapter, the UK economy depended on BP 
revenues due its pension fund investments in the company (BBC, 2010). Further-
more, Royal Dutch Shell is the largest private company in the Netherlands by revenue 
and one of the largest in the world. Given the structural importance of BP and Royal 
Dutch Shell for successful economic growth, it is not surprising that the British and 
the Dutch governments became one of the leaders in calling for a sustainable low 
carbon energy future. The UK together, with the Commission, proposed a long-term 
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vision for energy policy, i.e. sustainable low carbon energy for long-term economic 
growth. Furthermore, the Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende supported a 
low carbon energy future. In a collective letter to the European Summit in Finland, 
the leaders of the UK and the Netherlands stated that time had come to deal with cli-
mate change and future energy security in an integral way, as "climate security" 
(Watt, 2006). Green investment decisions made by the largest energy corporations 
thus had structural impact on the UK and Dutch low carbon positions. In the follow-
ing chapter, I will elaborate how, in the light of changing economic conditions, Shell 
and BP began to move away from green industries back towards fossil fuel oriented 
investments. 
Similar moves in the low carbon energy sector were seen in France and Ger-
many. Since the 2000s, large French energy corporations such as EDF, GDF Suez 
and Total invested heavily in low carbon energy projects. For example, in 2004 EDF 
formed its renewable energy subsidiary to develop wind farms and solar energy pro-
jects. Moreover, in the 2000s, the French oil and gas company Total spent billions in 
solar energy investments. The largest German energy corporations also undertook 
green energy investment strategies. Since the formation of a green energy department 
in 2007, the largest energy utility in Germany, Eon, invested more than 9 billion EUR 
in low carbon energy. The objective was to reduce the costs of renewable generation 
and make it more competitive. One could argue that these decisions to foster low car-
bon investments by the largest energy corporations companies had a structural influ-
ence on the positions of both the German and French governments. For instance, 
Merkel called for an integrated climate, energy and growth policy, “…we know that 
secure energy supplies are a particularly important element of a secure economic fu-
ture. In other words, we need reliable, affordable and sustainable energy. Of course, 
the issue of climate protection is directly linked to this issue. Both are important en-
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gines for growth” (Merkel, 2007). One Brussels’s insider explained: “I think that is 
correct that the UK had a very vocal role with regards to climate change incorpora-
tion into energy policy but I think that Germany probably had a very strong influence 
behind the scenes. The fact that these two were standing together on a given issue 
was a very important factor that allowed the Commission to be more vocal in its long-
term policy orientation” (Interview 16). Furthermore, chairing the Presidency of the 
European Council in 2008, the French government called vigorously for a reduction 
of European greenhouse emissions in order to combat global warming, for the diver-
sification of sources of energy, and for greater security in energy supplies across Eu-
rope (Vaise, 2008). Growing support in the Council, from at least by some member 
states, was therefore generated by shifts in the positions of the largest energy corpora-
tions.  
11. First steps towards a low carbon hegemonic order 
The symptoms of organic crisis described in this chapter opened up a space 
for the Commission to pursue the hegemonisation of its alternative low-carbon energy 
policy. Policies based on carbon sources of energy ceased to be regarded as sustaina-
ble models for the future. As a result of the war of position led by the Commission 
since the 2000s, one can see at least the first signs of the emerging low carbon hege-
monic order. According to the neo-Gramscian account, hegemony refers to a condi-
tion of “relative stability” within the dynamic structures and forces operating at mul-
tiple levels within society (Cox, 1987). During the second half of the 2000s, the inte-
gration of climate, energy and competitiveness objectives into a low carbon energy 
policy was seen as an indisputable objective. The Commission, and other players 
waged, a war of position at the material, institutional and ideational levels in order to 
repackage EU energy policy in a hegemonic way. First, the material dimension was 
strengthened. Renewable energy, efficiency and other green energy technologies have 
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been growing at their fastest pace since the 2000s. Second, at the institutional level, a 
strong low carbon bloc was formed between a variety of different players. In addition, 
the adoption of the first legally binding energy and climate targets was a major insti-
tutional breakthrough that provided an incentive for people and companies to invest 
in cleaner energy options. Third, at the discursive level, an equivalential linkage was 
established between energy, climate and competitiveness demands. Civil society 
groups, via the discursive and institutional levels, spread the low carbon order in the 
public domain. In addition, organic intellectuals consolidated the intellectual and 
moral unity of the emerging low carbon energy order by providing motivating myths, 
new concepts, narratives and images. The Commission and other players in the low 
carbon bloc therefore created a partial stability with regards to the future of EU ener-
gy policy.  
According to the neo-Gramscian account, hegemony rests on compromises as 
well as political and material accommodation. It could be argued that, with respect to 
the EU energy and climate package, the Commission made some accommodating 
steps. For example, there were some concessions given to Italy by introducing a mid-
term review clause (in 2014) regarding renewable energy targets (Euractiv, 2008b). 
Moreover, Poland and other countries received free allocations for power generation 
until 2020. In addition, because Poland over-achieved on its Kyoto targets, it also 
obtained a two percent additional free allocation for allowances (Interview 18). De-
spite these concessions and the relative stability of the Commission’s led low carbon 
hegemonic order, the end of the 2000s saw challenges emerge. The emerging eco-
nomic crisis, and competitiveness constraints brought by the US shale oil/gas revolu-
tion, slowed down progress towards low carbon hegemony. The dialectical tensions 
between material, ideational and institutional dimensions generated new conflicts and 
contradictions. It could be argued that economic crisis at the end of the 2000s, fol-
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lowed by changing economic and political circumstances, led to instability and 
change. While the Commission tried to accommodate the interests of all the major 
state and non-state actors, one could still see growing opposition to the Commission’s 
low carbon order. Given these new challenges, the partially hegemonic order was 
challenged. In the following chapter I will explain the emergence of the counterheg-
emonic movement. In other words, I will analyse the role of certain state and non-
state actors in their attempt to undermine EU energy and climate policy. Moreover, I 
will assess attempts to adjust to these challenges and to maintain the resilience of the 
low carbon bloc. 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that historical institutionalism, informed by a neo-
Gramscian perspective, provides a comprehensive approach to explaining shifts to-
wards low carbon energy policy. Due to the close relationship between growth and 
energy changes, capital accumulation regimes need to be taken into account in order 
to provide a better understanding of the EU energy domain in the mid-2000s. On the 
contrary from liberal intergovernmentalist, supranationalist or constructivist under-
standings, I argue that the neo-Gramscian concept of “organic crisis” helps to expose 
growing long-term contradictions within capital accumulation regimes and the emer-
gence of a new hegemonic order. The neo-Gramscian perspective defines the concept 
of “organic crisis” as a transitional process towards a new hegemonic bloc, when the 
old historical bloc becomes detached from the material, discursive and institutional 
(organizational) domains, and when the new one attempts to establish its hegemonic 
structure. In this chapter I argued that the Russian gas supply crisis, frequent extreme 
weather events, growing energy demands and decreasing European production un-
dermined the sustainability of carbon based energy policy, creating a particular open-
ing for the Commission to lead the transition towards a hegemonic low carbon energy 
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order. Using the historical institutionalist account, I view the Commission as forward-
looking, pro-growth oriented institution that due to its historical set up takes long-
term view of the general interests of Europe. Simultaneous crises in different policy 
domains thus questioned the sustainability of the carbon based energy order.  
A focus on Riker’s heresthetics helps to better explain the creation of a com-
mon long-term energy vision within the Commission. The successful construction of 
a low-carbon hegemony at the EU level required coherence and coordination within 
the Commission itself. Due to the number of different policy domains, one can view 
competing energy visions within the Commission. As was argued in the previous 
chapter, one of the failures of the creation of a strong hegemonic order in the early 
2000s was the internal division between the energy and environment commissioners 
with respect to the nuclear option, and a general lack of coordination within the 
Commission. On the contrary from some constructivist understandings, which over-
emphasise an ideational view of structural explanation and overshadow the role of 
agency-led actions, and supranational accounts which do not reveal the mechanisms 
within the Commission, I can better explain how a common EU vision of the long-
term energy future was coordinated within the Commission. The Commission’s Sec-
retariat-General acted in a heresthetical, contributing to establishing synergies be-
tween different policy departments through the use of certain strategic actions at the 
discursive and organizational levels. In other words, the SG helped to create a coher-
ent European low carbon policy approach. For example, I argue that Secretariat-
General, under the leadership of Day, transformed organizational work within the 
Commission, organized various events and created coordination platforms between 
different commissioners and directorates to work together on a future energy agenda. 
Moreover, the Secretariat-General used discursive actions to move beyond the issue 
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of the environment and to encapsulate other important dimensions such as security 
and competitiveness into the Commission’s future energy discourse.  
This theoretical approach is able to illuminate a diversity of material, discur-
sive and organizational strategies, and to explain the phenomena of transition towards 
the low-carbon hegemonic order that would otherwise be difficult to explain. In ex-
plaining growing support for the low carbon energy order, the theoretical approach in 
this chapter helped to account how the Commission used the logic of heresthetics in 
order to strategically exploit opportunities and to increase support for low-carbon he-
gemony. The Commission convinced some EU member states, especially those such 
as the Central and Eastern European countries which were more preoccupied with 
security issues, through the rearticulation of the security dimension in low carbon 
energy policy discourse. Moreover, the neo-Gramscian concept of “organic intellec-
tuals” helped to illuminate how certain individuals and groups constructed a low-
carbon collective will and dominant knowledge structures through the use of motivat-
ing myths, metaphors and ideological narratives. Liberal intergovernmentalists do not 
perceive any significant influence of private groups on the policy-making process, 
other than at the national level. Moreover, supranationalists recognise the function of 
expert groups but the focus is mainly on the forms and mechanisms through which 
“epistemic communities” exert influence on policy-making bodies. On the other 
hand, the theoretical approach applied in this thesis helps to account for how organic 
intellectuals attempt to increase solidarity and solve collective action problems 
through the execution of their educational and social functions. In other words, the 
neo-Gramscian perspective contributes to understandings of how “organic intellectu-
als” formulated and consolidated the ideological underpinnings of a hegemonic pro-
ject. It helps to reveal how organic intellectuals deconstruct existing narratives and 
offer alternative concepts that are used to construct coherent alternative orders. As a 
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result, in this chapter, I explained how “organic intellectuals” attempted to create a 


















The economic crisis and the shift towards the competitiveness dimen-
sion 
Introduction 
After progress in the 2000s, integrated EU energy and climate policy began to 
crumble and lose prominence. Given the economic crisis and growing concerns over 
Europe’s competitiveness, the low carbon historical bloc tried to sustain the legitima-
cy of the sustainable energy order by creating certain equivalential linkages between 
various urgent demands: dealing with the economic crisis, ensuring competitiveness, 
and the long-term objective of creating a green, sustainable, secure and affordable 
energy model. At the end of 2000s one could thus witness changes in the communica-
tion of EU energy policy, as well as growing concerns over competitiveness and eco-
nomic growth. These shifts were encouraged by both internal and external factors 
(contradictions). To a large extent, the economic/financial crisis undermined progress 
and the power of the emerging low carbon hegemonic bloc led by the EU Commis-
sion and other state and non-state actors. In addition, given the dynamic nature of the 
neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony, one could witness the emergence of players that 
challenged the legitimacy and viability of the low-carbon order. Responding to wid-
ening contradictions between short-term and long-term interests, the low carbon bloc 
tried to adjust and bring together the widest possible coalition of interests through the 
strategy of transformismo.  
This chapter explains the prominence of the competitiveness and growth di-
mensions in European energy policy. I will analyse the role of specific state and non-
state actors in their attempts to challenge progress towards a low carbon future. 
Moreover, the attempts by the low carbon bloc to reconcile growing contradictions 
and to keep the low carbon agenda will be explained. In the first part, I will assess 
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how the economic crisis and growing shale gas competition moved the low carbon 
order out of alignment, opened discrepancies within the hegemonic bloc, and raised 
accumulation-legitimation tensions. Furthermore, growing material, institutional and 
discursive challenges to the low carbon hegemonic order will be analysed. In addi-
tion, the structural influence of certain non-state players in blocking the emergence of 
a new historical bloc will be evaluated. The explanation of how the Commission, cer-
tain states in the Council, business groups and environmental organisations were try-
ing to reconcile opposing ideas will be provided. Finally, in order to illustrate how the 
Commission and other players tried to maintain a low carbon hegemonic order 
through the strategy of transformismo, a case study on the energy efficiency directive 
will be explained in more detail. More specifically, this case study will analyse how 
the low carbon bloc led by the Commission promoted energy efficiency in an attempt 
to reconcile long-term low-carbon policy objectives with short-term economic, finan-
cial, and social needs. 
1. Economic crisis and the shale revolution as a threat to the low-carbon hege-
monic order 
According to the neo-Gramscian account, hegemony is unstable and always 
contested (Jagers et al., 2004:250). One could argue that the low carbon hegemonic 
order which emerged in the 2000s was challenged by the emergence of global eco-
nomic crisis which opened a space for contradictions and contestations. In 2012, for 
the first time in nearly a decade, global investments in wind, solar and other green 
energy ventures went down instead of up (Clark, 2012a). The current economic crisis 
in Europe has slowed down the progress of the low carbon historical bloc. In addi-
tion, optimism with regards to the development of green energy technologies has be-
gun to fade away. This downturn is related to the economic crisis that was caused by 
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a crisis in banking, i.e. the credit crunch constrained green energy investments (The 
Economist, 2010). 
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe began in 2010, and austerity became the 
primary instrument to tackle this (Blyth, 2013). Some argued that Europe was braced 
for a new age of austerity as governments across the region take action to eliminate 
unsustainable budget deficits (Scott, 2012). As a result of this austerity pressure, gov-
ernments slashed subsidies for green energy investments. As Mark Scott (2012) 
claims: “Yet as the Continent’s debt crisis has continued to bite, many cash-strapped 
countries in Europe have pared back financial support for green energy investments”. 
Moreover, investors began to retreat from Europe in a search for new profits. Accord-
ing to Francesco Storace from Enel Green Power: “Some European governments are 
overwhelmed by their debts, so it is not surprising that renewables are seen as a small 
detail. They are totally absorbed in coping with the budget difficulties” (Scott, 2012). 
EU austerity policy thus had a negative effect on the green energy sector. 
The shale revolution in the US has had a detrimental influence on EU energy 
and industrial competitiveness. Figure 9 shows natural gas price differences in the 
US, Europe and Japan. According to the graph, in the early-2000s, the gas price in the 
US was higher than in Europe and Japan. Nevertheless, with the increased production 
of shale gas, US energy industry managed to reduce the price almost sevenfold. In 
2011, the gas price in the US was 4 times lower than in Europe. In addition, the dif-
ference in the price of gas had an effect on the price of electricity as gas is widely 
used for electricity generation in Europe. As some energy experts claim: “Europe left 
behind as shale shock drives America’s industrial resurgences…swathes of American 
industry have acquired a massive and lasting advantage in energy costs over global 
rivals. Europe is…drifting towards energy suicide” (Evans-Pritchard, 2012). Differ-
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ences in energy costs thus put pressure on the competitiveness of European industry 
(Wiesmann, 2012).  
Figure 9. Natural Gas Prices in US, Europe, Japan 
 
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data 
2. Accumulation-Legitimation tensions 
It is commonplace that, at all levels of political life in capitalist systems, a 
state has to both support the drive to accumulate and to legitimate this accumulation 
in the minds of the public by moderating its negative effects (Cox and Sinclair, 1996). 
As economic growth slows down, the contradictions between the two functions of 
accumulation and legitimation sharpen. In some situations, when the economy is in 
good shape, sustainability can be emphasised, but as soon as the economy is in crisis, 
accumulation demands undermine such needs. The intensifying economic crisis and 
growing competitiveness challenges contributed to the emerging disarticulation be-
tween different actors and their demands. As growth stagnated in many European 
countries, some governments denounced or at least slowed down the path towards 
decarbonisation. Governments had to balance fears of political and social unrest, a 
loss of legitimacy, and a lack of growth and competitiveness against the threats posed 
by an unsustainable carbon based accumulation regime. As Hay (1994) claims “…it 
is not difficult to see the potential for tension that this problem generates for the state 
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in seeking to reconcile the conflicting short-term interests of capital accumulation and 
long-term considerations of environmental preservation”. As has been evident since 
the start of Europe‘s sovereign debt crisis, accumulation demands have led to a mas-
sive downplaying of sustainability discourses. As growth stagnates, it becomes diffi-
cult to justify the short-term costs of decarbonisation policies. There is a thus strong 
pressure from particular capital groups to slash long-term low carbon investments and 
instead increase competitiveness and growth in the short term.  
To some extent, evidence of this legitimation crisis can be tracked if we look 
at public opinion in the EU. Due to the worsening economic situation, EU energy 
policy had to reflect public attitudes. For example, as we can see from Table 3, in 
early-2008 when the economic crisis was still in its initial phase, 62 per cent of re-
spondents considered climate change as the most serious problem and 24 per cent 
responded that an economic downturn should be viewed as the most serious issue. 
Nevertheless, if we compare these numbers with the 2011 figures, we can see a grad-
ual change in perception. In 2011, 51 per cent of respondents viewed climate change 
as the most serious problem facing the world. In addition, 45 per cent (a 20 per cent 
increase from 2008) of respondents considered the economic situation as the most 
pressing issue. In almost all countries, the number of people that viewed climate as 
the most serious problem decreased. 
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Table 3. Responses to Eurobarometer survey questions 
QD1T Which of the following do you consider to be the single most serious problem facing the 
world as a whole? Any others? 
 
 
                  
Global warming/ 
climate change 












 2008 2010 
EU27 
 
62% 24% 51% 45% 
BE 61% 26% 59% 36% 
BG 52% 27% 46% 58% 
CZ 45% 16% 39% 56% 
DK 71% 21% 67% 46% 
DE 71% 31% 66% 27% 
EE 58% 22% 35% 41% 
EL 90% 38% 61% 78% 
ES 61% 20% 56% 69% 
FR 71% 20% 52% 41% 
IE 63% 43% 45% 67% 
IT 47% 22% 42% 53% 
Source: Eurobarometer Climate Change 
 
For example, in the most seriously affected countries such as Greece, the 
number of people who considered climate change to be the most serious issue de-
creased by almost a third, and the number citing economic concerns increased by 40 
per cent. As one can see from the Table, Spain, Portugal and Ireland were the main 
countries that saw economic crisis as the most serious problem. One can thus see a 
gradual loss of legitimacy for low carbon bloc. O‘Connor (1979) points out that legit-
imacy depends on the capacity of a political system to secure a consensus over politi-
cal policies from groups which will either not benefit or will be disadvantaged by 
these policies – a task which typically requires that policies be defined and presented 
in way that conceals their real nature.  
In the context of one of the most severe economic crisis since World War II, 
certain state and non-state actors found it difficult to balance the increasing contradic-
tion between the need to ensure a long-term sustainable low carbon energy regime 
and short-term objectives to foster economic growth and competitiveness. Moreover, 
national governments had to create conditions for short-term economic growth in or-
der to protect their legitimacy and, ultimately, their survival. In other words, politi-
QD1T Which of the following do you consider to be the single most serious problem facing the 


















 2008 2010 
LV 66% 26% 51% 52% 
LT 58% 34% 45% 59% 
LU 69% 16% 62% 25% 
HU 71% 35% 48% 63% 
MT 64% 11% 53% 43% 
NL 66% 12% 53% 32% 
AT 69% 31% 55% 54% 
PL 50% 11% 41% 31% 
PT 47% 32% 28% 61% 
RO 60% 32% 46% 65% 
SI 80% 27% 67% 53% 
SK 66% 23% 51% 58% 
FI 73% 26% 50% 29% 
SE 74% 10% 68% 23% 
UK 57% 24% 44% 39% 
 
QD1T Which of t e following do you consider to be the single most seriou problem facing the world as a whole? Any others? 
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cians in the crisis-hit countries had a challenging task to justify investments in green 
energy projects at a time when major financial and social woes exacerbated problems 
of unemployment and social cohesion. I will explain these contradictions in more de-
tails in the following part where I analyse the shifts in the material, institutional and 
discursive dimensions that led to the destabilisation of the low carbon bloc. 
3. The disintegration of the low carbon hegemonic formation 
3.1. A disequilibrium of the material, institutional and discursive dimen-
sions 
According to Jagers et al. (2004:255) “...hegemony is never completely stable, 
and is subject to continuous reproduction and renegotiation”. In addition, neo-
Gramscian hegemony can be achieved through field stabilisation: the alignment of 
material, institutional and discursive elements (Levy and Egan, 2005). One could ar-
gue that the economic crisis and the issue of competitiveness weakened the material, 
institutional and discursive power dimensions of low carbon order. As a result, these 
shifts undermined the hegemonic formation of a low carbon bloc, and opened up a 
space where alternative conceptions of general European interests could be construct-
ed. For example, Jagers et al. claimed that “Crisis...create a particularly useful open-
ings for actors wishing to advance such alternatives“ (Jagers et al., 2004:250). In the 
following sections I will assess in more detail these developments in the material, 
institutional, and discursive realms.  
3.2. The weakening of the material dimension 
According to the neo-Gramscian account, the material level is developed by 
investments in technological and innovative solutions, thereby securing market posi-
tions (Levy and Newell, 2004). It could be argued that, since the beginning of the 
economic crisis, investments in renewable energy in Europe have dropped considera-
bly. These reductions in renewable energy investments prove that the optimism with 
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regards to the development of green energy technologies has begun to decrease. Fig-
ure 10 shows global investments in renewable energy since 2004. As we can see, the 
EU had a significant lead in renewable energy until 2008 and 2009 when the global 
economic crisis started to accelerate. The Graph illustrates that, from this time on-
wards, the level of investment began to highly decrease. Moreover, the biggest slump 
in clean energy investment was seen in the final three years, when concerns regarding 
economic crisis and a loss of competitiveness were at their highest level. Referring to 
the significant decrease in investments from 2012 until 2013, BNEF (2014) points out 
that “…the biggest story was in Europe, where investment slumped 41% to $57,8bn 
last year, from 97,8bn as big economies such as Germany, Italy and France either 
restricted subsidy payments for new projects or else failed to disperse uncertainty 
over future support”. 
Figure 10. Investment in renewable energy at global level 
 
The growing significance of the shale revolution diverted attention from low 
carbon projects in Europe to shale gas and oil investments in the US. The material 
sector of the low carbon bloc was thus weakened by the retreat of the largest oil and 
gas corporations which had, in the past, made considerable investments in renewable 
energy and green energy research and development. The current downturn in eco-
nomic growth and competitiveness forced businesses to reconsider their investment 
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strategies towards projects which generated the highest profits. Companies such as 
Iberdrola, BP and Shell announced about decisions to withdraw from green invest-
ments. For example, at the end of the 2000s, BP pulled out from renewable invest-
ments in Spain and the UK. As some argued: “The Big Oil picked up the pace of its 
withdrawal from renewable energy when BP revealed that it is closing two solar-
panel plants in Spain...The cutbacks...will result in 620 job losses...The oil giants 
have been rethinking their operations since the oil price plunged...” (Donovan, 2009). 
In addition, Shell sold its stake in the London Array project, potentially the world‘s 
largest offshore wind farm (Macalister, 2008). In 2012 BP announced its decision to 
exit the wind energy business and to increase capital investments in lucrative oil and 
gas fields. As Dillalo (2013) claims “It wasn't that long ago that BP was said to be 
ushering in a new kind of energy company. It was creating a diversified giant...and 
now BP is completely exiting the renewable energy sector”. In addition, in 2009, 
Shell also announced its withdrawal from solar and wind energy investments. Linda 
Cook, Shell's executive director, said “If there aren't investment opportunities which 
compete with other projects we won't put money into” (Webb, 2009). Instead of fo-
cusing on renewables, Shell and BP made significant investments into unconventional 
gas and oil projects in the US and the Arctic (Gonzalez and Flynn, 2012). 
Shale gas development in the US weakened the material dimension of the low 
carbon bloc and slowed down the creation of a sustainable energy future. In order to 
survive in the context of a slump in energy demand and uncompetitive gas prices, the 
largest capital groups prioritised their short-term interests at the expense of common 
European interests. For example, a growing consumption of coal in the EU over the 
last several years shows that a run for profits undermined the objective of creating a 
low-carbon energy future. The import and consumption of coal (lignite) has grown in 
the recent years due to the falling price of coal in the US. Anne-Sophie Corbeau, an 
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official from the IEA, argued that “While coal production and use plummet in Ameri-
ca, in Europe we have some kind of golden age of coal” (The Economist, 2013). 
Moreover, the amount of electricity generated from coal in some European countries 
is rising by 50 per cent annually (The Economist, 2013). In addition, over the last 
couple of years, energy utilities in Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Nether-
lands, and the UK have made large investments in the coal sector, the most polluting 
of all fossil fuels (The Economist 2013, Pfeifer, 2013). The re-emergence of the coal 
sector has had a negative impact on green investments. Every dollar spent on fossil 
fuels means less funding for renewable energy research and development. This shift 
in the attitudes of the most powerful players in the energy industry thus had a nega-
tive impact on the material dimension of the low carbon bloc. 
Due to the economic crisis and cuts in green subsidies, the renewables indus-
try found itself in a very difficult situation. For example, the world‘s largest wind 
turbine maker, the Danish company Vestas, has been facing falling demand in Europe 
while struggling to maintain competitiveness. Nevertheless, despite falling invest-
ments, it would be wrong to say that the material domain was brought to a complete 
halt. Investments in renewable energy and low carbon technologies are long-term in 
nature, and many projects have continued during the economic crisis. Moreover, low 
carbon investments made in the pre-crisis period brought technological advances and 
innovations, drove down costs, and made green energy more affordable (Goosens, 
2014). Nevertheless, since 2010, the material dimension of the low carbon bloc has 
been weakened.        
3.3. Growing tensions in the institutional domain 
3.3.1. Divisions in the Commission 
When the low-carbon historical bloc reached its hegemonic peak at the end of 
2008, the Commission was unanimous in its energy policy orientation. As was argued 
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in previous chapters, momentum was generated by close cooperation between differ-
ent commissioners in the EU Commission. Moreover, the Commission’s Secretary-
General Day helped to bring different low energy policy visions together into one 
coherent policy. Different DGs worked together in order to put the EU at the front of 
low carbon energy developments, thereby making Europe the most competitive clean 
energy region in the world. This cooperation was weakened under energy Commis-
sioner Oettinger (DG Energy) and climate Commissioner Hedegaard. After the ap-
proval of the second Barroso Commission in 2009, some disagreements emerged be-
tween these two commissioners regarding certain elements of EU low-carbon policy. 
For example, the first evidence of ambiguity within the Commission began to emerge 
in the debates surrounding the post-2020 energy-climate framework. As some ana-
lysts have claimed: "It seems likely that the relations between Oettinger and Hede-
gaard will become highly charged. It is highly probable that she will meet some re-
sistance from Mr Oettinger…” (Belin, 2010). Soon after his appointment, Oettinger 
expressed his doubts about setting the ambitious CO2 emission reduction targets of 20 
to 30 per cent by 2020. As Oettinger pointed out: “If we go alone to 30%, you will 
have a faster process of deindustrialisation in Europe. I think we need industry in Eu-
rope and industry means CO2 emissions” (Harvey, 2011a). His position contradicted 
Hedegaard’s policy of not wanting to diminish the Commission’s long-term decar-
bonisation policy ambitions and thus pushed for tougher carbon targets. According to 
Harvey (2011a) “Hedegaard kicked off the debate over the targets with a study...that 
showed a 30% target was "achievable, in part because a drop in emissions during the 
recession made it cheaper to slash greenhouse gases”. Moreover, after the Commis-
sion proposed to cut CO2 emissions 40 per cent by 2030, the EU energy Commis-
sioner condemned these proposed targets. Oettinger (2014) criticised the scope of this 
ambition: “Every percentage going down gets more difficult and cost intensive. To 
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think that with this (EU) 4.5 per cent of global emissions you can save the World is 
not realistic. It is arrogant and stupid”. Moreover, the energy commissioner preferred 
to focus on a new renewables target and called for a doubling in capital investments 
in renewable energies. According to Oettinger “I prefer to have a renewables target – 
if there is no binding target, then member states can reduce renewable energy after 
2020, to less than 20pc. That should not be the case” (Harvey, 2013).  Different voic-
es within the Commission thus began to question the pace of the low carbon transi-
tion. 
3.3.2. Structural constraints and weakening support from member states 
The economic crisis and growing challenges of competitiveness raised serious 
challenges for the legitimacy of the low carbon future. These challenges diminished 
the institutional dimensions of the neo-Gramscian historical bloc and exacerbated the 
accumulation-legitimation crisis in the EU. The consensus among member states re-
garding the low carbon energy future began to fade away. Especially due to the eco-
nomic crisis, EU member states were structurally constrained by the need to ensure 
short-term interests, i.e. to create conditions for immediate capital accumulation, em-
ployment, and competitiveness. Otherwise, the legitimacy of their rule might be chal-
lenged. Facing the dilemma of whether to cut social expenditure and risk further so-
cial unrest, or to reduce low carbon investments, certain member states began to re-
treat from the low carbon energy path. In certain countries the interests of manufac-
turing industries, large energy corporations and “financial capital” were prioritised, as 
these capital groups were seen as the core sectors of economy which could help to 
counter the economic downturn (Gill and Law, 1993). Energy intensive industries 
employ millions of people in Europe and are the foundation of the manufacturing sec-
tor, making the raw materials that go into everything from medicine and clothing, 
through to vehicles and computers. Some argued that, due to importance of these in-
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dustries for Europe's economic recovery, it was vital to protect their global competi-
tive positions. In other words, these sectors possessed a structural power with regards 
to state decision-making as they were seen as being able to advance the general inter-
ests of capital in Europe. Newell and Paterson (1998:691) pointed out “As a result of 
the role of state in capital accumulation, those who organise that process (i.e. capital) 
gain great structural power...”. Given concerns over short-term economic growth, 
employment, and competitiveness, EU member states were less interested in creating 
long-term low carbon energy industries and instead prioritised the interests of indus-
trial manufacturing sectors. Stollinger et al. (2013) explained the growing importance 
of these industrial sectors: “The recent resurgence of interest in industrial policy and 
its potential to spur economic growth has…been nurtured by concerns about growing 
competition from emerging economies”. The manufacturing sector was seen as play-
ing a significant role in Europe‘s economic development, employment, exports and 
innovation (Veugelers, 2013). According to Stollinger et al. (2013): “The economic 
crisis of 2008 has caused a change in the perception of the manufacturing sector in 
many countries among both economists and policy-makers. Manufacturing...is again 
considered to be a prerequisite for an innovative and fast-growing economy”. Alt-
hough national differences should be taken into account, it must however be pointed 
out that due to the mobility of certain industrial sectors and their role in employment 
and tax revenues, many European countries feared that manufacturing industries 
could move to other states or even regions, thus aggravating the already dire econom-
ic growth and employment situations. As Gill and Law (1993:105) pointed out 
“…governments are increasingly constrained in their freedom of manoeuvre by eco-
nomic policies of other states, as well as the investment decisions of internationally 
mobile capital”. Member states thus slowed down and even halted investments in 
green energy as they were much more expensive and detrimental to the short-term 
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growth and competitiveness of large industrial sectors. Moreover, the financial quasi-
regulation exercised by credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and 
Fitch) had a structural influence on widely scattered governments and energy corpo-
rations, thereby negatively affecting green investment decisions and low carbon poli-
cy choices (Sinclair, 2005). According to van Gilder Cooke (2012): “The call is being 
echoed across Europe, where governments are reconsidering what they – and taxpay-
ers – can afford in terms of green-energy initiatives in an age of austerity…But with 
pensions, health care and education budgets already feeling the chill, lavish spending 
on clean energy has become harder to justify”. As a result, governments feared that 
high energy prices and significant public deficits would constrain growth and push 
the European economy into an even more difficult position. 
During the economic crisis a number of EU member states, such as Italy, 
Spain, Germany, the UK and others, slashed low carbon investments and slowed 
down their transitions towards a low carbon future. In explaining the decision to cut 
support for low carbon energy, one should not neglect the importance of structural 
constraints such as a systematic dependence on international markets for financing 
public expenditure. In 2012, in order to stop the downgrading of their credit ratings 
and a subsequent increase in borrowing costs, the governments of Spain and Italy 
announced deep spending cuts. One of the main victims of these cuts was the renew-
able energy sector. According to Couture (2012) “Faced with growing fiscal chal-
lenges and the spectre of increasingly trigger-happy credit rating agencies, 
the...Spanish government has acted to...put a halt to awarding new feed-in tariff (FIT) 
contracts. The move is expected to have immediate impacts on...wind power pro-
jects...solar PV projects, as well as a number of projects in other technology classes. 
The main driver behind this decision is addressing the country’s electricity system 
deficit, which stands at over €24 Billion”. José Manuel Soria, Spain‘s Minister of 
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Industry, Energy and Tourism, argued that the abolition of energy subsidies was de-
signed to limit the runaway growth of the country‘s electricity tariff deficit. The min-
ister admitted that the energy problem could transform into a financial problem and 
become a severe drag on the economy (Sills, 2012). Mallet (2012) argued that “Spain 
has suspended subsidies for all new power plants using renewable energy and un-
veiled a draft law to cut public sector deficits to zero within eight years and reduce 
government debt...Mariano Rajoy...sought to convince...that he was ready to impose 
economic austerity...”. Moreover, with the highest unemployment rate in Europe, the 
Spanish government saw the need to reduce high electricity prices, thereby increasing 
the competitiveness of its industry and attracting foreign investment which could 
generate jobs. José Manuel Soria insisted that Spain must foster its competitiveness: 
“Our electricity costs on average more than that of France, one of our principal com-
petitors, and this is hurting our economy” (Duchamp, 2012). In addition, while reduc-
ing support for the low carbon energy sector, the Spanish government announced its 
decision to extend subsidies for the coal industry (ENDS Europe, 2013).  
Constrained by the decisions of the major rating agencies, the Italian govern-
ment embarked on a policy of austerity and an internal devaluation process whose 
primary target was renewable energy cuts. For example, in the draft of its 5th Energy 
Plan, the Italian government supported cuts to solar funding and feed-in Tariffs 
(Coats, 2012). Italy’s Economic Development Minister, Corrado Passera, explained 
“The incentives have produced “excessive” investment in solar and wind power 
which is distorting prices” (Vasarri and Sirletti, 2012). Moreover, the minister point-
ed out that energy prices were too high and urged thinking about development of do-
mestic oil and gas resources (UPI, 2012). Passera made it clear: “This will help in 
both the short and medium-term“ (UPI, 2012). The decisions to cut support for low 
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carbon energy in Spain and Italy were thus influenced by the structural constraints 
imposed by financial and industrial capital groups.   
One could argue that structural constraints also affected German govern-
ment’s proposal to curb renewable energy subsidies and to cap electricity prices. In 
the context of the economic crisis, large manufacturing and energy industries were 
seen as the main engines for growth and employment, accounting for about 25 of total 
GDP (World Bank, 2015). For instance, Germany‘s economy and energy minister, 
Sigmar Gabriel, called manufacturing industry the backbone of the German economy 
(Richter, 2014). Moreover, given Germany’s open and export-led economy, high en-
ergy costs were an extremely negative factor in diminishing the global competitive-
ness of German industries. It was stated that: “High electricity prices in Germany 
pose an increasing risk to the international competitiveness of German industry and 
exports, the economy’s growth engine. International competitiveness is particularly 
important to Germany and its standard of living, owing to the country’s high depend-
ence on exports. Germany’s ability to maintain its international competitiveness...will 
affect the entire economy, the German populace, and the fiscal position of the Ger-
man state” (IHS, 2013:7). Furthermore, the German government viewed growing in-
vestments in low carbon energy as undermining the stability of the work of its largest 
energy utilities, which played a significant role in ensuring the stable running of its 
economic regime. Gabriel began discussions with the largest energy utilities about 
special payments (capacity payments) that would encourage E.On and RWE to make 
investments into conventional power plants (Clark, 2012b). Fearing a loss of legiti-
macy, the German government decided to slow down the transition to a low carbon 
energy future. According to Gabriel: “For a secure transition to renewable ener-
gy...we need the support of the population. With rising energy prices, we will lose 
that. We have reached the limit of what we can ask of our economy” (Vasagar, 2014). 
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Moreover, Germany provided financial aid to its energy-intensive firms through ex-
emptions from electricity-network charges, potentially raising costs for industry and 
challenging a core aspect of Germany's drive to green energy (Boston and Torrelo, 
2013). The need to ensure the competitiveness of its industry, and provide a stable 
supply of energy, thus led Germany to question the implementation of its green ener-
gy policy. 
Constrained by austerity policies, the UK also announced major cuts in wind 
energy subsidies. The UK was trying to slow down its path towards green energy. 
Moreover, due to a decline in its financial industry after the crisis, the UK aimed to 
increase the share of industrial manufacturing output in its economy. As Prime Minis-
ter Cameron argued “What we need to happen in Britain is a rebalancing of the econ-
omy, away from excessive borrowing, financial services and consumption and to-
wards business investment, manufacturing, making things again” (Holehouse, 2013). 
In order to foster investments in manufacturing, the government sought to ensure a 
supply of secure and affordable energy. The UK‘s Chancellor, George Osborne, ar-
gued that renewable energy was too expensive and instead suggested expanding gas-
fired generation. According to Osborne: “We need to set out an approach which puts 
costs to consumers at the hearth. (We should be limiting) support for low-carbon gen-
eration to a level the country can afford” (Harrabin, 2012). Moreover, the Conserva-
tive government promised to drop public subsidies for onshore wind farms and, due 
to pressure from of its supporters to address the issue of the visual impact of wind 
turbines, give local people the final say on wind farm applications (Barton, 2015).  
The UK government saw shale industry as a core sector that could ensure the 
development of general interests of capital. The UK‘s Prime Minister argued that 
shale gas development could deliver a large economic boost and ensure supply of 
cheaper, more secure energy. Cameron (2014) explained: “...we‘re going all out for 
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shale. It will mean more jobs and opportunities for people, economic security for our 
country”. It could be argued that the UK government was constrained in its freedom 
to manoeuvre by the investment decisions of the shale industry. For example, in order 
to attract investment, the UK government adopted one of the most generous tax re-
gimes in the world. Osborne (2013) explained: “We want to create the right condi-
tions for industry to explore and unlock that (shale gas) potential...”. As a result, UK 
policy was influenced by the necessity to create favourable investment conditions for 
certain sectors of industry. 
3.3.3. Growing divisions in the Council 
Growing disagreements in the Council reflected changing attitudes among EU 
countries towards the low carbon energy model. Most of the objections in Council 
discussions came from Poland, which expressed its opposition to and vetoed the “En-
ergy roadmap 2050”, the EU’s long-term energy policy strategy. One could argue that 
Poland’s position was structurally constrained by the interests of its powerful coal 
industry. Explaining its decision to veto the EU low carbon plan, the Polish environ-
ment minister Marcin Korolec called the Commission’s proposals radical, and warned 
that if adopted they would undermine investor confidence (Keating, 2012a): “Our 
position is – we do not agree to any higher EU reduction goals looking to the year 
2020” (Rettman, 2012). As one Polish representative to the EU said “The Commis-
sion loves to save the World at the expense of European citizens” (Interview 9). One 
may argue that the Polish disagreements were due to the issue of growth. Some poli-
ticians in Poland claimed that Europe’s climate policy has lessened the competitive-
ness of the European economy in comparison to the United States and Asia (Szy-
mañski, 2013). Moreover, the UK and Czech governments, which were the leading 
countries in promoting the 2008 energy and climate package, expressed their opposi-
tion to the renewable energy targets in the post-2020 policy framework. The UK’s 
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Energy Secretary, Ed Davey, explained that, since 2008, circumstances had changed 
and that the UK supported a technologically neutral approach. According to Davey 
(2013) “RES (renewable energy) represent just one of the possible ways towards low-
carbon economy. We strongly support a 2020 target, as it was needed to help develop 
new technologies. And, of course we are in an economic environment that is chal-
lenging European countries to address competitiveness and growth. But, above all, 
we must recognise that our economic competitors are stealing a march on us”. Con-
sequently, growing opposition in the Council undermined support for the EU’s low 
carbon future. 
3.3.4. Attempts to break down hegemonic discourse 
Despite attempts to sustain the development of a sustainable low carbon ener-
gy regime, the influence of the low carbon bloc was diminished due to the severe 
economic crisis. Large energy intensive companies and corporations engaged in the 
formulation of a counter-hegemonic discourse. When it came to recession, economics 
began to intervene and accumulation demands led to the downplaying of discourses 
of sustainability. Using a post-structuralist account, one could argue that elements of 
EU low carbon energy discourse became “floating signifiers”. According to Griggs 
and Howarth (2013:21) “…”floating signifiers”…can…be articulated by rival politi-
cal projects seeking to fix their meaning and import…”. In the context of deepening 
crisis and emerging discursive dislocation, energy intensive industries, together with 
certain civil society groups and other state and non-state actors, attempted to break up 
the chain of equivalences that connected climate, security and competitiveness 
(growth) demands into an integrated energy and climate policy. In other words, the 
counter-hegemonic group used the political logic of difference in order to negate and 
decouple an integrative energy and climate discourse and emphasise the primacy of 
short-term growth and competitiveness. On the contrary from the logic of equiva-
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lence, the logic of difference aims to decouple various demands and to present them 
as contradictory and conflicting (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). The counter-hegemonic 
group led by energy intensive businesses thus aimed to undermine the Commission’s 
low carbon energy and climate policy by emphasising its contradictions. 
Given growing economic and social challenges, the narratives of industrial 
groups focused on the essential role of industry in recovering from economic crisis. 
Jürgen Thumann (2013), the President of one of the leading European business 
groups BusinessEurope, argued that “industry is the most important contributor to 
Europe’s return to sustainable growth and job creation”. By using metaphorical ele-
ments such as “carbon leakage”, energy-intensive industries wanted to increase and 
step up accumulation pressures both at the European and domestic levels. This meta-
phorical description has been used at the EU level since the mid-2000s. The aim was 
to show that, despite EU attempts to tackle climate challenges, energy intensive in-
dustries could move their emissions from Europe to less environmentally regulated 
regions or countries (Buchan, 2009). This metaphorical description aimed to deny the 
competitiveness aspect of European low carbon policy. In other words, the narrative 
promoted by energy-intensive groups underlined that certain actions in the low car-
bon energy domain could seriously disrupt their competitiveness, forcing them to 
move their production abroad. BusinessEurope President Jürgen Thumann argued 
that “European companies are suffering from the negative effects of “green tape“. 
The European Commission is still inclined to develop unnecessarily burdensome leg-
islative instruments in climate, energy and environment policies. This is why Busi-
nessEurope is continuously urging the Commission to move towards a technology-
driven and competitiveness friendly approach…” (Thumann, 2013). By connecting 
EU low carbon policy to the idea of “green tape” BusinessEurope aimed to show 
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that, in promoting its vision of a low carbon future, the Commission was not listening 
to the urgent competitiveness demands of industry. 
In order to decouple energy and climate policy integration, especially as the 
economic crisis started to intensify, the largest industrial groups began to employ oth-
er metaphorical re-descriptions. Generative metaphors as such “investment leakage” 
and “job leakage” were used in their arguments. Leakage is associated not only with 
loss, but primarily with waste (e.g. water, electricity or money). The idea was to 
evoke associations between the continuation of strong post-2020 energy and climate 
targets and the wasting of investment and employment opportunities, thereby dimin-
ishing economic growth and competitiveness in Europe. BusinessEurope (2014) un-
derlined the necessity to put the competitiveness dimension at the top of the energy 
and climate nexus: “The EU needs to reassess its approach to energy and climate pol-
icy in order to reverse the “investment leakage” trend. It should learn from the high 
cost lessons, game changers such as the shale gas revolution in the USA and the very 
limited progress in global climate talks”. Moreover, certain energy intensive capital 
associations warned about “job leakage”, i.e. increases in unemployment if the ambi-
tions of the low carbon policy are not reduced (Glass Alliance Europe, 2013).  On the 
contrary from low carbon industries, energy-intensive capital groups and certain large 
fossil fuel companies viewed competitiveness only in terms of short-term energy 
costs. For example, the European Cement Association (Cembureau) stated that “Re-
newable energy policies, carbon costs and the structure of the electricity market play 
a significant role in driving up energy prices and climate costs in Europe“ (Cembu-
reau, 2013). This view was strongly supported by some powerful domestic industry 
associations such as the BDI (Federation of German Industry) that raised questions of 
the competitiveness of European business. The BDI worried that the cost of Ener-
giewende (energy revolution in Germany) would inevitably push electricity prices 
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much higher in coming years (Bryant, 2013). Subsidies and other taxes already repre-
sent about 50 per cent of the cost of industrial electricity bills in Germany (Bryant, 
2013), and some of the largest industrial corporations thus highlighted potential nega-
tive consequences of growing disparities between energy prices in the US and Eu-
rope. The CEO of Bayern Schwager argued that “Energy costs in Europe...will con-
tinue to rise. That will have an effect on the competitiveness of several sectors” 
(Wiesmann, 2012). In reference to the EU energy policy, Schwager said “Europe’s 
politicians should be careful not to make already pricey energy even pricier by levy-
ing new taxes or surcharges” (Wiesmann, 2012). Energy intensive industries there-
fore attempted to decouple EU energy and climate integration by stressing the nega-
tive impact of this policy on economic growth and competitiveness. 
The largest European energy corporations, together with the financial rating 
agencies, attempted to deny the role of renewables in providing energy security, re-
ducing CO2 emissions and fostering European competitiveness. The CEO of one of 
the largest European utilities, Eon, called EU energy and climate policy dysfunction-
al: “...things are now just getting out of control. European power is getting dirtier. 
The CO2 content is increasing in spite of renewables. It is unaffordable, and it‘s los-
ing its security. So the alarm signs are tremendous”. Moreover, nine of Europe‘s larg-
est utilities that refer themselves as the Magritte group were united in their opposition 
and warned that EU energy and climate policy would create dire energy security 
risks. The CEO of Germany‘s RWE said: “We cannot have a renewables society 
without security of supply” (Clercq and Lewis, 2013). Furthermore, GDF Suez point-
ed out that renewable subsidies must be cut to preserve the profits of conventional 
(fossil fuel) power generators. According to Mestralett, the CEO of GDF Suez, “We 
have to reduce the speed at which Europe is building new wind farms and solar pan-
els. At the moment, it is not sustainable” (Chazan and Clark, 2013). As a result, fol-
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lowing the logic of difference, the largest European utilities aimed to dismantle the 
energy and climate nexus by stressing concerns regarding energy security. 
In the neo-Gramscian account, civil society plays an important ideational role 
in solidifying the stability of an historical bloc (Levy and Egan, 2003:806). Given the 
economic crisis and growing concerns over employment, the support of civil society 
regarding the low carbon energy future was fragmented. Certain European trade un-
ion associations tried to break down low-carbon discourses. The largest European 
trade unions representing people working in energy and energy intensive industries 
supported narratives that were promoted by European energy-intensive industry asso-
ciations. For example, discussing the post-2020 energy and climate policy frame-
work, the IndustriAll European Trade Union, representing workers from energy in-
tensive industries, urged a rebalancing of EU energy and climate integration by 
stressing the primacy of European industry and its competitiveness. IndustriAll 
(2014) acknowledged “...the need to rebalance the EU climate and energy goals with 
the competitiveness of its industry. This long-term strategy is of crucial importance to 
workers in the investment goods and energy-intensive sectors in the light of our con-
cerns about securing the necessary investment in high-performance equipment and in 
the improvement of industrial processes”. The General Secretary of IndustriAll, Ul-
rich Eckelmann, explained that climate ambitions should not disadvantage energy 
intensive companies: “Climate goals must be held in balance with the need to ensure 
that energy-intensive industries remain in Europe and are not subject to unfair compe-
tition from outside the EU” (IndustriAll, 2014). Moreover, IndustriAll Europe, to-
gether with European industry groups, stressed that climate targets should not be set 
at the expense of economic growth and job creation. For instance, in a common letter 
to the President of the EU Commission, IndustriAll and the European Chemical In-
dustry Council decoupled low carbon developments from economic growth: “...we do 
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not believe that these should or can be achieved at the expense of sustainable em-
ployment or economic growth. Proposed EU measures...are intended to increase the 
costs of doing business. They will divert resources and discourage the investments 
needed to build a resource efficient, low carbon economy” (Elliot et al, 2012). Certain 
civil society groups thus sought to decouple the economic and social benefits posited 
by low carbon discourses. 
4. The engagement of traditional intellectuals 
In this research I use the concept of organic intellectuals more broadly than 
more traditional Gramscian perspectives that often perceive them as radical activists 
rooted in certain social class. I argue that as we live in different times with a variety 
of complex and inter-connected issues, linkage to certain social class becomes irrele-
vant and limits our understanding of the role that certain individuals or groups played 
in providing a coherent framework for hegemonic change. One must be flexible in 
interpreting Gramsci and in applying his analytical concepts, including organic intel-
lectuals to the area of EU politics. I argue that the importance and relevance of the 
use of organic intellectuals stems not from their linkage to certain social or business 
group but from their ability to provide new thinking and organising elements for a 
new hegemonic bloc as well as to stimulate public’s knowledge about certain issues. 
 In the previous chapter I argued that certain organic intellectuals attempted to 
establish a coherent low carbon historical bloc. However, Gramsci also refers to tradi-
tion intellectuals who perform most of the functions of elaborating and maintaining 
the existing order. I argue that, since the beginning of the economic crisis, traditional 
intellectuals of the carbon-based world tried to break down the low carbon hegemonic 
discourse, as well as defend energy, economic, social structures that reproduce status 
quo. For instance, William Nordhaus, a well-known US economist, Dieter Helm, the 
professor at the Oxford University and Special Advisor to the European Commission-
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er for Energy, and other energy experts have all played an important role in trying to 
break up the chain of equivalences which connect the climate, security and competi-
tiveness (growth) dimensions in the low-carbon bloc’s ideology. First, some experts 
questioned the credibility of the Commission‘s energy calculations. According to 
some analysts “The credibility of a European energy review has been cast into doubt 
by experts who point out that long-term plans to cut carbon emissions are based on an 
economic model...that cannot be independently scrutinised” (Clark, 2011). In addi-
tion, Nordhaus doubted the impartiality of the Stern Review, the main document that 
the low carbon bloc relied on in justifying the economic case for immediate decar-
bonisation. Nordhaus (2008:167) explained that “...Stern Review should be read pri-
marily as a document that is political in nature and has advocacy as its purpose...”. 
Moreover, Helm attempted to deny the argument of the low carbon bloc that a “new 
industrial revolution” through immediate green energy transformation could lead to 
future prosperity. According to Helm (2012: 20, 21) “Politicians jumped on its con-
clusion. The ‘greening‘ of the economy through climate change policy has been vari-
ously claimed to be way out of recession, the path to a “new industrial revolution“, 
and capable of lowering future energy prices. Listening to the President of the Euro-
pean Commission…you could easily led to believe that the challenge of climate 
change is actually a good thing regardless of the climate, that climate mitigation will 
lead to future prosperity…Politicians tell us that the solution of the economic crisis is 
“green growth”, and that even decarbonisation will reduce energy bills by 2020…It is 
hard to take seriously – that the world‘s carbon-based economy can be decarbonised 
in a few decades without economic pain; that we will be better off. Even more sur-
prising is that apparently intelligent people actually seem to believe it” (Helm, 
2012:26). Helm thus criticised one of the key arguments of low the carbon bloc: that 
immediate decarbonisation was less costly than delay. He also questioned two other 
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dimensions of the Stern Review: the measurement of costs and discount rate of the 
analysis of costs: “...the costs are much higher than estimated, and that the political 
economy of climate-change policy is much more constraining. On this view, the easy 
compatibility between economic growth and climate change, which lies at the heart of 
the Stern Report, is an illusion” (Helm, 2008:213). Helm thus called into question the 
economic validity of the low carbon bloc’s arguments. 
Traditional intellectuals not only challenged the arguments of the low carbon 
bloc by decoupling climate change and the potential of economic development. Helm 
(2012:26) also focused on the level of uncertainty about global warming and even 
situated climate change within powerful discourses of progress: “Is a gradual increase 
in average global temperatures...a bad thing? Again the answer is far from clear-cut. 
Climate change is disruptive, but its very disruptiveness is what spurs evolution, and 
it was climate change that enabled humans to spread across the planet as the ice re-
treated. The ice is a major barrier to accessing significant raw materials – oil, gas coal 
and minerals...The opening-up of Arctic resources is gathering pace, and the local 
population is on the cusp of a revolution in its economic circumstances”. Moreover, 
the validity of the UN‘s Framework Convention on Climate Change proposal to pre-
vent climate catastrophe by limiting global warming to just 2 degrees Celsius was 
challenged. Some questioned the certainty of the target: “What would happen at 2C 
warming on average? Bearing in mind uncertainty inherent in the science and in the 
climate models, the first important thing to say is that we have a very general idea – 
and one that is fragmented at that...what at first looks like the alarmists’ Armageddon 
– and is often presented in this way – turns out to be a set of economic costs (against 
which benefits have to be weighted)” (Helm, 2012:28). Helm thus linked processes of 
climate change with possible economic benefits. 
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Intellectuals called into question the conventional argument of peak oil. Helm 
contradicted the Commission‘s argument that the promotion of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency would increase energy security: “For the peak oil advocates, the 
convenient truth is that de-carbonisation via renewables and nuclear is not only good 
for the climate, but sound economics too. Almost all of this is nonsense – and some 
of it is dangerous nonsense. There is enough oil and gas (and coal too) to fry the 
planet several times over. The problem is there may be too much fossil fuel, not too 
little, and that fossil fuel prices might be too low, not too high” (Helm, 2011a). Helm 
tried to decouple the low carbon future from investments exclusively in renewable 
energy in order to create a new common sense that the creation of a sustainable low 
carbon future necessitated a gradual transition from lower carbon to low carbon 
sources. He explained that alternative lower carbon energy investments are needed to 
make long-term decarbonisation revolution economically sustainable in the short and 
medium terms. Moreover, Helm argued that a short-term focus on gas rather than re-
newables provides a better option economically. In other words, Helm 
(2012:195,196) argued that the focus on shale gas investments would tackle Europe’s 
climate and energy security challenges without compromising short-term economic 
competitiveness and growth: “...as an immediate alternative…gas provides an oppor-
tunity for a major step reduction in emissions from business-as-usual; it can be 
achieved quickly; and what makes it particularly attractive is that it would almost be a 
lot cheaper and on a much bigger scale than the other options. It may also be reasona-
bly secure”. As a result, Helm attempted to provide a new common sense for the low 





5. The low carbon response: attempts to maintain a hegemonic order 
5.1. Transformismo and adaptation 
In order to analyse the transformation of the low carbon historical bloc, we 
must look at the role and actions of the Commission. As I argued in my theoretical 
account, the EU Commission should be considered a forward looking and growth-
oriented institution which advances long-term European interests. In other words, the 
Commission is monitoring and evaluating long-term prospects and structural tenden-
cies to ensure the long-term viability of capital in-general. Moreover, the Commission 
is not constrained by the structural power of particular capital groups because, unlike 
member states, it is not directly elected, and its legitimacy and survival does not thus 
directly depend on capital accumulation. Nevertheless, due to its historical set up, 
heavily influenced by the French view of public administration, the Commission 
sought to escape the short-term constraints of accumulation and to advance a broader 
view of economic development and growth. In the EU institutional environment there 
is always tension between the particular interests of capital, of certain EU Member 
states that depend on the structural power of business groups, and the Commission’s 
vision to ensure the long-term feasibility of European economic growth. Going back 
to the early-2000s, the Commission began to lead a low carbon “war of position” in 
order to ensure the success of the EU’s economy and businesses in a long term. The 
strength of the low carbon historical bloc reached its peak with the adoption of the 
climate and energy package in December 2008. However, a broad consensus on de-
carbonisation began to fade away as a result of the economic and financial crisis that 
began in 2007, and gained its momentum in 2010. Short-term competitiveness de-
mands were thus put high on the agenda and the idea of a new sustainable low carbon 
energy regime based on green energy investments began to lose its prominence. For 
the Commission and other players, it became increasingly difficult to legitimise the 
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movement towards a low carbon energy future. In addition, due to growing contradic-
tions, the low carbon bloc began to lose its material capabilities and institutional sup-
port. For example, its material capabilities were undermined because of a reduction in 
green investments and the increasing financial difficulties of many renewable busi-
nesses. As was argued in previous sections, institutional unity may also have been 
lost because of divergent views, not only in the Council, but also in the Commission. 
These shocks and contradictions thus threatened to fragment the low carbon consen-
sus in the EU. 
According to the neo-Gramscian account, hegemony is always unstable and 
challenged by certain players across the material, institutional and discursive do-
mains. As the contradictions between short-term accumulation and legitimation 
sharpened, the low-carbon bloc tried to strategically incorporate these new demands 
into its ideational domain. In terms of discourse, what is happening here is that the 
historical bloc is trying to respond to new challenges, to repackage energy and cli-
mate integration, and to create certain equivalences and to articulate them. In this 
context, the Commission applied passive revolution, or the reorganisation of power to 
preserve its hegemony (Cox, 1987). As I have argued, compared with national gov-
ernments the Commission does not possess financial or military powers. Neverthe-
less, despite the lack of these capabilities the Commission is still able to muster insti-
tutional support and apply discursive actions in order to neutralise hegemonic for-
mations. In other words, the Commission uses a strategy of transformismo in which it 
seeks to bring about the widest possible coalition of interests (Cox, 1987). In addi-
tion, the aim of transformismo is to assimilate and to accommodate potentially con-
flicting and dangerous ideas by adjusting and incorporating them to the policies of the 
hegemonic coalition, thereby disturbing the formation of organised opposition (Cox, 
1996). The low carbon bloc led by the Commission thus tried to absorb these poten-
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tially dangerous ideas by incorporating them into the discourse of the low carbon 
bloc.  
For instance, in the energy domain, the low carbon historical bloc wanted to 
accommodate conflicting ideas and preserve its unity. DG Climate Action, headed by 
Commissioner Hedegaard, led this policy orientation (Interview 2). Reflecting on the 
current crisis of legitimation, a high ranking policy adviser from DG Climate Action 
said: “There is an opposition towards low carbon energy policy. It does change in the 
short-term, the perspectives of what is feasible. I do think that it slowed down more 
ambitious policies in a short term” (Interview 29). It could be argued that the Com-
mission acted strategically, i.e. when support for its sustainable low-carbon energy 
regime started to crumble, it analysed the situation and adapted to changing circum-
stances. In other words, the Commission switched from more radical proposals to less 
ambitious ones, but its primary long-term objectives remained the same. An official 
from DG Energy pointed out “…we are trying to balance everyone’s perspectives and 
to incorporate various interests. I think it is the logic that the Commission has to think 
about longer-term perspective even if in a short term it may have a negative effect. If 
climate issues are not tackled it may results in much higher costs for future genera-
tions” (Interview 12). As a result, in the context of changing economic circumstances, 
the historical bloc led by the Commission attempted to reconcile different demands 
and to reproduce legitimating ideologies. 
In its communications, EU energy policy began to focus more on competi-
tiveness and growth dimensions. The Commission and other actors created a chain of 
equivalence and linked different demands together. Given the growing economic and 
social crisis and a decline in legitimacy, the primary aim was to draw an equivalence 
between demands for decarbonisation and economic growth. In other words, the low 
carbon historical bloc focused on the lack of growth and loss of competitiveness in 
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the EU in order to maintain the legitimacy of its decarbonisation policy. The low car-
bon bloc adjusted their discursive strategies and began to concentrate on the most 
pressing economic and social challenges while keeping its long-term perspective. As 
Hedegaard (2011a) pointed out “Economic growth is no obstacle to tackling climate 
change; just as reducing emissions is no obstacle to economic growth”.  Due to eco-
nomic, social and political uncertainties, the low carbon bloc thus attempted to show 
that its long-term decarbonisation policy was able to deal with emerging short-term 
economic demands. 
Responding to new pressures of short-term accumulation, the Commission 
wanted to change the perception of growth. For instance, Hedegaard (2010) stated 
that “Shifting from our present model to a low-carbon future is...a huge opportunity 
to reinvigorate our economies and accelerate our exit from the crisis. Innovations in 
low-carbon technologies such as energy efficiency, renewable energy and carbon cap-
ture and storage promises to generate new sources of economic growth and jobs and 
to strengthen our economies' energy security”. For the low carbon bloc, the economic 
crisis was a time when new legitimating frames and narratives were needed. Hede-
gaard (2011a) pointed out “We need to act NOW – now…when the crisis is inviting 
us to look into new ways of economic growth”. Moreover, in order to strengthen the 
linkage of these new demands, the Commission used a metaphorical dimension in its 
argumentative frame. For example, old metaphorical terms such as “green growth” or 
“sustainable growth” were encapsulated in the new terms “smart growth” or “intelli-
gent growth” which were used to generate new perceptions and give a new view of 
the problem, i.e. the necessity to ensure a new model of economic growth. As Hede-
gaard stressed, the emergence of new demographical and economic challenges neces-
sitated a new model of accumulation: “The 21st century must have a more intelligent 
growth model, or else it’s really difficult to see how we feed 7 billion people now and 
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9 billion people [by 2050]. Resources were cheap before, but it seems we are in for a 
period where resources become more and more expensive. Oil is coming up in price, 
so many other commodities are coming up in price. We need to deal with this” (Har-
vey, 2012). The Commission wanted to turn the idea of a sustainable low carbon en-
ergy regime into a generative metaphor that could hold decarbonisation and growth 
demands together, thus reducing the tension between emerging contradictions. In oth-
er words, conventional growth based on the use of fossil fuels was opposed in the 
name of “smart” (intelligent) accumulation.  
In order to argue for decarbonisation, wider metaphorical elements were also 
used. The historical bloc talked about “responsible capitalism” as an economic sys-
tem which integrates several socio-economic demands and emphasises the need to 
preserve a long-term perspective at the time when short-term accumulation pressures 
started to take hold. As Hedegaard (2013) stated “The market tends to look for short 
term gains. But it typically gives no value to protecting public goods like a stable 
climate or a healthy environment. That's where we need politics and politicians that 
dare to think also for the long term. This is what I call responsible capitalism. And 
right now...politicians are not interested in talking about extra pain...”. This “growth” 
discourse was framed around the necessity to go “beyond GDP”, i.e. to the percep-
tions of the way we measure economic progress. In other words, the issue was to 
move the discussion from short-term growth to long-term development. Barroso 
(2007) pointed out: “So it's time to go beyond the tools developed for the very differ-
ent world of the 1930s. It's time to go beyond GDP”. The low carbon historical bloc 
thus responded to new challenges by trying to promote a new understanding of accu-
mulation and the measurement of economic growth. 
As the accumulation-legitimation contradiction became more acute, the low 
carbon bloc addressed the issue of competitiveness. Barroso (2013) stressed compati-
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bility between competitiveness and energy and climate policy: “What underlies the 
current debt crisis…is, at its heart, a crisis of competitiveness. That is a key question 
in my view. Because obviously our policy does not operate in an economic and polit-
ical vacuum. I do not see energy and climate policy as contradictory to fostering Eu-
rope-wide competitiveness, but…as mutually reinforcing. So we will keep an eye on 
this dimension of competitiveness”. In Barroso’s statement one can clearly see evi-
dence of the logic of equivalence, an attempt to link demands for sustainable energy 
and competitiveness. This linkage was sustained by a rhetorical operation in which 
proponents of decarbonisation policy sought to transform our view of competitive-
ness. For instance, Hedegaard (2013) used metaphorical language such as “true com-
petitiveness” to link diverse demands together into a policy that publicly contested 
normal conceptions of competitiveness. “True competitiveness” was used as a meta-
phorical re-description, alluding to “untrue” or “artificial” competitiveness which is 
not sustainable in a long-term. In its strategy of transformismo, the Commission thus 
used metaphorical descriptions in order to adjust its vision of a low carbon energy 
future to the growing challenges of competitiveness. 
5.2. Discursive restructuring in the policy of transformismo 
Civil society groups were divided with regards to the low carbon energy or-
der. As was argued in the previous section, the industrial unions tried to undermine 
the legitimacy of the low carbon order. However, there were also certain civil society 
and other non-state actors which helped to promote and legitimate the ideologies of 
the sustainable historical bloc. Levy and Egan (2003:805) pointed out that “…the in-
stitutions of civil society…plays a central role in ideological reproduction, providing 
legitimacy through the assertion of moral and intellectual leadership and the projec-
tion of a particular set of interests as the general interest”. Given economic and social 
crises, civil society groups found it increasingly difficult to develop messages for 
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public campaigns and to mobilise public support for the creation of a low carbon en-
ergy future (Interview 7). Despite a loss of influence, these groups attempted to con-
tribute to the use of transformismo by helping to absorb potentially dangerous ideas.  
In order to increase the resonance of low carbon demands, green energy and 
climate groups cooperated on the ideational spectrum. Civil society organisations 
emphasised the importance of fostering green growth, jobs, and competitiveness. Dis-
cussing their discursive strategies in Brussels, the representative of one of the largest 
environmental groups pointed out: “We are trying to adapt to changing circumstanc-
es. At the moment there are virtually all economic arguments. In the immediate term 
we aim to persuade public about the economic and social benefits that low carbon 
policy could bring” (Interview 22). For example, the WWF and the European Wind 
Energy Association (EWEA) attempted to create equivalence between the issue of 
competitiveness and low carbon investments. As was argued in the WWF report, 
“The argument is often made that investment in renewable energy will increase ener-
gy costs, further compromising the EU‘s competitiveness. In fact, investment in re-
newable energy, coupled with energy savings, is a smart choice, even in difficult eco-
nomic times. The more renewable capacity there is in Europe, the less there is a need 
for increasingly expensive energy imports” (WWF, 2013b). Moreover, both the Eu-
ropean Renewable Energy Council (EREC) and Greenpeace tried to situate the decar-
bonisation dimension within a powerful discourse of crisis: “It's not just the economy 
that's in crisis. The climate crisis and the financial crisis are not two competing issues 
that need to be addressed separately by the world community. The solution to one is, 
in fact, the answer to the other” (Greenpeace and EREC, 2009). Renewable business 
associations and environmental groups used the metaphorical expression of “just 
transition”. By using such a rhetorical device, the historical bloc tried to show the 
compatibility of environmental, economic and social demands: the transition towards 
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a low carbon energy regime must encompass a complete transformation of the way 
we produce, consume and distribute energy, and at the same time maintain sound 
economic growth, generate employment and ensure competitiveness (Greenpeace and 
EREC, 2009). Furthermore, the low carbon bloc drew a line between green jobs of 
tomorrow, growth and ecological and social collapse (Greenpeace and EREC, 2009). 
The decarbonisation agenda was also supported by a coalition of progressive energy 
companies such as SSE, Eneco, Dong Energy and others. In an Open Letter to the EC 
and the Presidency of the Council, the group called on them to take next step and de-
cide a legal mandate for binding 2030 renewable, CO2 and energy efficiency targets 
(Euractiv, 2012a). It could thus be pointed out that the interests and positions of re-
newable industries and environmental organisations corresponded to the Commis-
sion’s long-term vision to create a sustainable accumulation regime fuelled by green 
low carbon energy sources.  
Civil society attempted to assimilate certain opposing ideas and counter-
arguments. For example, The “Beyond GDP” initiative was introduced in order to 
promote the inclusion of environmental and social aspects into the measurement of 
economic growth. The Organising Committee Members of this initiative were repre-
sentatives of not only EU institutions, but also civil society groups such as the WWF, 
the Club of Rome, and academia. The initiative challenges the way growth is meas-
ured. Chaired by Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz, it aims to develop new indica-
tors of economic growth which would include the environmental and social aspects of 
progress. In the neo-Gramscian tradition, this group could be regarded as organic in-
tellectuals who perform the function of developing and sustaining new ways of think-




5.3. The role of organic intellectuals 
Certain organic intellectuals tried to reconstruct the collective will of the low 
carbon bloc in the wake of economic and financial crisis. For example, Jeremy Rifkin 
challenged existing economic narratives and provided a new motivating myth in an 
attempt to overcome growing collective action problems within the low carbon bloc. 
Rifkin urged a change in the course of European economic policy. In his speech for 
the “Mission Growth Summit: Europe at the Lead of the New Industrial Revolution”, 
hosted by The European Commission, Rifkin (2012:1) urged a move from austerity 
towards a new economic narrative: “There is a growing realisation that austerity 
measures alone will be insufficient to assure the future of Europe. It is becoming in-
creasingly clear that what Europe (in economic crisis) needs, above all else, is a bold 
new economic narrative that can take it into a more equitable and sustainable future”. 
Moreover, Rifkin provided a new motivating myth based on the creation of “collabo-
rative commons”, or the creation of a new zero marginal cost economic system, 
which would replace market capitalism and where all goods and services would be 
nearly free. According to Rifkin (2014) “We are on the cusp of a promising new eco-
nomic era, with far reaching benefits for humankind. What’s required now is a global 
commitment to phase in the Internet of Things platform to facilitate the transition to a 
Zero Marginal Cost Society, if we are to create a more just, humane and ecologically 
sustainable society”. Furthermore, delivering the keynote address in an event orga-
nized by the Commission, Rifkin (2014) linked his new economic myth with the crea-
tion of a low carbon energy future: “…the bulk of the energy we use to heat our 
homes and run our appliances, power our businesses, drive our vehicles, and operate 
every party of the global economy will be generated at near zero marginal cost and be 
nearly free in the coming decades. Unlike fossil fuels and uranium for nuclear power, 
in which the commodity itself always costs something, the sun collected on rooftops 
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and the wind travelling up the side of buildings are free”. In addition, Rifkin empha-
sised that the new economic paradigm would require changes to the measurement of 
economic growth from GDP metrics towards more quality of life based indices. At 
the time of the crisis, Rifkin therefore tried to increase solidarity within the low car-
bon historical bloc by promoting a myth of the economic paradigm shift from market 
capitalism to the collaborative commons. 
Sir Nicolas Stern also tried to refute the idea that low carbon policies are not 
affordable at a time of crisis. He linked climate change and economic recovery de-
mands, arguing that green investments would lead to a post-crisis economic recovery. 
Stern (2009) explained: “How did we reflate the economy after the bust of the dot-
com? We lowered interest rates, had a big asset price bubble, and demand increased 
on the back of inflated house prices. That’s not sustainable. We need to have a refla-
tionary package, which lays the foundation for future growth. It’s the opportunity to 
go for low-carbon growth. I described, there are number of things that we have to 
overcome. One is the idea that the economic crisis takes precedence over climate cri-
sis. That is just confusion. That just misses the point about how we can put our poli-
cies on these two things together in a very constructive way”. Furthermore, Stern 
(2013) linked low carbon policies with European economic opportunities, pointing 
out that “Europe has a golden opportunity to re-ignite growth by investing in the tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy. With interest rates at low levels, relatively high un-
employment and liquidity in the private sector, governments can unleash economic 
activity through sound and credible policies that encourage investment in its energy 
infrastructure. Low-carbon growth is the only credible…growth strategy. And at the 
time of depressed economies is exactly the time to invest in the growth story of the 
future”. Moreover, in order to strengthen concerns and to call for immediate action, 
Stern used the metaphorical expression of “Russian roulette”. According to Stern 
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“Looking back, I underestimated the risks. I would have been much more strong 
about the risks of a four- or five-degree rise. Governments should now act forcefully 
to shift their economies towards less energy-intensive, more environmentally sustain-
able technologies. This is potentially so dangerous that we have to act strongly. Do 
we want to play Russian roulette with two bullets or one? These risks for many peo-
ple are existential” (Stewart and Elliot, 2013). Moreover, Stern developed a myth of a 
“golden age of innovation” in order to deal with growing collective action problems 
within the low carbon bloc. This myth focused on the attractiveness of a low-carbon 
future. As Stern (2011:12) pointed out “New industrial revolution and the transition 
to low-carbon growth constitute a very attractive path likely to bring two or three 
decades of dynamic, innovative and creative growth, and large and growing markets 
for the pioneers. When achieved, low-carbon growth will be more energy-efficient, 
more energy secure, more equitable, safer, quiter, cleaner and more bio-diverse”. As a 
result, Rifkin and Stern can be regarded as organic intellectuals who attempted to ab-
sorb counter arguments by adjusting the vision of a low carbon future to the new cir-
cumstances of the economic downturn.       
6. Case study: the promotion of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
The low carbon bloc tried to execute a strategy of transformismo. As has been 
argued, transformismo aims to co-opt different players into a wide coalition for policy 
change and to absorb certain potentially counterhegemonic arguments by making the-
se arguments consistent with the ideas of the historical bloc (Cox, 1996). The Energy 
Efficiency Directive that was adopted in 2012 could be seen as an example of this 
strategy (Euractiv, 2012b). Given accumulation tensions and concerns over competi-
tiveness, the Commission and other players in the low carbon bloc focused on the 
promotion of energy efficiency in order to reconcile its long-term low-carbon policy 
objectives with short-term economic, financial challenges. In other words, by focus-
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ing on energy efficiency, the Commission and other players in the historical bloc 
wanted to make their long-term energy and climate policy compatible with short-term 
demands of growth and competitiveness. In addition, the low carbon bloc aimed to 
expand the coalition of interests and absorb conflicting ideas that were promoted by 
the counterhegemonic bloc. Some have argued that “Getting a deal on a new legisla-
tion has become a priority for the EU as other elements of its climate policy…have 
stalled or stumbled” (Chaffin, 2012). Nevertheless, despite initial expectations, the 
efficiency directive was significantly watered down with more flexibility and exemp-
tions for certain industrial sectors. Keating (2012b) states that: “The deal will water 
down the European Commission’s proposal so significantly that it will not enable the 
EU to even get close to meeting a goal of improving energy efficiency by 20 per cent 
by 2020”. The aim of the case study is to explain how the low carbon bloc led by the 
Commission used energy efficiency in its strategy of transformismo.  
According to the post-structuralist tradition, energy efficiency discourse was 
promoted as an equivalential connector which linked the long-term sustainable ener-
gy future with short-term demands to respond to the immediate slowdown of the 
economy, and to foster growth, competitiveness and employment. As a high level EU 
official from DG Energy pointed out: “Energy efficiency really fits exactly in the 
middle of our long-term integrated energy and climate policy. Because with energy 
efficiency you increase your energy security, you reduce your CO2 emissions. And 
also knowing that the prices for unit will increase, energy efficiency is a way to keep 
a total bill down. So I think in that sense energy efficiency is really a logical priority 
in this triangle. On top of that, in the context of economic crisis and rising unem-
ployment efficiency policy also serves that objective too that it creates jobs and in-
centivises economic growth” (Interview 24). One of the immediate tasks for the low 
carbon bloc was to create an image of the problem, as energy inefficiency is often 
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perceived as intangible issue which does not have material substance. As a result, the 
generative metaphor “energy-plumber” was used in order to structure the way in 
which the problem of excessive energy use is viewed and tackled. For instance, the 
image of “energy-plumber” indicates solutions or remedies to address the issue. In a 
conventional sense, a plumber normally deals with water problems, i.e. someone who 
fixes leakages. In the case of energy efficiency, this metaphorical description could 
be viewed as an attempt to create this image and to push for immediate and necessary 
steps to increase efficiency levels, and to insulate and renovate buildings. Hedegaard 
(2011b) elucidated on the metaphor: “If you have a water leak in your house, you will 
set everything else aside until you've managed to stop the leak or made a plumber 
come urgently and fix it – within the hour. When it comes to energy, it is time to start 
thinking more like that: Europe's buildings are leaking. Money, energy and emissions 
are literally flowing out of the windows and cracks as we speak.  It is time to fix it – 
it's time to call the "energy-plumber"!”. The promotion of energy efficiency could 
therefore be seen as one of the main instruments through which the strategy of trans-
formismo was conducted. 
During difficult times for Europe, with growing economic challenges, the 
promotion of energy efficiency was situated within a wider discourse of the European 
response to economic and social crisis. For instance, Hedegaard pointed out that the 
promotion of energy efficiency could serve as the best tool for tackling the world’s 
debt and social crises: “When we want to adjust our economies and make them more 
resilient, can anyone come up with a better proposal than address energy efficiency? 
We must bring sustainable development from the margins of the economy to the 
mainstream of the global economic debate” (Lewis, 2012). As a result, the Commis-
sion’s climate directorate led the strategy of transformismo by making its integrated 
energy and climate policy adaptable to new economic challenges.       
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Given rising levels of unemployment and social problems in the EU, the pro-
motion of energy efficiency was connected to job creation. It was argued that actions 
in the spheres of building renovation, low-carbon vehicles, high-efficiency equipment 
and appliances, as well as energy performance contracting, would stimulate private 
investment, leading to the creation of jobs and increasing public revenues (Euractiv, 
2012b). Hedegaard pointed out that improving insulation standards and retrofitting 
buildings would serve not only as a vital instruments to Europe‘s climate and energy 
objectives, but also create new jobs in different sectors which were hit by the crisis. 
According to the climate commissioner “...by raising the amount of buildings that are 
renovated, we create new jobs in the construction sector, in industries that are produc-
ing energy efficient building materials and appliances, and the renewable energy sec-
tor… we could create up to 1.5 million new NET jobs in all those sectors by the end 
of this decade. And these jobs in retrofitting business, cannot easily be outsourced” 
(Hedegaard, 2011b). Moreover, the Commission attempted to link demands for ener-
gy efficiency and competitiveness, thus absorbing one of the main arguments of the 
counterhegemonic bloc. Furthermore, in its new growth strategy, Europe 2020, the 
Commission considered Resource efficient Europe as one the flagship policy areas 
which could help to boost European competitiveness (EC, 2010a). Barroso pointed 
out: “The Commission...recognises energy efficiency as a key area for Union's com-
petitiveness. Energy efficiency can help the EU companies to reduce operational 
costs and keep energy price increases under control” (Karnitschnic, 2013). Moreover, 
the European Commission has estimated that these efficiency measures will increase 
the EU‘s GDP by €34 billion by 2020 (EC, 2011a).  
The European Parliament supported a strong energy efficiency directive. 
Moreover, in 2012 the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favour of de-
manding more ambitious targets for energy efficiency. The majority of MEPs viewed 
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energy efficiency as a solution to the economic crisis. For example, Claude Turmes, 
Green MEP and rapporteur on energy efficiency, said: “The energy-efficiency di-
rective is part of the solution to the economic and social crisis. Governments were 
“missing the big picture” by not seeing the link between the economic crisis and the 
EU's energy debt. Better energy efficiency would cut the EU's annual €400 billion 
energy debt by up to €50bn a year. This money could be used to create new jobs in 
the building sector and to improve the energy competitiveness of small businesses. 
Jobs could be created in renovating building and installing energy-saving measures” 
(Taylor, 2011). The European Parliament was thus one of the leading institutions in 
energy efficiency discussions.      
Certain capital and civil society groups supported the promotion of energy ef-
ficiency led by the Commission and the Parliament. The Coalition for Energy Savings 
and The European Alliance to Save Energy, two coalitions of supporters that brought 
together businesses groups, experts, local authorities and prominent NGOs, provided 
an ideational justification for the promotion of energy efficiency. The objective of 
these broad coalitions was to put much greater emphasis on energy efficiency and 
savings in EU energy and climate policy. Tony Robson, the chairman of The Europe-
an Alliance to Save Energy linked energy efficiency with economic and social de-
mands: “At a time of economic crisis, when we need jobs and economic recovery, the 
energy efficiency…is the EU‘s untapped natural resource. If there was ever a time to 
tap into this resource, to release its potential to power a recovery and help create a 
sustainable future, then that time is most certainly upon us” (Robson, 2012). In addi-
tion, The Coalition for Energy Savings highlighted that greater energy efficiency 
could lead to a sustainable economic recovery. Stephan Scheuer, Secretary General of 
the Coalition for Energy Savings called energy efficiency “a true kick-start for a sus-
tainable economic recovery, creating non-exportable EU jobs and win-win way for 
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Europe to lead by example. Unlocking this joint political and financial effort requires 
an ambitious and robust Energy Efficiency Directive” (Scheuer, 2011). The metaphor 
of sustainable recovery was put forward to highlight the importance of ensuring that 
the economic recovery programme is conducted in such a way that it does not have a 
negative impact on future generations’ abilities to meet their own needs. In other 
words, the coalition tried to argue for a long-term perspective even in the context of 
immediate economic and social challenges. 
Organic intellectuals played an important role in the ideational strategy of 
transformismo. For instance, supporting the Commission’s energy efficiency initia-
tives, Jeremy Rifkin related the Commission’s efficiency proposals to the wider idea 
of a third industrial revolution. Rifkin pointed out that fossil fuel energies and tech-
nologies have lost much of their potential for increasing their energy efficiency: 
“Fossil fuel energies have matured and are becoming more expensive to bring to the 
market. And the technologies designed and engineered to run on these energies, like 
the internal-combustion engine and the centralized electricity grid, have exhausted 
their productivity, with little potential left to exploit” (Rifkin, 2014). In addition, 
Rifkin argued that the pursuit of a low carbon revolution would significantly increase 
aggregate energy efficiency, leading to an unprecedented increase in productivity and 
growth in the next half century (Rifkin, 2014). Moreover, the Chief Economist of the 
IEA, Fatih Birol, claimed that energy efficiency was a central policy option to recon-
cile energy and climate policy objectives. Birol (2012) explained “Not to push for the 
energy efficiency measures is another way of asking for higher emissions, higher en-
ergy import bills and higher energy insecurity. So, therefore I think it is must that we 
all have to push the energy efficiency measures throughout the energy supply chain”. 
Moreover, certain organic intellectuals helped to absorb counterhegemonic ideas that 
focused on short-term economic gains. For example, Stern underlined the importance 
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of energy efficiency as an opportunity for promoting growth and employment. Ac-
cording to Stern (2009) “We can insulate our homes and get unemployed construction 
workers into work“. Organic intellectuals therefore promoted ideological transform-
ismo by contributing to the establishment of a common sense in which energy effi-
ciency was considered as a central area to reconcile both long-term European inter-
ests and particular short-term demands.  
In the process of transformismo the low carbon bloc led by the Commission 
aimed to bring together the widest possible coalition of interests. Energy efficiency 
was also used as an instrument to try to co-opt capital groups and other state and non-
state actors into the low carbon bloc. In other words, the low carbon bloc saw an op-
portunity to attract different capital groups by depicting energy efficiency as an eco-
nomic activity which would benefit a wide range of industrial groups and energy 
companies. By using energy efficiency, the low carbon bloc gained some support 
from certain capital groups, especially from construction, insulation and its related 
manufacturing industries. However, resistance from the largest energy intensive in-
dustries and energy groups such as EDF and German was obvious. The main reason 
for this was a requirement for utilities to make energy savings equivalent to 1.5 per-
cent of their annual sales each year from 2014 to 2020 (EC, 2011b). Big energy cor-
porations would thus have to decrease the volumes of gas and coal they used for elec-
tricity generation. In other words, the implementation of this legislation would sub-
stantially reduce their profits from energy sales. Nicola Rega from Eurelectric made it 
clear: “Governments have to deliver energy savings, but want low energy prices. The 
concern is that energy companies will end up paying for everything” (Rega, 2012). 
Moreover, the largest European business association, BusinessEurope, named the 
Energy Efficiency Directive an energy cutting and therefore a growth-cutting di-
rective. According to Philippe de Buck, director-general of BusinessEurope, “The 
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current…package does not match what industry expects from our legislators. We 
need a flexible not a bureaucratic directive, and above all one which does not confuse 
energy efficiency with prescriptions on cutting energy consumption" (Euractiv, 
2012a). Furthermore, resistance was also expressed by energy intensive industries 
such as chemical, aluminium or steel manufacturers, who feared that struggling pow-
er utilities would pass on the extra costs to their industrial customers, thus forcing 
them to move abroad or to close. As Rega explained “If the energy efficiency di-
rective was passed...big industries would inevitably end up paying more” (Rega, 
2012). The largest industrial and energy corporations were therefore opposed to the 
Energy Efficiency Directive.  
DG Climate Action was able to rally support for energy efficiency within the 
Commission and lead transformismo. In general, the Commission was united in its 
policy orientation. Compared with the issues of renewables and CO2 emissions, there 
was unanimous support for the adoption of the Energy Efficiency Directive. For ex-
ample, Oettinger (2013), the EU energy commissioner, pointed out “...there is a vast 
amount of untapped potential to save energy, which would save money for individu-
als and businesses alike...action on energy demand has the most potential with imme-
diate impact for saving energy, reducing waste and maintaining our competitiveness”. 
In addition, Antonio Tajani, the EU Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, 
viewed energy efficiency as a new opportunity for European industry. Tajani (2012) 
explained that “Energy efficiency presents an agenda of opportunity for Europe. It is 
one of the only sectors today that can provide concrete solutions for the economic 
recovery and job creation by increasing the innovation and competitiveness of Euro-
pean industries. Energy efficiency can also help to...reduce the expensive energy bills 
for both businesses and EU citizens”. As a result, at this time of high economic uncer-
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tainty, the refocusing of the low carbon energy future towards energy efficiency 
helped to strengthen unity within the Commission. 
The Commission was not able to co-opt certain member states in the low car-
bon bloc (Interview 12). For example, the Commission was in close cooperation with 
Denmark, which at this time chaired the Council and was at the centre of the existing 
sustainable historical bloc. The fact that Denmark chaired the Council and collaborat-
ed closely with Commission was an important factor (Interview 12). Denmark‘s 
Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, argued (2012) that energy efficiency is a 
policy which can reconcile both short-term and long-term interests: “If Europe is to 
thrive in a new world order...You are needed to create green growth in Europe. The 
Commission estimates that their proposal for a new energy efficiency directive will 
deliver about two million new jobs. This clearly illustrates the potential of pursuing 
the green agenda”. Moreover, even Poland, a country which blocked two of the EU‘s 
long-term energy and climate strategies, expressed clear support for energy efficien-
cy. According to some energy experts: “Unlike other climate targets, power savings 
have a clear business case in Poland, for their ability to increase energy independence 
while lowering costs to industry, electricity prices…” (Euractiv, 2013). Moreover, an 
official in the Polish government admitted that, because of the structure of its econo-
my, energy efficiency is Poland’s preferred climate and energy policy tool (Euractiv, 
2013).  
Despite some support, the low carbon bloc was not able to bring about a wide 
coalition of interests in support of the Efficiency Directive. Some energy officials, 
who were directly involved in negotiations, claimed that the UK, Germany and Spain 
were against efficiency legislation (Interview 12, 3).  One could argue that the posi-
tions of these countries were constrained by the structural power of vital sectors of 
capital. In certain countries the interests of energy intensive manufacturing, large en-
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ergy corporations and “financial capital“ were prioritised because these groups were 
seen not only as the core sectors of economy, but also as sectors which would lead the 
economic recovery. For example, the position of Germany was structurally con-
strained because industrial competitiveness and a stable supply of energy were seen 
as integral parts in fuelling its economic engine. In other words, Germany feared that 
its support for the Energy Efficiency Directive, as it was proposed by the Commis-
sion, would undermine the competitive position of its industrial sector and would ag-
gravate the financial challenges faced by energy utilities, thus diminishing energy 
security. According to some experts: “...the backlash was overwhelming. BDEW, the 
powerful German energy association representing utility giants RWE, E.ON and 
EnBW, came out strongly against the Commission’s proposals; German economics 
minister Philip Rosler joined them, publicly condemning the directive just before its 
release” (Riley and Hope, 2011). 
One should also take into account structural constraints in explaining the 
UK‘s opposition. The UK government feared that, by accepting a strong efficiency 
directive, its energy industry would shy away from investments which were urgently 
needed in order to ensure stability of its energy supply and growth model. The UK‘s 
secretary for Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne, warned of possible black-
outs: “We have to stop dithering – you can have blackouts or you can have invest-
ment. Which do you want?” (Harvey, 2011b). In addition, Huhne called for a new 
"dash for gas" and promised that a new emissions performance standard would be set 
at a rate that favoured gas. As Huhne stated: “We are sending a clear signal that we 
do want new gas” (Harvey, 2011b). The UK therefore aimed to water down the di-
rective because it feared that the requirement to reduce gas volumes for power gener-
ation companies would make potential investors more reluctant to invest in the ener-
gy sector. 
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In explaining Spain‘s opposition to the Energy Efficiency Directive one 
should not neglect to note the structural power of financial capital, among other fac-
tors. Given significant fiscal challenges, Spain saw energy efficiency as an additional 
financial burden for its massively indebted energy sector. According to some analysts 
“Spain has offered no constructive proposals at all, and has supported the worst ideas 
of other Member States to weaken the Directive. It is in complete denial of the boost 
the energy efficiency directive could give to its ailing economy” (CAN Europe and 
FOE, 2012). Feeling pressure from the credit rating agencies, the Spanish government 
had to impose economic austerity to bring the country‘s public finances under con-
trol. As has been argued by some experts: “Spain...claims implementing the legisla-
tion will be too costly for its already tight austerity budget” (Euractiv, 2012d). More-
over, during the negotiations regarding energy efficiency, Spanish bond yields 
reached unsustainable levels after one of the rating agencies downgraded its rating. 
The government worried that energy efficiency would put country‘s finances under 
more strain, thereby threatening its entire financial system. As a result, Spain‘s oppo-
sition to the Energy Efficiency Directive can be explained by assessing its structural 
dependence on financial capital groups. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the neo-Gramscian account has provided several explanatory 
factors. First, compared with more mainstream theoretical perspectives, in this chap-
ter I underlined the distinct role of the EU Commission in attempting to articulate and 
promote long-term European energy policy. An important explanatory ingredient in 
Chapter 6 concerns the analytical concept of transformismo. The neo-Gramscian per-
spective provides a dynamic account of the struggle between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic groups. The concept of transformismo explains what happens when a 
hegemonic bloc is challenged. For example, when certain internal or external actions 
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or events dislodge those elements that have been the basis of partial hegemony, the 
existing bloc attempts to react by reorganising the hegemonic order, respecifying 
goals, and neutralising and channelling popular initiatives so that the counter-
hegemonic initiatives are destroyed and relations between different actors reimposed. 
In this chapter, the use of poststructuralist logics in the discursive domain revealed 
how the counterhegemonic bloc led by the Commission, in the process of transform-
ismo, tried to break up the chain of equivalences that linked climate, security and 
competitiveness (growth) demands. Due to its state-centric focus, the liberal inter-
governmentalist approach would not be able to explain the important role of the EU 
Commission and other non-state players in leading a neo-Gramscian strategy of 
transformismo. In this chapter I argued that these players were not passive followers 
of signals from member state governments, but rather themselves attempted to neu-
tralise potentially dangerous counter-hegemonic arguments and to adapt them to the 
low carbon discourse through the use of various rhetorical and discursive instruments. 
Although the supranationalists emphasise the more decisive role of the Commission 
and non-state actors, this approach does not elaborate on the question of power. As 
illustrated in this chapter, due limited material resources, the Commission often relies 
on discursive power in the process of transformismo, i.e. the Commission and other 
players attempted to neutralise opposing ideas by focusing on energy efficiency pro-
posals.  
There are aspects to the constructivist approach that resonate well with my 
own, especially the important role of ideas in the process of transformismo. Neverthe-
less, I do not treat ideas as independent elements but as reciprocally related to other 
dimensions of power, i.e. the material and institutional (organizational). Moreover, as 
I argued in the previous section, despite reciprocal relationships between all three 
dimensions of power, there might be certain autonomous events or situations which 
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do not depend on the interaction between these dimensions. In this chapter I argued 
that the Commission and other players tried to rearticulate a low carbon discourse by 
reflecting on changes in material and institutional circumstances. For example, given 
the economic and financial crisis, the historical bloc tried to put forward new argu-
ments regarding growth and competitiveness which were embedded in a discourse of 
energy efficiency. In order to understand the dynamics of discursive contestation and 
to operationalise the process of transformismo, the neo-Gramscian account is sup-
plemented by the post-structuralist political logics of equivalence and difference. The 
low carbon bloc therefore attempted to situate the promotion of energy efficiency 















In this dissertation I have argued that, since the 1990s, EU energy policy has 
been a subject to several considerable shifts in the prominence of various objectives, 
beginning with energy liberalisation in the 1990s, then shifting towards energy secu-
rity as well as climate change in the 2000s, and again liberalisation at the end of the 
2000s. In order to explain these shifts I have used a historical institutionalist perspec-
tive to portray the EU Commission as a distinctive player in the development of Eu-
ropean energy policy. I argue that the Commission can be viewed as a forward-
looking pro-growth institution that attempts to address collective action problems and 
build consensus. This broader focus is imprinted in the Commission’s historical set 
up, its organisational DNA, which was strongly influenced by Jean Monet and the 
principles of French public administration, stressing “dirigisme” and active interven-
tion in the economy. In other words, the Commission was established as a classic 
technocracy, populated with experts whose main objective was to ensure the protec-
tion of common European interests through economic planning and promoting long-
term economic growth. The Commission was established to help secure post-war 
peace through supervising and managing the broader elements of economic develop-
ment, rather than merely focusing on the growth of GDP. These objectives were seen 
as mutually reinforcing; the promotion of economic development was viewed as con-
dition for sustained post-war peace, while peace is necessary for economic develop-
ment. Moreover, the Treaty of Paris envisaged that the High Authority (the predeces-
sor to the European Commission) of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) would be responsible for the supervision of economic development, growth 
in trade, and modernisation. I therefore argue that the EU Commission was created 
with a historical mandate to ensure Europe’s forward-looking pro-growth orientation. 
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The Commission pursued its pro-growth stance across different phases of en-
ergy policy development. For example, in Chapter 2 I argued how, in order to support 
long-term economic revitalisation, the Commission addressed liberalisation and the 
creation of a common energy market as a key element in increasing Europe’s compet-
itiveness and efficiency. In Chapter 3 I explained how, given growing contradictions 
at the end of 1990s between a dependence on energy imports and long-term economic 
sustainability, some in the Commission saw nuclear power as a way to reconcile these 
issues. In the mid-2000s the Commission proposed a programme of energy and cli-
mate policy integration through low carbon measures such as increases in renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, and a reduction in CO2 emissions. As was argued in Chap-
ter 4, these objectives were included in the 2008 energy and climate package which 
was viewed by the Commission as an important element for Europe’s long-term de-
carbonisation policy. In Chapter 5 I explained how, at the end of the 2000s, as a re-
sponse to economic crisis and growing contradictions between long-term and short-
term interests, the Commission adjusted its low carbon orientation and proposed en-
ergy efficiency as an integrative solution which could address both short-term con-
cerns of economic growth and long-term issues of low carbon transition. Throughout 
these different periods the Commission has consistently adopted a long-term pro-
growth orientation regarding energy policy development. 
Due to heterogeneity and the complexity of energy policy there were disa-
greements within the Commission with regards to a long-term energy policy vision. 
Moreover, the Commission’s forward-looking orientation often clashed with the par-
ticular, often short-term, interests of member states and other non-state players. States 
are not homogenous as they have each different capital accumulation regimes, diverse 
energy mixes, as well as diverse political and economic traditions. One distinctive 
feature which differentiates the Commission from national governments is its relation 
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to capital. As I explained in Chapter 1, in contrast with member states, the Commis-
sion is able to transcend the structural constrains of capital and take a broader view in 
order to promote common European interests. In relation to capital, the difference 
between national governments and the Commission is that the Commission is not a 
directly elected institution. Vote-seeking politicians at the national level are sensitive 
to the impact of their decisions on the short-term views of voters and businesses. This 
gives businesses structural influence vis-à-vis national governments’ decision-making 
processes. For example, as I argued in Chapter 5, Poland strongly opposed the Com-
mission’s low-carbon policies as it is structurally dependent on coal industries which 
play a significant role in its economy and energy security. One can thus argue that the 
Polish government’s survival and legitimacy is structurally constrained by the coal 
industry.  
The Commission, on the other hand, is not a directly elected institution; it is 
therefore not structurally depended on continued growth and investment. Although, 
the Commission does not depend on capital for taxes or the provision of employment, 
it cooperates with progressive climate-friendly businesses in order to strengthen the 
material base of its forward-looking policies. The relationship between the Commis-
sion and capital could be defined as mutual cooperation rather than structural depend-
ence. For example, as I explained in Chapters 4 and 5, businesses often compete in 
Brussels for new investment opportunities provided by the Commission’s R/D funds, 
as the Commission seeks to the impact the investment decisions of capital in order to 
promote long-term growth and technological advancement. For instance, the Com-
mission has provided various financial support mechanisms and opened investment 
opportunities for certain businesses in the low-carbon energy area. Moreover, as I 
have argued, the Commission’s forward-looking vision is driven by its historically set 
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objectives to sustain peace in Europe and provide opportunities for economic devel-
opment.  
I argue that the Commission’s legitimacy derives from its ability, as a supra-
national institution, to take effective decisions that promote peace and economic de-
velopment in Europe, as well as its role in addressing collective action problems. In 
order to achieve these objectives the Commission takes a broad, long-term view of 
growth and investment, and seeks to ensure a more inclusive economic development. 
As the Commission does not possess significant material or financial resources, its 
legitimacy depends to a large extent on support from, and the consent that is provided 
by, civil society groups. For example, in Chapter 4 I argued that the Commission co-
operated with churches and other groups in order to promote the legitimacy of its 
low-carbon policies. As we have seen, the Commission often cooperates with, and 
tries to find a consensus among, progressive businesses, civil society groups and oth-
er state and non-state players, when this cooperation was beneficial for long-term Eu-
ropean interests. 
Another important feature of my research is the unpacking of embedded heg-
emonic struggles between different players with heterogeneous energy interests and 
ideologies in order to explicate how collective action problems in EU energy policy 
development are addressed. One criticism of historical institutionalism is that it does 
not reveal elements of endogenous change. By focusing only on external events or, in 
the parlance of historical institutionalism, historical junctures, we are missing how 
agency factors in the shaping of EU energy policy. It is hard to believe that, with the 
high number of actors involved in EU politics, agency-led actions are of no signifi-
cance. The use of neo-Gramscian analytical concepts entailed in the strategy of 
hegemonisation has helped to explicate what took place during different policy phas-
es. As I have explained, contestation at the EU energy policy level often begins with 
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exogenous events or crises that open a space for endogenous struggles between dif-
ferent players within the material, institutional (organisational) and discursive do-
mains.  
For example, at the end of the 1990s, the third oil shock created a temporary 
vulnerability in the existing energy order and thus opened a space for contestation. 
The Commission’s response during these crises or shocks was often long-term and 
pro-growth oriented. It often clashes with actors representing narrower specific inter-
ests. The neo-Gramscian account unravels the dynamics of endogenous struggle, as 
well as affording mechanisms and strategies for tracing contestation regarding energy 
policy. Moreover, the neo-Gramscian approach, through its focus on discursive ac-
tions, is useful in analysing collective action problems. For example, motivating 
myths, and powerful narratives or images, are often the mechanisms through which a 
group attempt to address these collective action problems. The neo-Gramscian per-
spective helps to explore how the opposing players of a counter-hegemonic bloc at-
tempted to dismantle the Commission’s hegemonic formations and protect their own 
particular interests. In the rest of this chapter I will provide my main theoretical and 
practical conclusions, as well as to addressing future debates regarding European en-
ergy policy. 
1. Theoretical implications 
The use of historical institutionalism has driven one of the most distinctive 
features of my research, a new way of looking at the role and interests of the EU 
Commission. I have consistently argued that the Commission is a forward-looking 
pro-growth oriented institution. In studying the role of the Commission, the liberal 
intergovernmentalists are too simplistic. Depicting the Commission only as a follow-
er of the interests of states, liberal intergovernmentalists fail to account for the rich 
empirical evidence of the Commission’s behaviour provided in this research. Alt-
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hough I accept that states play a significant role in energy policy development, this 
research has shown that the Commission is much more than a servant of the interests 
of certain states. As we have seen, the Commission was one of the leading forces of 
change during the various phases of EU energy policy developmment. For instance, 
in the early-1990s the Commission was at the forefront of policy liberalisation. In 
addition, the Commission was the leader of EU decarbonisation policy.  
The supranationalist focus on the logic of spillover, that is essentially a deter-
ministic structural pressure, underestimates the importance of the Commission’s his-
torical institutional DNA. Although I accept that one of the Commission’s roles is to 
cultivate and promote the ground for integration through its role of mediator, this ap-
proach misrepresents and underestimates the other roles and interests of this EU insti-
tution. What is missing is a recognition that, in addition to its political role in ensur-
ing European peace, the EU Commission was historically established to promote the 
broader interests of economic development for all of Europe.  
Due to uncertainty regarding the role of agency, more radical forms of con-
structivism and post-structuralism cannot explain the Commission’s attempts to pro-
vide forward-looking energy policy. They would view the struggle over the develop-
ment of EU energy policy as a purely discursive construction. In addition, the strong 
focus of certain post-structuralist accounts on the formation of national discourses 
does not allow us to reveal how the Commission pursued hegemonic ideas at the EU 
level. Moreover, some discourse-based theories of hegemony are unable to make dis-
tinctions between the levels at which hegemony operates and focus only on the articu-
lation of subject positions within a discourse. In addition, hegemony is here perceived 
as a textual matter that is cut-off from the extra-discursive world. In other words, by 
detotalising and decollectivising any sort of representation, some post-structuralist 
perspectives minimize the proactive and important role of the Commission in promot-
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ing hegemonic projects during different phases of European energy policy. Moreover, 
as this research has shown, the Commission, although with limited resources, togeth-
er with other players has consciously promoted hegemonic projects and strategies at 
the material, institutional, and discursive levels. Although the post-structuralist per-
spective could contribute to an analysis of EU energy policy by analysing the creation 
of deeper hegemonic conditions that affect the identities of the Commission and other 
players, such analyses go beyond the remits of my research. My research has rather 
sought to analyse and explain hegemonic struggles within the EU, focusing on the 
concrete hegemonic projects and practices promoted by the Commission and other 
players.  
The relevance of Commission’s historical set up is often ignored in the EU lit-
erature. We can better explain the Commission’s role and interests in the EU policy 
domain if we take into account its historical DNA. This new way of looking at the EU 
Commission could be transferred to other policy domains outside energy. As there are 
an increasing number of policy areas discussed at the EU level, with a variety of dif-
ferent players concerned, the Commission’s forward looking view helps to explain 
how certain policy initiatives emerge, why certain arguments are promoted, and how 
these arguments relate to the Commission’s initial interests. For example, studies of 
the development of telecommunication or transport policies in the EU could be better 
explained if we take into account the Commission’s path-dependent features of its 
organizational character and historical make-up. The energy, transport and telecom-
munication sectors were dominated by monopolies providing services of relatively 
low quality and extremely high costs. Since the monopolists are short-term profit 
maximisers these policy domains are seen by the Commission as the targets to protect 
common European interests by applying its long-term pro-growth orientation. Other 
theoretical accounts are thus limiting of our understanding of the Commission’s inte-
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grationist role. We must view the actions of the EU Commission in light of its histor-
ical set up in order to advance our understanding of its role and interests. 
This research has contributed to the development the neo-Gramscian theory. 
As I have argued, I have used the neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemonisation to 
unravel embedded contestation between the common European interests pursued by 
the Commission, and the particular interests of other state and non-state players. 
There are some limitations of the neo-Gramscian account which I have addressed in 
my research. First, the neo-Gramscian perspective provides only a vague definition of 
certain analytical concepts and does not always provide clear analytical mechanisms 
that are of practical use. Although the discursive domain plays an important role in 
the process of hegemonisation, the neo-Gramscian account lacks mechanisms to ex-
plain hegemonic contestations over ideational dimensions during the different phases 
of energy policy development. My research has used the post-structuralist logics of 
equivalence and difference in order to flesh out how the Commission and other play-
ers constructed their hegemonic ideas and arguments, as well as to operationalise the 
neo-Gramscian strategy of transformismo. In other words, I have applied these logics 
as descriptive framing devices to show how different players strategically couple or 
decouple different demands in hegemonic and counter-hegemonic arguments. For 
example, in Chapter 5 I argued that the low carbon bloc led by the Commission tried 
to absorb potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the discourse of decarbon-
isation. The low carbon historical bloc thus tried to accommodate conflicting ideas 
and create a chain of equivalence between different demands through the use of the 
logic of equivalence. 
In a similar way, I have analysed the institutional dimension of the neo-
Gramscian perspective by using the Rikerian logic of heresthetics. In the neo-
Gramscian tradition, explanations of the institutional or organizational dimension are 
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often limited to certain “soft” actions such as the creation of forums or the organiza-
tion of demonstrations. The use of heresthetics broadens our understanding of the 
institutional level as it allows us to explain how different players try to strategically 
manipulate the dimensionality of certain issues in order to acquire consent at the insti-
tutional level. In Chapter 3 I argued how the pro-nuclear bloc attempted to expand the 
dimensionality of the nuclear debates in order to increase institutional support for its 
Nuclear Package. For instance, the Commission linked the adoption of the Nuclear 
Package with the process of EU enlargement. The objective here was to use the issue 
of enlargement to create a unanimous and centralized EU position on nuclear safety 
and regulation. 
These improvements enrich our understanding of the neo-Gramscian account 
by making it more applicable in practice. I have provided clearer mechanisms and 
shown how the neo-Gramscian strategies of hegemony can be executed in practice. 
One of the criticisms of the neo-Gramscian approach is that it is overly theoretical 
and somewhat vague when it comes to practicality. For Gramsci, theory and practice 
are internally related as change does not automatically follow economic develop-
ments but is produced by historically situated players. Moreover, I moved from a 
merely theoretical conceptualisation of hegemony towards more a practical opera-
tionalisation of the concept. The neo-Gramscian approach, enhanced by elements of 
post-structuralism and heresthetics, could be applied as an analytical mechanism to 
reveal endogenous processes of change and to widen our understanding of the role of 
agency at the EU level. In this respect, an enhanced neo-Gramscian account provides 
the direction and methodological tools to better reveal the importance of agency fac-
tors in the struggle for EU energy policy hegemonisation.  
A key observation of my research has been the difficulty in extracting the the-
ory of hegemony at the EU level in an accurate Gramscian sense that could be de-
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fined as the manufacture of consent, or domination by consent. Due to the fact that 
the EU is a more complex and heterogeneous environment than a national state, it is 
difficult to perceive how long-lasting hegemony could be formed when there are such 
different players with conflicting interests and ideologies. One must thus be flexible 
in interpreting Gramsci and in applying his analytical concepts to the area of EU poli-
tics. At its best, what this theoretical approach can show us is the formation of “par-
tial hegemony” or a “moment of hegemonic order”. This also applies to other multi-
faceted areas of IR, including the use of the neo-Gramscian model of hegemony for 
the analysis of international regimes regarding trade, environmental and economic 
issues, as well as conflict resolution. The usefulness of the Gramscian approach on 
hegemony therefore comes not from a strict and orthodox usage, but from a more 
flexible application that describes and explains a specific ensemble of economic, in-
stitutional and discursive relations that bind players together in a hegemonic struggle. 
In other words, the explanatory power of the neo-Gramscian concepts of hegemony, 
historical bloc, war of position, transformismo, civil society, and organic intellectuals 
provide a basis for a comprehensive understanding the processes and struggles sur-
rounding the development of EU energy policy. 
2. Practical implications 
As this research has shown, the Commission has not been entirely successful 
in creating a hegemonic order in the EU energy domain. Only from the mid-2000s 
could one see the creation of partial hegemony when there was a quite remarkable 
material, institutional and discursive unanimity regarding Europe’s decarbonisation 
policy. This raises some important practical questions regarding why the Commission 
and other players were successful in creating at least a moment of hegemonic order. It 
must be clarified that I do not intend to provide any causal explanation of why he-
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gemony is (or is not) constructed, but rather elaborate on some interesting insights 
generated by my research.  
Exogenous shocks (events) create opportunities for the Commission to pro-
mote its long-term pro-growth policy orientation. In order to understand why the 
Commission was more successful in creating partial hegemony over decarbonisation 
policy in the 2000s, one must make a distinction between the organic phenomena that 
challenges the entirety of the existing order and conjunctural (economic) crises, day-
to-day politics that operates within the framework of the existing order. In contrast 
with other periods, in the mid-2000s, several significant external shocks helped the 
Commission to generate a momentum of organic crisis for its forward-looking energy 
decarbonisation policy. As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, the existing economic (en-
ergy) order based on the use of fossil fuels was not challenged in the 1990s or early 
2000s. The Commission’s long-term response was triggered by conjunctural events 
(shocks) such as decreases in competitiveness and GDP in Europe in general, as well 
as the sudden rise in oil prices. The capitalist model is historically prone to economic 
cycles and variations in energy prices, so these changes could be viewed as cyclical 
downturns. Nevertheless, the spikes in oil prices throughout the 2000s, growing envi-
ronmental disasters, the gas supply disputes and the cut off of supplies to Europe, 
were all-important factors that triggered an organic crisis and opened a space for the 
Commission to challenge the entire capital-energy relationship by promoting its low-
carbon energy order. As analysed in Chapter 4, these events caused a series of de-
bates about fundamental moral, ethical and intellectual questions regarding the sus-
tainability and viability of a fossil fuel based capitalist model of growth. One of the 
differences from the unsuccessful hegemonisation attempts of the 1990s is that, in the 
2000s, exogenous shocks led to the emergence of organic crisis, a situation of visible 
and growing disequilibrium within the system. This organic crisis could be consid-
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ered an important pre-condition for the new hegemonic formation as it trembled the 
foundations of the existing energy order. 
 A successful process of hegemonisation at the EU level requires full unanimi-
ty within the Commission. In Chapters 2 and 3 I argued that, during energy liberalisa-
tion and nuclear policy debates, there were disagreements within the Commission as 
to how to proceed with its long-term policy orientation. In the mid-2000s there was a 
strong unanimity in the Commission regarding decarbonisation policy. One could 
argue that unanimity must be created by internal hegemonic process. For instance, in 
Chapter 4 I argued that the Commission’s Secretariat General (SG) contributed to the 
creation of a common and coherent energy vision through the use of organizational 
and discursive actions within the Commission. For example, various internal events 
were organized within the Commission in order to strengthen the coordination of the 
low carbon agenda. In addition, the SG pursued actions at the discursive level in or-
der to move beyond the issue of environment and to incorporate energy security and 
competitiveness elements into a coherent narrative. As a result, in order to pursue 
successful hegemonisation at the EU level, the Commission must establish internal 
coherence and unanimity.  
Successful hegemonisation requires strong support from a variety of different 
civil society groups that can reach out to the public and contribute to the creation of 
policy discourses. In the 1990s and the early-2000s, the Commission was not able to 
acquire support from civil society groups. For example, in Chapters 2 and 3 I showed 
how the Commission’s liberalization and nuclear initiatives were harshly criticized 
and rejected by a majority of social and environmental NGOs. The success of the war 
of position towards decarbonisation in the mid-2000s thus rested on the active partic-
ipation of different civil society groups who contributed to the formation of a hege-
monic low carbon energy order by strengthening the ideological and organisational 
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dimensions of power. Strong and wide support from a variety of civil society groups 
is thus an important element for successful hegemonisation. 
Hegemonic order cannot be created without support from different organic in-
tellectuals who address collective action problems by providing certain motivating 
myths. In contrast with other energy policy periods, when the role of organic intellec-
tuals was limited to a particular area, in the mid-2000s the Commission’s decarboni-
sation agenda was supported by a range of different intellectuals. These intellectuals 
reinforced certain ideas and images regarding the need to proceed with a low carbon 
energy agenda. For example, Jeremy Rifkin promoted the myth of Third Industrial 
Revolution, a powerful narrative which contributed to the creation of unity among 
various players with regards to the low carbon future. Rifkin argued that the combina-
tion of the internet and renewable energy technologies would help to create a bal-
anced and mutually beneficial economic order. Moreover, Nicholas Stern contributed 
to economic calculations of effects of climate change. The release of the Stern Re-
view helped to promote a myth of urgent action, i.e. that the world will be much bet-
ter off if it deals with climate change sooner rather than later. In contrast with other 
periods, the myths promoted by these organic intellectuals were oriented towards a 
positive and victorious future. For instance, although accepting an increase in short-
term costs, Stern’s report argued that urgent economic transformation would lead to a 
better life for billions, from city dwellers to farmers. Furthermore, Al Gore’s movie 
“An Inconvenient Truth” helped to develop visual and mental images of the multi-
dimensional effects of global warming on drought patterns, rates of extinction, storm 
strength and the pace of the melting of polar ice sheets and sea ice. In addition, there 
were other organic intellectuals who were active in changing perceptions of the status 
quo in the fields of energy security, environment and economics. 
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It is easier to create hegemonic order at the EU level when the Commission’s 
long-term pro-growth orientation is not overshadowed by the structural power of 
business. As has been argued, on the contrary from member states, the Commission is 
able to transcend the structural constraints of capital and take a broader view in order 
to promote common European interests. Moreover, there was a lack of major progress 
in the EU energy domain in the 1990s as the structural power of business and the par-
ticular interests of certain member states went against the Commission’s attempts to 
promote a forward-looking energy order. However, in the 2000s, growing support in 
the Council for the Commission’s hegemonisation initiatives showed that, due to 
changes in the strategies of business, some member states and corporations were will-
ing to support the Commission’s decarbonisation initiatives. 
As my research has showed, the Commission is quite limited as a hegemonic 
entrepreneur and possesses low resources relative to big nation states attempting to 
create hegemony at the domestic level. The Commission’s powers are largely discur-
sive and, while it can provide some material resources, they are limited. For example, 
in the mid-2000s, the material level of neo-Gramscian hegemony was significantly 
strengthened as investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency increased 
considerably. This was not so much because of the Commission’s increased financial 
capabilities but rather because, in the midst of the economic boom, some large busi-
nesses saw renewable energy as a profitable investment opportunity. In contrast with 
earlier periods, the shifting attitudes of certain capital groups in the mid-2000s gener-
ated the material momentum for low carbon hegemony. Moreover, the Commission is 
quite restrained when it comes to action at the institutional level of hegemony as its 
proposals require the consent and approval of the Council and Parliament. Growing 
institutional support for decarbonisation in the mid-2000s can also be explained partly 
by the Commission’s actions, as some of its heresthetic strategies contributed to the 
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mobilisation of new member states, but also by the structural power of certain capital 
groups which affected the decisions of national governments. Persuasion and provid-
ing ideas that others can follow are important hegemonic tools, yet they are unlikely 
to be sufficient for creating a successful hegemony. One could argue that, in the EU 
context, idea-based leadership needs to be accompanied by action at the material and 
institutional levels to make hegemonisation a viable strategy. As a result, the Com-
mission is constrained and has relatively low resources aside from discourse and per-
suasion. 
This research provides practical insights regarding the Commission’s attempts 
to create a successful hegemonic order. These observations are by no means causal 
explanations. I have argued that partial hegemony, or a moment of hegemonic order, 
is more likely to be achieved if simultaneous external shocks open contradictions 
within an existing order, leading to an organic crisis which creates an opportunity for 
the Commission to question the existing order and promote its long-term policies. 
Moreover, unanimity must be created within the Commission before achieving suc-
cessful hegemonisation at the EU level. The Commission also needs wide support 
from different civil society groups and a variety of organic intellectuals who help to 
address collective action problems.  
3. Future Policy Debates 
What do these conclusions imply in terms of EU energy policy developments 
in the coming years? Given the Commission’s long-term orientation, what future 
challenges is it likely to face in the EU energy policy domain? While I will not be 
presenting different scenarios for future energy policy developments, I will however 
elaborate on potential areas of conflict in the coming years. 
The current economic crisis has slowed down progress towards a low carbon 
policy. As the economy recovers, energy-climate integration will remain the central 
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element of the  Commission’s long-term policy approach. Due to growing geopoliti-
cal tensions between the EU and Russia, the focus of the energy-climate duality will 
probably move towards energy security. At the discursive level, narratives will more 
likely be framed around the security of energy supply and the unpredictable and un-
sustainable reliance on Russia for energy imports. However, in following next years it 
will be difficult for the Commission to sustain energy-climate integration through the 
low carbon link, i.e. investments in renewables, energy efficiency and biofuels. First, 
the persistence of low oil and gas prices could have negative consequences for green 
energy investment. This may eventually trigger opposition from a number of member 
states which might not be willing to commit themselves to expensive green energy 
investments and would prefer to invest in cheaper gas. Europe’s largest oil and gas 
corporations might well use growing security concerns to try and refocus the narra-
tive towards the use of gas as the most secure and cost-effective route to a low-carbon 
future. There might be arguments promoting gas as an ideal partner to renewables, 
and focusing on the potential of gas to solve the issue of renewable intermittency. In 
addition, investments in shale gas development will impact Europe’s energy security 
situation. Given growing energy security concerns in Europe triggered by Russian 
military posturing, some member states might prefer to invest in shale gas at the ex-
pense of renewable energy technologies. Growing opposition in the Council could 
increase pressure for the Commission to accept a more distinct role for gas in Eu-
rope’s long-term energy vision. In addition, this could split the Commission’s long-
term energy policy orientation. For instance, energy and climate commissioners could 
have different views on the role of gas. The shift towards gas could alienate many 
civil society groups which prefer to concentrate on truly clean renewable energy. The 
prospects of developing common EU energy policy will depend on the Commission’s 
ability to frame the policy in such way that it addresses not only its long-term policy 
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orientation, but also incorporates the conflicting interests of other players. As a result, 
in the context of the growing prominence of energy security in Europe, the role of gas 
in Europe’s low carbon future could be the next major struggle between the Commis-
sion and other state and non-state players.  
In general, the next few years of progress towards a common European energy 
policy is likely to be uneven and ambiguous. The Commission will try to play an im-
portant role in promoting its long-term policy orientation. However, there will be 
growing opposition from member states and non-state players which will attempt to 
secure their particular, often short term, interests at the expense of common European 
interests. The clash between these interests will not disappear unless the Commission 
gets more powers to directly influence the energy mix choices of member states.  
Perhaps the biggest factor is uncertainty. As this research has explicitly 
shown, energy policy is prone to inconsistency and uncertainty due to the complex 
and unpredictable factors involved. In addition, a lot of what drives EU energy policy 
developments is exogenous to EU processes, for example, globalization in the case of 
market liberalization. Looking ahead, it is uncertain whether oil and gas prices will 
stay so low, what will happen during the Paris climate summit at the end of 2015, 
how fast the European economy will recover, and whether the US will open its gas 
reserves for global exports. All these and many other factors will determine the 
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